THE JAPANESE PRESS AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

1927-1933

by

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for

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Preface

Considering the indirect linkage between public opinion, as reflected in the press, and government policy, in particular in the foreign policy sphere where the government is at its most secretive, it is not surprising that very little research into their inter-relationship has been carried out. It is easy to understand, therefore, that this situation applies with regard to pre-War Japan which had a more authoritarian tradition than most Western nations. Even the Japanese press, however, had a role to play in the formation of government policy and its attitude at times did have serious implications for foreign policy and diplomacy. In this sense, the decline of the Japanese press as an Opposition force between 1927 and 1933, which is the subject of this study, is significant. It was in this period, with the Manchuria Crisis of 1931-1933 as the decisive turning point, that not only the Japanese press but also Japanese foreign policy tilted from a tendency to internationalism, as reflected, for example, in the Washington treaties of 1922, to the more xenophobic nationalism which was to lead Japan to the Sino-Japanese War and, ultimately, to Pearl Harbor.

Well before the Manchurian Crisis, it could be foreseen that Japanese foreign policy would face serious challenges. Its internationalist tendency

still remained to some extent in the form of 'Shidehara Diplomacy' or even in the supposedly more nationalistic 'Tanaka Diplomacy'. Japan's willingness to participate in the Geneva and London naval conferences of 1927 and 1930, though undoubtedly derived partly from financial necessity, suggested such remaining internationalism. Her readiness to agree, if only in principle, to China's recovery of tariff autonomy and extra-territoriality also indicated that Japan would even accept a certain amount of financial sacrifice in an endeavour to obtain some goodwill either from China or the West. It was clear, however, that the growing nationalist sentiment in China would, sooner or later, challenge any and every form of foreign encroachment and the 'special interests' in Manchuria and Mongolia which Japan had been seeking to expand and consolidate would then be in jeopardy. Japan's main problem would, therefore, be how best to protect the 'special interests'.

The Japanese press also found itself in a confused situation in the same period. The growth of education during the previous 'Taisho Democracy' period had enabled the 'non-partisan' 'commercial' newspapers of this period to boast of

circulations of hundreds of thousands or even of millions each compared with the tens of thousands claimed by their Meiji predecessors, which had been used as political forums for their proprietors cum editors. The 'popularisation' of newspapers had also led to the flourishing of various 'quality' journals which catered mainly for the equally growing liberal or left intelligentsia.[1] The phenomenal growth of the Japanese press, coupled with its traditional anti-government attitude, with the enactment of universal male suffrage in 1925, and with the subsequent consolidation of the party cabinet system, had transformed itself into a force which the government could not afford to ignore. On the other hand, such growth inevitably contained problems which were bound to surface. The excessive commercial rivalry among the press organisations had pushed the press, especially the major newspapers, to sensationalism and this was not always supported by the editorial departments, thus creating schism not only between the rival newspapers but also within a single newspaper. At the same time, the untested internationalism of the Japanese press, which pressurised the government to take a more sympathetic attitude towards China's national

aspirations but which nevertheless failed to question the validity of the government contention that Japan possessed 'special interests', was being challenged by the harsh reality of Chinese nationalism. These factors, together with the secretive handling of the China issue by the Foreign Ministry, pushed the Japanese press, if gradually, to adopt an attitude which was still anti-government but which was less conciliatory towards China than that of the government. The outbreak of the Manchuria Crisis pushed the reluctant Foreign Ministry towards guidelines drawn by the military authorities whose 'spokesman' the press had virtually become. In retrospect, the weakening and ultimate loss of the traditionally liberal and anti-government attitude of the Japanese press in the period between 1927 and 1933 was significant because it was in this period that the Japanese press had a real chance to influence the course of foreign policy to a greater degree than ever before or after, and did so, but in a regrettable direction.

It is not uncommon for students of Japanese foreign policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s to quote press opinions in order to indicate the trend of 'public opinion'. Neither in English nor in Japanese, however, is there a systematic presentation of these opinions and their causes and consequences. Takeuchi Tatsuji's War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (London, 1936), it is true, placed major emphasis on press attitudes in his study of Japanese foreign policy, but his work covered a much longer period and the fact that official documents were not available to him meant that he was unable to research into government press control. There have also been a number of studies on the methods of such press control, especially those of the 1930s, mostly by Japanese scholars. Okudaira Yasuhiro's Political Censorship in Japan from 1931 to 1945 (University of Pensylvania, 1962) and Uchikawa Yoshimi (ed.) Gendaishi Shiryō : Masumedia Tosei I & II (Materials for Modern History : Control of Mass Media I & II) (Tokyo, 1973 & 1975) provide much information on legal regulations concerning press control as well as official figures on their effectiveness but do not indicate what effects they had on the tone of press opinions or the conflict among the government departments concerning the implementation of these regulations. Some contemporary scholars have dealt with the relationship between a specific foreign policy issue and 'public opinion' as reflected in the press, with some reference to the 'guidance' provided by the government. Itō Takashi's Showa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyū (Study of Political History in the Early Showa Era) (Tokyo, 1969) is informative on the general attitude of the major newspapers towards the

London naval conference of 1930 and Stephen Pelz's London Naval Disarmament Conference (1934) and Public Opinion in Kokusaiseiji No.I (Tokyo, 1969) has also touched upon government 'guidance' on the press. In the same edition of Kokusaiseiji, Ogata Sadako dealt with the press attitude towards the Manchurian Crisis in her article entitled Gaikō to Yoron (Diplomacy and Public Opinion) whereas Kakegawa Tomiko's The Press and Public Opinion in Japan, 1931-1941 in Dorothy Borg and Okamoto Shunpei (ed.) Pearl Harbor As History (New York, 1973) focuses attention on the attitude of the Japanese press towards the U.S. in the period between the outbreak of the Manchuria Crisis and Pearl Harbor. These studies have been, however, either confined to one or two newspapers or journals whose views were not necessarily representative of 'public opinion', or have been limited in their research into the interrelationship between government press control and the press attitude. Watanabe Tōru and Inoue Kiyoshi (ed.) Taishoki no Kyūshinteki Jiyū Shugi (Radical Liberalism in the Taisho Period) (Tokyo, 1972), though confined to the economic journal, Tōyōkeizaishinpō, is the only study to have examined a journal or newspaper so thoroughly and systematically that the reader can follow the change of its attitude not only towards domestic but also towards specific diplomatic issues. The limitation of this study is that Tōyōkeizaishinpō's view is compared almost exclusively with that of the Osaka Asahi which was generally accepted as the most liberal among the major newspapers but which did not necessarily

represent the majority press opinion in the political capital, Tokyo. Moreover, because the journal escaped much of the press control imposed upon the major newspapers and other more influential journals, little of the government 'guidance' is discussed in this study which covers the first three decades of this century. It is also appropriate to mention the studies of Ono Hideo who was already an established scholar of Japanese journalism when the Manchuria Crisis broke out in 1931. His Nihon Shinbunshi (History of Japanese Newspapers) (Tokyo, 1948), Shinbun no Rekishi (History of Newspapers), (Tokyo, 1955) and Shinbun Kenkyu Gojūnen (Fifty Years' Study of Newspapers) (Tokyo, 1971) make essential reading for any student of Japanese journalism, but are too general in their content and do not examine closely the interrelationship between government press control and press opinions. This situation applies also with regard to Okamoto Kōzō (ed.) Nihon Shinbun Hyakunenshi (One Hundred Years' History of Japanese Newspapers) (Tokyo, 1961). On the other hand, some studies such as Arase Yutaka's Nihon Gunkoku Shugi to Masumedia (Japanese Militarism and Mass Media) in Shisō (Tokyo, September 1957) discuss the details of the press control excercised in the 1930s. Once again, however, the interrelationship between press control and press opinions is not examined, and there is a conspicuous absence of any kind of examination of the period which preceded the Manchuria Crisis. Thus, there still remains room for much research to be carried out on the relationship between the Japanese press and the

course of Japanese foreign policy, not just in the late 1920s and early 1930s but also in the previous and succeeding periods. This, in fact, has been one of the most neglected aspects of Japanese history.

It should be stated that the general nature and limitation of the documentation which is available has put considerable restrictions on this study. It is possible, even probable, that, at the end of the Second World War, the intelligence departments of the Imperial Army and Navy destroyed the files which contained sensitive references to the relationship between them and the press. Certainly, there are few traces of them among the remaining files, although some of the internal circulars produced by these departments which survive in the Foreign Ministry archives suggest the existence of such documents in the service Ministries at the time. A similar situation applies with regard to the available files of the Home and the Communications Ministries which were closely involved in the control of the press. This inevitably made it necessary to rely almost exclusively on the Foreign Ministry files so far as official papers are concerned.

It should be noted, however, that the Foreign Ministry files themselves are by no means complete. Not only many of the circulars produced and supplied by the service Ministries but also those compiled by the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry on 'public opinion' are missing from these files ; nor is it inconceiveable that other files which existed at the time have been 'lost' completely.

Nevertheless, despite their deficiencies, the Foreign Ministry papers have provided valuable information for this study.

Company histories of the various press organisations have also been extensively utilised. Asahi Shinbun no Kyujunen (Ninety Years of the Asahi) (Tokyo, 1969) and Asahi Shinbun Shuppankyukushi (History of the Publication Department of the Asahi) (Tokyo, 1969) are useful in tracing the development of the Asahi although they cover too long a period to be of much importance for this particular study. A similar situation applies with regard to other company histories such as Nishinihon Shinbunshashi (History of the Nishinihon) (Fukuoka, 1951) and Yomiuri Shinbun Hyakunenshi (One Hundred Years' History of the Yomiuri)(Tokyo, 1976). It should be noted that those which were written between the outbreak of the Manchuria Crisis and the end of the Second World War tend to stress their 'pro-government' attitude, as Tōnichi Nannajūnenshi (Seventy Years' History of the Tokyo Nichinichi) (Tokyo, 1941) and Dentsū Shashi (History of Dentsū) (Tokyo, 1938) certainly do. On the other hand, the post-War accounts by the same companies such as Mainichi Shinbun Hyakunenshi (One Hundred Years' History of the Mainichi)[2] (Tokyo, 1972) and Dentsū Rokujūnen (Sixty Years of Dentsū) (Tokyo, 1967) seem either to ignore the sudden change of view which took place after the summer of 1931, or to project themselves as the 'victims' of state interference in the 'freedom of the press'. Internal circulars which would have cast a better light on the

conflicts within the press organisations themselves, or those between them and the government departments, have not generally been available or traceable.

Memoirs or accounts published in journals by various journalists have also been extensively used. Once again, however, there is a distinctive difference between the pre-War and the post-War versions. Some pre-War accounts written by those who were forced to resign after the outbreak of the Manchurian Crisis sound highly critical of their former colleagues who had now become little more than 'government spokesmen'. Itō Masanori's Shinbun Seikatsu Nijūnen (Twenty Years in Newspapers) (Tokyo, 1933) and Ogawa Setsu's Shinbun Seiji Gaikō Kiji no Kiso Chishiki (Basic Knowledge Concerning Political and Diplomatic Articles in Newspapers) (Tokyo,1932) are but two examples in this category. Most of the post-War accounts by the 'government spokesmen' inevitably sound somewhat defensive as, for example, Ogata Taketora's Ichi Rōhei no Setsunaru Negai : Genron no Jiyū ga Subete de Aru (Ardent Wish of An Old Soldier : Press Freedom Is Vital) in Bungeishunjū (Tokyo, December 1952) suggests.

It may also be necessary to mention the linguistic difficulties of translating extracts from the Japanese press in the late 1920s and early 1930s. To begin with, there is the inherent vagueness in the way in which the Japanese language is used as compared with most of the European languages. Moreover, not only was pre-War Japanese very different from that of today, but many contributors took pride in their ability to write in a more elaborate and grandiose style which

was often imprecise and allusive. This may have been due to the fact that many of these writers had read literature.[3] As a result, many articles contain passages which are very difficult to put into clear and comprehensible English without some embellishment. In this thesis, I have taken the view that it would be inappropriate to modify the original and that it is proper to translate as literally as possible, even though this unfortunately results in awkward phrases and peculiarities of expressions in various places.

A brief word may also be necessary on the background of the proprietors, editors and correspondents of the Japanese newspapers and journals. The majority of the editors and correspondents had always been graduates of private educational institutions. This was partly due to the fact that the graduates of state institutions, in particular those of Tokyo Imperial University, virtually monopolised government posts. In 1882, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the noted Meiji educationist and the founder of the private Keiō University, established the prestigious newspaper, Jijishinpō to introduce the new ideas and ideologies of the West while Tokutomi Sohō, once a student at another well-known private educational institution, Dōshisha, also founded in 1887 Kokumin Shinbun in order to press for the establishment of the Imperial Diet. Even in the late 1920s and early 1930s when the major newspapers were no longer the political forums of their proprietors or editors like their Meiji predecessors, and when the character of their staff became more institutionalised and careerist through the introduction of public examinations

open to any university graduates,[4] the majority of the editors and correspondents still came from private institutions such as Waseda and Keiō. (Ogata Taketora, the chief editor of the Tokyo Asahi and a Waseda graduate was a notable example.) This explains, at least partly, why the Japanese press was in general against government policy. On the other hand, the proprietors of the metropolitan newspapers in the late 1920s and early 1930s were generally businessmen with no particular partisanship. Murayama Ryūhei of the Asahi and Motoyama Hikoichi of the Mainichi were the best examples in this category. In contrast, not a few owners of provincial newspapers were influential local politicians who either were already members of the Imperial Diet or had ambitions to be so, and they included Hamada Kunimatsu of the Mie Nichinichi and Kosaka Junzō of the Shinano Mainichi.[5]

Finally, some words may be necessary on the organisation of this study. Chapter I outlines the general situation within the press itself at the dawn of the new Showa era in December 1926, but I leave until Chapter V a discussion of how the government and the military authorities sought to control the press through censorship and other means. The subject is treated at this point because the nature of censorship changed during the early Showa period and because it is convenient to discuss, and easier to grasp, the very intricate workings of censorship by considering both the background and changes in a separate chapter. It is important to note, however, that even in the earlier period, some degree of government censorship had always existed.

Abstract

Much research has been carried out on the causes and consequences of the dramatic Manchurian crisis of 1931-1933. Many books have also been written on the history of the Japanese press with not a little attention being paid to the effect of state intervention on press freedom. A systematic analysis of press treatment of foreign policy before and during the Manchurian Incident and of the ways in which the role and character of the press changed has, however, been lacking. This thesis attempts to fill the gap by examining a number of newspapers and journals, including the most influential and those specialising in foreign affairs for the years 1927-1933, focusing on the crucial foreign policy issues of naval disarmament and the China question. The various methods of government censorship are also examined. It lends support to those who have seen the Japanese press in the period of 'Taisho Democracy' as a formidable critic of the Japanese government in foreign policy as well as domestic politics. This critical tone, based in part on liberal international attitudes, is shown to have continued down to 1930, particularly with regard to disarmament. The thesis also shows, however, that well before 1931, there was a growing tendency to emphasise sensational reporting, often of an anti-Chinese nature, for reasons of commercial rivalry. It is also argued that, largely for commercial reasons, the press tended to move away from a distinctively independent editorial position towards conformity with public opinion, and that it sought to avoid conflicts with the government, which might result in temporary bans on publication. Thus it indicates that to a considerable extent the apparently dramatic switch of role to support of nationalistic official policies in 1931 had already been foreshadowed.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I - Brief Survey of the Japanese Press

1. Newspapers, News Agencies and Radio

The history of the two giant newspaper concerns, the Asahi and the Mainichi, was virtually the history of the Japanese press in pre-War Japan. Their rise and the decline of their rivals began roughly in the 1890s when the newspapers started shifting their main emphasis from discussion to reporting and finally to entertainment.[1]

The two Osaka newspapers, the Asahi and the Mainichi, had at least two advantages over their Tokyo rivals to exploit and develop the new situation. Firstly their early growth away from the political centre had left them with much less sense of responsibility of the press in the conventional sense. Unlike the 'great newspapers' (dai shinbun) in Tokyo, which had been established by their founders as the political forum, the Asahi started in 1879 as a 'minor newspaper' (sho shinbun), whose main function was to provide reports on social rather than political aspects of the local residents and which did not usually carry any lead article. Indeed, the Asahi published its first leader only in 1893, when the controversy over the 'unequal' treaties between Japan and the Powers was at its height. The Mainichi, whose origin dates back to 1872, catered primarily for the business circles of the commercial capital of Japan and as such placed much emphasis on the economic rather than political aspects of the country as a whole.[2]

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, they had a much stronger financial background than their rivals. They had already established themselves as the most influential and popular newspapers in Osaka when one of the 'great newspapers' in Tokyo, Jijishinpō, started publishing its sister newspaper, Osaka Jijisjinpō, in 1898. The outbreak of the

Russo-Japanese War in 1904 led the Asahi and the Mainichi to form a cartel called Teikauri Sokkokai (the Association for Immediate Execution of Sale at a Fixed Price) which quickly forced their weaker rivals in the city either to close down or to switch over to evening newspapers, thus achieving a near monopoly between them by the end of the War.[3]

Their advance to Tokyo began when the Asahi acquired the control of a 'minor newspaper', Mezamashi Shinbun, in 1888. This newspaper was subsequently published under the name of the Tokyo Asahi and the original Asahi was renamed as the Osaka Asahi. The Mainichi on its part made a somewhat tentative advance to Tokyo in 1906, but it was not until after its acquisition of the erstwhile most prestigious Tokyo Nichinichi in 1911 that the Mainichi changed its name to the Osaka Mainichi. Indeed, it was then, according to Shimizu Ikutaro, that the course which the Japanese press was to follow in the next three decades was finally decided.[4]

While the advance of the two Osaka newspapers to Tokyo was in progress, such important events as the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) aroused greater public interest in reports from overseas. In 1897, the Osaka Mainichi (then the Mainichi) decided to send their own staff members as the permanent correspondents to London and New York in its attempt to overtake the more reputed Osaka Asahi. The Osaka Asahi in turn not only signed an exclusive contract with Reuters of Britain later that year, but also followed the example of its Osaka rival for the improved overseas news supply. However, the main purpose of these movements by the Osaka Asahi was not to compete with the Osaka Mainichi but to catch up with, and eventually to overtake, the hitherto most respected newspaper in international

affairs, Jijishinpo of Tokyo.[5] This was an important development in a country, where there was no news agency which could afford to send its correspondents overseas. There was not even a Japanese news agency at the time which could act as the dominant mediator between the foreign news agencies and the domestic newspapers. Indeed, by 1918, Tokyo had come to claim more officially registered news agencies than any other capital city in the world.[6]

The outbreak of the First World War not only consolidated the shift of emphasis from the leader to reports but also helped the Asahi and the Mainichi groups to further their quest for supremacy, thanks largely to their superior overseas news supply network. Mitarai Tatsuo, the well-known Asahi columnist, writing in 1961, observed:

> War never fails to promote the circulation of newspapers. This war was regarded as the 'once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to this end. Everyone wanted to get the war reports, wished to peep into the real situation behind diplomatic wars .... People's demand for the newspapers could only be summarised in the cry, 'I want to get the news and facts as soon as possible'. Thus the newspapers were forced into an era in which reporting was supreme, with the inevitable consequence of the decline of the Tokyo-based 'leader' (bokutaku) newspapers.[7]

The Armistice in 1918 had a significant impact on the news supply system world wide. Internationally, the 'Big Three', i.e. Reuters, Havas of France and the Associated Press (hereinafter AP) of the U.S., subsequently divided the world outside the U.S.S.R. into their 'spheres of influence'; Havas for France and her territories, AP for the U.S. and its territories and Reuters for more or less the rest of the world. In addition, there was an independent American news agency, the United Press (hereinafter UP) whose reputation had been somewhat less than the 'Big Three', but whose monopolistic coverage of the Russian Revolution

of 1917 had come to place it virtually equal to its three main rivals in its stature.[8] Within Japan, the importance of international reports rapidly decreased. This in turn forced most of the smaller Japanese news agencies either to close down or merge in order to survive and by the end of 1926, only two news agencies of any significance in overseas news supply were still in existence. They were Shinbun Rengōsha and and Nihon Denpō Tsūshinsha (hereinafter Rengō and Dentsū respectively).

Dentsū was established as an independent commercial organisation in 1901 and had been the sole recipient in Japan of reports from UP since July 1907. Rengō, on the other hand, was started in April 1926 and was modelled after AP with an equal share owned by each of the eight original shareholders, i.e. the Asahi of Tokyo and Osaka, the Tokyo Nichinichi, the Osaka Mainichi and four other major Tokyo newspapers. At first Rengō was a non-profit making body like AP and its main aim was to avoid excessive and unnecessary competition between the eight founder members. In addition, Rengō enjoyed the subsidy from the Foreign Ministry which hoped that it would grow into a powerful news agency comparable to the 'Big Three'.[9] Neither of these two news agencies, however, had the financial base to send out its own staff correspondents overseas other than to China. As such, each agency remained a passive recipient of its senior partners; UP for Dentsū and Reuters, AP and Havas for Rengō.[10]

This did not mean that the Asahi and the Mainichi groups had come to rely mainly on these two news agencies for overseas news supply. Indeed, despite the fact that they owned half the shares of the cooperative news agency, Rengō, their rivalry against each other and against their Tokyo rivals prevented them from giving serious consideration to changing the situation until the cost of keeping their own staff

correspondents forced them to do so, in favour of the uniformed news supply through the newly established semi-governmental news agency, Dōmei Tsūshinsha (hereinafter Dōmei), in 1936.[11]

While the commercial expansion of the Asahi and the Mainichi groups through the better coverage of overseas events was still possible even after the Armistice, it was the Great Tokyo Earthquake in 1923 that gave them a decisive opportunity to overtake their Tokyo rivals, at least in circulation. In the immediate aftermath of the catastrophic event, the Osaka Asahi and the Osaka Mainichi and their sister newspapers in Tokyo fully exploited the difficulties of their rivals, which culminated in the application of a new 'cartel' formed between them in December 1925.

The method employed was identical to one used in Osaka during the Russo-Japanese War two decades earlier. Unlike in Osake where there had been no existing 'cartel' agreement, however, Tokyo already had Goshakai (the Five Companies' Club) which controlled the price of each copy produced by its member companies, i.e. the Tokyo Asahi, the Tokyo Nichinichi, Jijishinpō, Kokumin Shinbun and Hōchi Shinbun, and other agreements concerning the distribution of the newspapers which were designed to avoid an excessive sales competition among them. In order to take full advantage of the aftermath of the Earthquake, the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo Nichinichi needed to break up Goshakai which had by now become an obstacle for their commercial expansion. This they did with the backing of more than one hundred of the biggest distributors of newspapers in Tokyo.[12] By the end of 1926 they had established themselves as the unchallenged giants with

their advertised circulation of one million each.[13] From now on, the sales war in Tokyo entered a new phase where the main interest was focused on the competition between the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo Nichinichi rather than between these two on the one hand and the other three on the other.

The commercial success of the Asahi and the Mainichi groups in Tokyo and Osaka did not necessarily permeate to the provinces at the same pace. Indeed, there remained, right up to the Second World War, some 'pockets' where they failed to penetrate. One of the reasons for this failure was that their 'provincial editions', despite a full page of local news for 'appeasement', did not satisfy the proud local readers who felt that their interests were not fully represented in the metropolitan newspapers. Secondly, the special 'provincial editions' were normally poorer in their content as well as appearance owing largely to the necessity of their earlier printing for shipment. Finally and perhaps most importantly, one or two local newspapers had already established their dominance well before the introduction of modern transport made it physically possible for the metropolitan newspapers to reach these rather remote areas.[14]

These provincial newspapers often kept their political identities well after the 'commercial' newspapers of Tokyo and Osaka had embarked on their expansion under such self-acclamatory phrases as 'impartial and selfless' (the Asahi) and 'non-aligned and non-partisan' (the Mainichi). Itō Masanori, the former editor of Jijishinpō, observed:

> Among the influential provincial newspapers, there are those which are associated with the political parties. If there are only two influential

> newspapers in one provincial city, the one with a stronger partisanship may well be more profitable, contrary to the popular belief.[15]

Perhaps none were better suited to this description than the Fukuoka Nichinichi. This newspaper was first published as a Seiyūkai newspaper financed by subscription in 1891. It has been alleged, however, that this newspaper had established an independent editorial position during th era of 'Taisho Democracy'.[16] Nevertheless, the official view in 1927 was that it was still a Seiyūkai newspaper while its rival, the Kyūshū Nippō, was classified as a 'Minseitō newspaper', because of its editor, Nakano Seigō, who was a Minseitō Diet member. Whereas the Kyūshū Nippō was credited with a fairly small circulation, the Fukuoka Nichinichi enjoyed a readership not much smaller than one of the five major Tokyo newspapers, Kokumin Shinbun, with its distribution extending not only to Tokyo and Osaka but to Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria.[17]

Most of the provincial newspapers, including the Fukuoka Nichinichi, depended more on the independent news agency, Dentsū, for overseas news supply than Rengō which was owned - and therefore preferred - by their metropolitan rivals.[18] The Fukuoka Nichinichi was in fact a major shareholder of Dentsū and it was no surprise, therefore, that in 1936, this newspaper and nine of the most influential provincial newspapers opposed most vehemently in the name of 'freedom of press' the forced merger of the communication department of Dentsū and its arch rival, Rengō. They claimed then that the establishment of Dōmei as a result of the proposed merger would only help the Asahi and the Mainichi groups to expand in their areas because of the subsequent unification of the reports.[19]

While the sales competition between the newspapers intensified towards the end of the Taisho era, there appeared another factor which looked set to add more fuel to this trend. Radio broadcasting was first introduced in Japan on 22 March 1925 under the direction of the Communications Ministry. As had been predicted, the speedy reporting of daily events in its 'flash news' programmes 'made the morning edition of the newspapers look like nothing more than their remnants'.[20] The popularity of this novel form of communication was such that following the creation of its 'Radio Programmes' column later in 1925, the circulation of the Yomiuri, the small evening newspaper, immediately increased from 40,000 to 70,000.[21] Nor was this phenomenon likely to be confined to the metropolitan areas where the major newspapers distributed free extra editions (gōgai) to compete with the radio.[22] Indeed, if anywhere, it was in the provinces that the radio was set to gain greater popularity thanks to its speedy reporting.

2. Periodicals

Not all 'public opinion' was represented in the newspapers. Just as there was some room left for smaller newspapers to flourish in remote areas, so there was for periodicals in Tokyo. The development of the more 'serious' periodicals, such as Kaizō and Chūōkōron, was very closely related to that of the metropolitan newspapers.

In pre-War Japan, periodicals used to be classified into several clear-cut categories. Among them were sōgōzasshi (omnibus journals), and gakujutsu zasshi (scholarly journals).

Sōgōzasshi were generally regarded as a uniquely Japanese feature. They, like popular journals, dealt virtually with all the

subjects which were separately taken up by other more specialised journals with more or less equal emphasis on each theme.[23] Their respective readers belonged to very different social strata, however. Popular journals such as Kingu catered for a much greater readership with their sensationalism and often the inclination to the Right whereas sōgōzasshi, especially Kaizō ('Reconstruction') and Chūōkōron (the Central Review) were proud of their 'high class' readership although it inevitably entailed a smaller circulation.[26]

Sōgōzasshi were also an attempt to put the various topics dealt with by the daily newspapers into a better perspective and analysis through their longer publication period - normally a month. This strategy worked largely because the Japanese newspapers seemed to lie between the quality newspapers and the popular newspapers in the Western sense. This tendency had developed in proportion to the 'commercialisation' of the newspapers under the mask of 'neutrality'.[25] The constant propagation of ruling conservative party policy of the time by these 'neutral' newspapers may have contributed to the steady demand for sōgōzasshi which tended to be Left-inclined, especially after the First World War when Kaizō was born more or less as a direct product of 'Taisho Democracy'.

Kaizō was first published in April 1919. Its chief rival, Chūōkōron, which was established in 1887 had already overtaken in its influence the erstwhile most prestigious 'bourgeois' liberalist journal Taiyō (the Sun). The emergence of the more acute social problems during and in the aftermath of the war had begun to push Chūōkōron further towards the Left when, as a result of the most famous direct state

intervention in press freedom in Taisho during the Rice Riot of 1918, the two well-known columnists of the Osaka Asahi, Hasegawa Nyozekan and Kushida Tamizō, were forced to resign.[26] It was significant because the opinion of the Osaka Asahi had by then come to be regarded more highly than that of the Tokyo press.[27] These two columnists joined their friends, Ōyama Ikuo of Waseda University and Yoshino Sakuzō of Tokyo Imperial University, both considered the 'Fathers of the Taisho Democracy', as well as the 'Marxist' scholar, Kawakami Hajime of Kyoto Imperial University, to become regular contributors of sōgōzasshi. This not only provided the much needed impetus to this genre in this transitional period but enabled the journals to enjoy a much greater prestige than any comparable category in post-War Japan.

The two giant newspaper concerns attempted to answer the challenge from sōgōzasshi with their publication of weekly journals in 1922. Encouraged by the success of the economic weekly, Tōyōkeizaishinpō,[28] Shūkan Asahi (the Asahi Weekly) and Sandē Mainichi (the Sunday Mainichi) were intended to 'put together the fragmented reports published in haste at the outbreak of events in the daily newspapers' and to 'correct the wrong reports as well as to describe the events systematically'.[29] In spite of their relatively large circulations, however, they remained in the shadow of their 'parent' newspapers and never really came to be regarded as a rival force to Chūōkōron or Kaizō.[30]

There was also competition from other sōgōzasshi, but Kaihō ('Liberation') which had shown ⁂ promise in the early 20s failed to become a 'great' sōgōzasshi.[31] Bungeishunjū (the Literary Chronicle) which was registered as sōgōzasshi remained, despite its larger circulation, essentially a 'literary' journal while Nipponhyōron (the

Japanese Review) came into existence only in 1935. Others were negligible in their influence compared to the two most respected journals.[32]

More individualistic journals such as Warera ('We') and Shakai Mondai Kenkyū (the Study of Social Problems) were, though not necessarily small in circulation, confined to the devotees of the personal character of ideology of the editor himself. Among the women's journals, Fujinkōron ('Women's Review') was the only journal of any significance, but it was published by the company which also published Chūōkōron. Besides, its preoccupation was with the role of women in society rather than politics in general, not to mention foreign policy. Some 'Left' journals such as Senki ('Banner') and Rōdō Tsūshin ('Workers' Correspondence') also enjoyed respectable circulations in the early '20s. As the Peace Preservation Law was enforced in return for the universal male suffrage in 1925, however, these journals were subjected to frequent sale-bans for their 'anti-war' views, especially after the Mudken incident in 1931, and found it difficult to reach the reader.[33]

'Scholarly journals' were also available on the market, but the majority of their contributors, especially those of the well established journals such as Kokusaihōgaikōzasshi ('Journal For International Law and Diplomacy'), was the same as that of sōgōzasshi and diplomatic journals.[36] The reader could also subscribe to some of the university newspapers. Even the most influential Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun of Tokyo Imperial University, however, only became the place for discussion to any significant degree after the Mukden incident, not to mention the conspicuous absence of any lead article. Moreover, its contributors

were confined to the professors of the university whose opinions were often being heard through sōgōzasshi which adapted kashizashiki henshu (literally the 'room-letting editing').

This editorial method was, according to Ikeshima Shinpei, to pick out an author whose opinion was known to be 'generally in line with that of the editor', and to ask him to write on a title selected by the editor himself.[35] This was, by no means, however, to exclude opinions contrary to the editor's. Indeed, in spite of their proclamation to be the 'leading advocate of progressive thoughts' by the two sōgōzasshi,[36] at least Chūōkōron was willing to welcome contributions from the Right as well as the Left as its editor wrote in 1929:

> We hereby declare that Chūōkōron does not belong to the Right or the Left and that it will not be mean in providing the freest opporunities for both parties to express their sincere thoughts and ideas, although we shall be taking the utmost caution lest one party make ill use of the journal for its own propaganda. 37

Chūōkōron's declaration was echoed in the 'non-alignment with the government or the political parties' claimed by the most influential diplomatic journal at the time, Gaikōjihō (le Journal Diplomatique).[38] This journal was first started by a private publisher in February 1898 and continued to voice its 'non-alignment' policy at least until the spring of 1931.[39] In contrast, another diplomatic journal, Kokusaichi-shiki (the International Understanding), was a monthly publication of the League of Nations Association in Japan. As such it was 'aligned' from its start in March 1921 and its chief goal was to promote a better understanding of the League of Nations among the Japanese people.[40]

Neither of these journals seems to have matched sōgōzasshi

in circulation largely owing to their specialist nature.[41] On the other hand, they played an important role in the discussion of foreign policy and diplomacy by providing a place for those whose opinions were not represented in sōgōzasshi either because their views were too 'conservative', or 'moderate' or 'reactionary' or because sōgōzasshi were too limited in space, owing to the shortage of pages. It is also significant that some of the contributors of these diplomatic journals were as critical as, if not more so, than those of sōgōzasshi, but that they escaped the degree of censorship applied to sōgōzasshi.[42]

Another journal of some signficance at the time was Tōyōkeizai-shinpō (the Oriental Economist). It was undoubtedly the most prestigious economic journal in pre-War Japan and its 'uniquely systematic and consistent' attitude provided the 'most radical and militant liberalist argument' not only in this particular category but among the Japanese press as a whole.[43]

The journal was started immediately after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 by Machida Chūji whose aim was to make it the regional equivalent of the prestigious Economist of London.[44] Unlike other economic journals such as Jitsugyō no Nihon (Business Japan) which were filled with rather flimsy 'rags to riches' stories, its reports were more analytical and its editorial discussions, like the Economist's, covered not only the economic aspects of the country but politics of all kinds.

Its prolonged criticism of the government derived partly from its 'liberal' founder and its nature as an economic journal with a relatively small circulation.[45] More important, however, was the unique 'co-ownership' of the company among its employees.[46] In addition, the

essentially 'closed-shop' editorial method which, unlike the 'room-letting' policy of sōgōzasshi and diplomatic journals, results in far fewer external contributions illustrated its editorial policy more clearly than any other journal.[47]

3. Some Internal Developments

The third decade of this century in Japan coincided with the intensification of sales war between the newspapers, between sōgōzasshi and even between these two widely different press institutions. Especially acute was the dilemma which faced the newspapers of how not to alienate the better educated readers while at the same time expanding further in an age when the improvement in the content of the leader was unlikely to increase the circulation. A later recollection about the Tokyo Asahi, by now the most prestigious newspaper in Japan, describes this situation:

> Towards the end of Taisho and early Showa ..., the Tokyo Asahi which enjoyed a big readership was, among others, obliged to popularise its reports and to make them more interesting to read. It had to grasp the essence of the important political, diplomatic, economic and other issues and to edit them efficiently in order to satisfy the intellectual class while explaining and discussing them for the ordinary readers to understand easily. 48

Various attempts were made to this end. Shortening of the leader, the introduction of the tanpyō ('short review') column in the evening edition and even the emergence of the evening edition itself were the results of such 'popularisation'.[49] On the other hand, the publication of zadankai (symposia) was to reintroduce an old format used by the

journals in order to 'appease' those who used to rely mainly on the leader for the formation of their opinions.

Behind all these changes, there was an intense sales war between the newspapers which made them very vulnerable to the 'yellow journalism' imported from the U.S. and Britain. Indeed, as Hugh Byas, the Tokyo correspondent of The Times and The New York Times at the time, observed, many of the young Japanese journalists had come to regard sensationalism rather than the 'dull' accuracy as the essence of modern journalism.[50] Any attempt to 'quieten' the newspapers was, therefore, bound to fail either because of the pressure from the sales department or, more often than not, owing to the intense rivalry between the reporters themselves.[51] The effect of the often sensationalised reports on the reader was so great that Ono Hideo, the well known scholar of pre-War Japanese journalism, observed this phenomenon with certain irony:

> Ordinary people, the most important readers of the newspapers, did not participate in the discussions as they used to. On the contrary, they seem to have devoted themselves to reading reports and were trapped by them. An article written by an unknown correspondent had the same impact as a leader by Fukuchi Ōchi. 52

The 'letters to the editor' column in the Japanese newspapers also was essentially a product of the greatly intensified sales war among them. Though, as Ono suggests, there had been occasions on which letters from ordinary readers were published in the newspapers,[53] the establishment of the first regular column called Tessō (the Iron Sweeper) in the Tokyo Asahi in 1917 marked the arrival of a new era in the history of the Japanese press.

Initially, Tessō was intended to convey the opinions of the staff members of the newspaper with an emphasis on the 'high-class readers' and tended to exclude the wider range of subjects which would have interested ordinary people.[56] On the other hand, the newspaper was quick to see its potential to attract more readers who believed, rightly or otherwise, that at last there was some channel through which they could make their views known to their fellow readers and that they could participate in the formation of 'public opinion'. A Tessō 'fan' wrote on 18 February 1923:

> The column indicates the rapprochement between the newspaper and its readers. It is also popular perhaps because these letters contain fresh interests in their amateurish observations and sentences which those by professional writers do not. 55

In spite of such enthusiasm among its readers, Tessō and its equivalents in other newspapers such as Tsunobue ('Horn') of the Tokyo Nichinichi failed to develop into a place for discussion like that in a Western newspaper, especially that of The Times. One obvious reason for this was the limited size of these columns.[56] Another was the newspaper's policy of not allowing more than one letter on any topic, however important it might be. A high degree of sophistication was also required to comply with the 'humour' and 'chatty tone' to make the letter 'worthy of publication'. The Tessō editor wrote on 18 October 1924:

> It is naturally impossible for the contributors to pursue scrupulous logic and to establish a delicate argument. It is sufficient for him to provide hints and to show the trend .... The newspapers chase new events, rare things and interesting matters. It is desirable for one not to run riot in blind imitation of others but to present arguments on a new and interesting topic.[57]

Neither Tessō nor Tsunobue appeared eager to print letters on foreign policy or diplomacy in the late 1920s and early 1930s. It is unlikely that this was due to a shortage of letters on these subjects. As Table I (Appendix pp. 299-300) indicates, in the case of Tessō, an average of over two hundred letters were received each month according to its monthly statistics on which the table is based. Moreover, many of the signed letters received by Tessō had come from noted critics[58] who could not have lacked the 'sophistication' demanded by the column, although the editor claimed the chronic shortage of 'suitable' letters.[59] Indeed, as the tension between Japan and China mounted in the spring of 1931, there was an increase in the number of letters discussing the subject. Very few of them, however, were published.[60]

Finally and perhaps most importantly, the Japanese newspapers began to introduce various symposia at this juncture. Together with the individual contributions from the experts in almost every conceivable field, these symposia may well have worked against the expansion of the 'letters to the editor' columns. Ogawa Setsu, an editorial staff member of Jijishinpō at the time, observed:

> [The Japanese newspapers] present even a most shaky argument very extensively if it is written by a so-called authority. On the other hand, they do not welcome very much those contributions from anonymous and ordinary readers, however creditable they may be. 61

While some signs such as the introduction of various symposia indicated the 'periodicalisation' (zasshika) of the newspapers, there was also a trend among journals, especially sōgōzasshi, towards 'newspaperisation' (shinbunka). The inherent 'omnibus' nature of

sōgōzasshi itself inclined them towards 'newspaperisation'. As the sales war between Chūōkōron and Kaizō intensified towards the end of Taisho and early Showa, however, more obvious attempts towards this end began to appear in these journals. Each contribution was shortened and the overall number of essays and the range of topics covered increased.[62] At the same time, news columns such as the 'Recent Overseas Events' (in Chūōkōron) and the 'World Affairs' (in Kaizō) started to appear.

For all this, however, sōgōzasshi remained essentially a place for discussion. Both journals carried a short 'leader' whose comment will be referred to as the opinion of the journal. Each also had a semi-editorial column under different titles but written by such well-known critics as Ōyama Ikuo and Yoshino Sakuzō (Chūōkōron) and Yamakawa Hitoshi (Kaizō). Most of the other pages were for the 'external' contributors, with politics, economics and foreign policy discussed in such sections as Kōron ('Public Opinion') and Setsuen ('Garden of Discussions').

The situation in diplomatic journals was very similar to that in sōgōzasshi. Both Gaikōjihō and Kokusaichishiki carried a short 'leader', but Gaikōjihō also had a semi-editorial column called Jiron ('Current Review') exclusively written by its editor, Hanzawa Gyokujō.[63] Both carried various essays on diplomatic topics, but those in Kokusaichishiki were more or less confined to the works by the members of its parent body, the League of Nations Association in Japan.

Finally, the economic journal, Tōyōkeizaishinpō, carried basically three regular 'leader' columns. Shasetsu ('Leader') was

the most important and Jihyō ('Current Review') and Zaikaigaikan ('General Survey of the Financial World') also discussed issues related to foreign policy. Few external contributions in this sphere were invited, however.

4. The Japanese Press and Japanese Foreign Policy

Towards the end of the Taisho era, the Japanese press found itself in a precarious situation. It had successfully influenced the government to accept the Washington naval treaty and universal male suffrage during the Taisho period, thus encouraging the public to participate in the decision-making process of not only domestic but also foreign policy. The government on its part had come to recognise the danger of such 'public opinion' led by the press, and was determined to curb press freedom through every conceivable channel including the enforcement of the Peace Preservation Law in 1925.[64]

Not the least daunting to the press was the ever intensifying sales war among the journals themselves. In order to survive and expand commercially, the press would have to undergo various internal changes. Individual methods might differ from one journal to another. There was little doubt, however, that more space was to be devoted to entertainment rather than serious discussion. To educate and enlighten the public in this situation was by no means an easy task, particularly in the areas of foreign policy and diplomacy where the government attitude was at its most secretive. In an age of 'democracy', however, this situation had to change. The press, whose influence in guiding public opinion had, according to a contemporary assessment, become 'far more potent than generally credited by the foreign students of Japanese journalism', seemed set to take its traditional 'anti-government' attitude.66

CHAPTER II - In Search of 'Independent Diplomacy'

The death of the Emperor Taisho coincided with the dawn of the new year 1927. After the last few rather gloomy years which had been plagued by such catastrophes as the severe post-War depression and the Great Earthquake of Tokyo in 1923, the accession of young Hirohito to the throne seemed a spur to new hope among the people in every sphere. Even the trouble-filled Japanese diplomacy appeared to be heading for a brighter future. At least this was the picture presented by the press at large.[1]

The press had found some encouraging signs in the way Foreign Minister Shidehara was conducting his office. These symptoms were widely regarded as an indication of the long-awaited 'independent diplomacy'. Even the more nationalistic Gaikōjihō editor felt that at long last Japanese diplomacy had begun to grow out of a 'British-born parrot' or 'myna imitating the U.S.' confined to and manoeuvred within a 'cage' at Kasumigaseki. He wrote rather proudly on 15 January 1927:

> Fortunately the recent birdkeeper has started teaching our celebrated bird such new forms of art as 'economy-first diplomacy' and 'independent China diplomacy'. We should encourage him to proclaim the significance of the Showa diplomacy and to aim at the stability of the daily life of the people.[2]

What policies then had Shidehara been pursuing to receive such appraisal and what sort of reactions had the press shown to them?

1. 'Non-Intervention'

'Non-intervention' in the Chinese civil war had been the tacitly recognised official policy of Japan since the Hara Kei Seiyūkai

cabinet (1918-1921).[3] It was no surprise, therefore, that Shidehara, as Foreign Minister under the two successive Kenseikai cabinets of Katō Takaaki and Wakatsuki Reijirō, adopted it as his policy as well. This does not mean that he always succeeded in maintaining this attitude.

Shidehara's immediate predecessors had been supporting Chang Tso-lin, the head of the Mukden clique, in his quest for Peking. Not surprisingly, Shidehara's more conservative colleagues and the military authorities forced him to issue a 'warning' to both Chang and his foes in 1924 and again in 1925. Despite its claim of 'neutrality', the warning, which declared Japan's intolerance towards the spread of warfare in Manchuria where she held 'special interests', was clearly designed to rescue Chang from an imminent defeat.[4] Even so, the press accepted it as a fair, if not ideal, measure in the circumstances.[5]

Such faith in the government would have lasted had Shidehara not succumbed to pressure from his colleagues at the cabinet meeting on 15 December 1925 when the Japanese government decided to send troops to Manchuria. This sudden development was almost universally condemned by the press. As the Tokyo Asahi wrote on the following day:

> Moreover, we fear that the government's change of attitude compels us to suspect that it was the result of the change in the power balance between the army and the Foreign Ministry within the government rather than the change of the Manchurian situation .... We fear that such lack of diplomatic principle will bring a situation in which an outstation army commander controls not only the military but diplomatic authority. We recall the time of the Siberian expedition when, owing to the existence of the dual governments, we had an inevitably bitter experience. We pray for our country that the present expedition is nothing more than the replacement of the Kwantung army force and that it will not be drawn into any other controversy. 6

This 'regrettable' inconsistency on Shidehara's part[7] came under constant fire from the press which was more sympathetic towards China's national aspirations than the Foreign Minister. Indeed, it was this lack of principle, rather than, as Bamba Nobaya suggests, the increasingly conservative and nationalistic sentiment within the press, that made the hitherto 'most progressive' Tokyo Asahi print the following observation on 6 February 1926:

> Recent Japanese diplomacy, i.e. Kasumigaseki diplomacy, has undeniably been imbued with liberalism. This tendency is, if anything, to be welcomed as the conversion from conservatism to liberalism suits the new era. There remains, however, great anxiety and danger in it because the liberalism of the Foreign Minister is nothing more than a cover-up of empty content with no statesmanship or determination. We cannot help counting the government's attitude towards the recent fight between Chang Tso-lin and Kuo Sung-ling as an obvious case imbued with such liberalism of the Foreign Ministry.[8]

It was also the uneasiness towards Shidehara's change of attitude that a week later led the Tokyo Asahi to reply 'on behalf of the government' to the growing anxiety among the Chinese over the recent surge of 'special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia' arguments in Japan. Clearly offended by the 'hasty' and 'misguided' conclusion drawn by China, the editor wrote:

> If they have judged the actual state of Manchuria and Mongolia only from the current situation and have come to consider it the result of Japan's ambition for more rights, we cannot but feel that they have totally disregarded Japan's honour.... The age of militarism or imperialism has ceased to exist even in Japan since the Great War. There is no one who has any territorial ambition for China.[9]

Thus the Tokyo Asahi and the press in general at the time was, contrary to Bamba's contention, still very sympathetic towards China and this was even more clearly shown in the other issue that greatly concerned the two countries, treaty revision.

2. Revision of Unequal Treaties

The 'negative' attitude of the Japanese government towards China's aspiration for the revision of the various unequal treaties had long been the target of press criticism. The most immediate issue in this sphere that faced Shidehara in 1925 and 1926 was China's demand for greater tariff autonomy.

Having watched the powerful anti-imperialist uprising in the spring and summer of 1925 to which even Britain's gunboat diplomacy was no answer,[10] the press firmly believed that Japan's reluctance to comply with China's demand for a unified 12.5% instead of the current 5% import duty would lead to a further instability in East Asia. It was no surprise, therefore, that the somewhat cautious decision by the government[11] on 7 October on the coming Peking tariff conference between China and the Washington treaty signatories invited the following attack from the Tokyo Asahi two days later:

> We suspect that Japan's intention is to impose a maximum increase of 2.5% and to oblige China to recompense Japan with the surplus income for the debt, thus minimising her sacrifice with this negative attitude. If so, Japan who has claimed to be most sympathetic to the wishes of the Chinese people and who has constantly talked about mutual existence and prosperity between the two countries is in fact the meanest. It would be unthinkable that such an attitude on her part as to keep her eyes closed to the general trend and to pursue solely her immediate interests would contribute to the fundamental improvement in the Sino-Japanese relationship.[12]

The press was well aware that the Chinese demand would hurt Japan more than Britain and the U.S. owing to the overlapping nature of her export goods with the Chinese products. The entente cordiale between the two Asiatic nations, however, meant more to the press at this stage than any other considerations. When on 26 October, therefore, Japan unexpectedly declared her support in principle for China's tariff autonomy, the surprised but delighted press hailed this action as a welcome indication of the 'independent diplomacy' and unanimously urged the government to stick to this principle regardless of the change in the Chinese government.[13] The conference itself, however, made little progress because of the conflicting interests among the participants and the unyielding attitude of the Chinese government which subsequently fell on 30 April 1926. Three days after the indefinite closure of the conference was announced on 3 July, the disappointed Tokyo Asahi wrote with a certain pride:

> Japan's attitude has lost her all the friends except China and she is in fact isolated. It would be extremely difficult for the Powers to accept the Japanese opinion even if the conference is reopened in the future, thus making Japan's prospect gloomier. The hostility of Britain and the U.S. towards Japan's independent action is fairly strong.... Although we hope for the reopening of the conference and long for cooperation between the Powers and Japan, nevertheless we urge the Japanese government to adhere to its just attitude and principle.[14]

The 'independent diplomacy' to the Tokyo Asahi was, therefore, a diplomacy which should not exclude international cooperation but which should be able to stand up against such cooperation if and when

it was designed to hinder the recovery of China's national rights'. This concept was shared even by the more nationalistic Gaikōjihō when its editor wrote on 15 January 1927:

> The survival of a nation could not be achieved through injustice to and suppression of another nation. The Japanese nation, therefore, wishes to achieve its demands for survival through the link of economic necessity which is universal to every country, thus contributing to the mutual progress of the human race. The ideal of 'cooperation and peace of all nations' should be the essence of foreign policy.[15]

Even though, as Bamba Nobuya points out, this journal published in its New Year edition a leader which proclaimed the 'superiority' of Japan's kokutai (national polity) over other forms of government,[16] such nationalistic assertions had been a fairly common feature at least since 1920[17] and did not necessarily represent or indicate a 'striking change that was taking place' in the journal which 'had been advocating international cooperation until a few years before'.[18] Indeed, contrary to Bamba's contention, the press at large maintained its sympathy towards China and continued to encourage and support Shidehara from the more progressive point of view.

3. Shidehara's New Year Speech, 1927

Just as the Tariff conference at Peking was coming to an end, the Kuomintang government was established under Chiang Kai-shek in Kwangtung on 1 July 1926. Almost immediately, it organised the 'Northern Expedition' forces under the banner of the unification of China and the recovery of her 'national rights'. Chiang's nation-wide

appeal for the abolition of extra-territoriality and foreign settlements on 19 November kindled the nationalistic as well as xenophobic sentiment among the Kuomintang army, and the foreign settlements in various Chinese cities looked increasingly vulnerable. It was the British settlements at Hankow and Chiu-chiang in early January 1927 that received the first Chinese attacks.

In many ways it was a predictable result. Japan had earned China's friendship through her refusal of an Anglo-Japanese expedition in 1925 and her sympathetic attitude at the Tariff conference, benefitting her greatly in her China trade.[19] Only nine days before Chiang's historic speech, the Japanese government had agreed to the opening of the negotiations for the renewal of the Sino-Japanese trade treaty which came up for revision every ten years. Britain, well aware that she was fighting a losing battle against Japan, proposed on 18 December the reopening of the Tariff conference with a substantial amount of concession on her part.[20] While the Japanese government was reported to be indignant about such a unilateral action and expressed its reservations about the legal standing of the Peking government,[21] the British concession at Hankow was reoccupied by the Chinese on 4 January 1927. It was in this rather complex situation that Baron Shidehara delivered a New Year speech at the Imperial Diet on 18 January.

Basically, his speech consisted of the so-called 'Four Principles' concerning China; high regard for China's sovereignty and non-intervention in the Chinese civil war; sympathy towards China's national aspirations; mutual economic prosperity; and tolerance for the current Chinese situation. On the same platform, the Foreign Minister also proposed the

reopening of the pending Tariff conference followed by a thinly disguised warning to Russia against intervention in China.[22] Three days later, the Sino-Japanese negotiations over the bilateral trade treaty opened in Peking on an unofficial basis.[23] On the same day, Shidehara rejected the British proposal for a new joint expedition to the threatened Shanghai which had been made twenty-four hours earlier. Britain nevertheless sent a force of 23,000, which inevitably stirred up anti-British sentiment among the Chinese even further.

The press was unanimous in its support of Shidehara's rejection of the British proposal and hailed it as an indication of his 'independent diplomacy'. Underneath such praise, however, there was a fair amount of hostility towards Japan's former ally who had 'abandoned' her at the Washington conference, leaving many Japanese feeling internationally isolated. The Tokyo Asahi wrote on 1 February:

> We are not to criticise the British policy by dating back to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. We believe, however, that it is a duty for Japan to remind her long-standing friend that Britain's traditional high-handed policy towards the various nations in the East has contributed to her present misery in China.[24]

The expedition issue apart, however, Shidehara was by no means free from press criticism. Few critics doubted the desirability of the non-intervention policy described in his speech towards a 'purely' internal power struggle among the Chinese military cliques. On the other hand, most of them agreed that the ambiguity of the speech itself indicated the lack of any fundamental China policy on his part and feared that the Foreign Minister would be incapable of coping with

China if and when the non-intervention and the defence of vested Japanese interests became incompatible with each other.

Shidehara's vaguely-worded warning to Russia pleased nobody except some of the government supporters.[25] Kokusaichishiki argued that the existing Russo-Japanese detente[26] would have been enough to refrain Japan's communist neighbour from intervention in China.[27] To the ardent advocate of total non-intervention, Nakamura Yoshihisa of the Opposition Seiyūhontō, the sheer weight of Chinese history appeared to be a sufficient antidote to the sovietization of the country. Instead of issuing such a hasty warning, Nakamura contended the Foreign Ministry should be paying more attention to the movements among the Chinese youths and students, an accurate assessment of which had escaped the Japanese diplomats because of their too brief a tenure of office at one place.[28]

The 'non-committal' attitude of the Foreign Minister was also a focus of press criticism. Kamio Shigeru, an editorial writer of the Osaka Asahi, agreed with Shidehara that cooperation with Britain such as expedition to Shanghai would turn China towards Russia, thus providing an excuse for a further communist infiltration into the neighbouring country. On the other hand, Kamio argued, Japan should stop treating the Kuomintang government 'like a step-son' immediately and show her sympathy to its claim for the overthrow of the military cliques as well as the total abolition of the unequal treaties if such unfavourable development was to be avoided.[29]

Uehara Etsujirō, a well-known Opposition Seiyūkai Diet member, and an ex-diplomat , Shinobu Junpei felt some uneasiness

about the enthusiastic support among the people for Shidehara's rejection of the British proposal. The Japanese public, Shinobu argued, overjoyed with their sudden discovery of 'independent diplomacy', would have to realise that independence and cooperation did not necessarily contradict each other. Moreover, he warned in Chūōkōron, in the absence of any fundamental policy concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, Shidehara's 'co-prosperity' and 'sympathy' towards China's national aspirations would become a mere fiction. Were Shidehara's non-intervention to prevail, Uehara contended, Japan would have to make doubly sure that the Powers, including the U.S.S.R., would follow her lead.[30]

The editors of Gaikōjihō, Kaizō and Chūōkōron were equally dissatisfied with Shidehara's rather ambiguous attitude. Indeed, the disappointed Chūōkōron rather surprisingly identified itself with the Japanese proletarian parties and argued in favour of the abandonment of the 'special' status hitherto enjoyed by Japan. The Japanese proletarian parties would do, the editor promised the Kuomintang government, everything short of giving immediate recognition to help it to recover China's 'national rights'.[31]

Thus for the press, how best Japan could cope with the rapidly changing situation if and when 'non-intervention' and the defence of vested Japanese interests became incompatible with each other had become a major question. The problem was that nobody seemed to possess any clear-cut solution for this dilemma and the two unfortunate developments at Nanking and Hankow in the spring of 1927 were the first of these occasions that put the Japanese press to the test.

4. Nanking and Hankow Incidents

Having occupied the British settlements at Hankow and Chiu-chiang in early January, the Kuomintang army began to march downstream towards Nanking and Shanghai along the Yangtse. Instead of directing its efforts solely at the British, however, the soldiers attacked at random the consulates and residents of various nationalities in Nanking on 24 March with a death toll of three British, two French and one American as well as a number of other casualties. In retaliation, the British and the American gunboats bombed the occupied city. The Japanese consul at Nanking, Morioka, however, feared that such action would further provoke the Chinese soldiers and succeeded in persuading the Japanese naval units there not to resist them. As a result, there were no death casualties among the Japanese residents and the Foreign Ministry released its own account to the press on the following day.

Immediately after the incident, the Ministers of Japan, Britain, the U.S., France and Italy held a conference which agreed on three principles; the five participants would hand a note of protest to the revolutionary army demanding an apology, compensation, punishment of those responsible and future guarantees; they would attach a 'time limit' to the note; and they would hand the note to Commander-in-Chief of the revolutionary army, Chiang Kai-shek.

While the issuing of this note was held up owing to the objection of both the Japanese and the U.S. governments, a similar incident occurred in Hankow. This time, however, the Japanese marines landed in the city and clashed with the Chinese soldiers, and Shidehara was forced to agree to the issuing of the note. Nevertheless the Foreign

Minister managed to leave out the 'time limit' or any other reference to retaliatory actions.[32]

The press reaction towards these incidents was fairly restrained unlike that of the main Opposition, Seiyūkai, which embarked on a clamorous attack on Shidehara's 'weak-kneed' diplomacy on 2 April.[33] It is true that some telegrams from China with such sensational headlines as 'BRUTALITY! INDESCRIBABLE LOOTING BY THE SOUTHERN ARMY' and 'SWARMING HANKOW RIOTERS, LIKE A LIVING HELL!' seemed to fill the newspapers,[34] which, as Bamba Nobuya suggests, undoubtedly became the tool for the anti-Shidehara campaign mounted by Seiyūkai, the Army and the Navy.[35] It is too hasty, however, to conclude that the editorial policy represented in the leader had also changed. Indeed, the major newspapers on the whole supported Shidehara until Baron Tanaka took over the Foreign Ministry on 20 April.[36] The Tokyo Asahi, reminding itself of the danger of falling a prey to the 'hard-liners', wrote on 2 April:

> Apart from some voices among the population in Britain or the U.S., neither government has yet decided upon its final attitude. Any hasty declaration by our government at this stage would merely be made use of by the advocates of 'unyielding policy'. Considering the important role which our government is playing at the three Power conference in Peking, we should not lose our coolness but take the most appropriate measures.[37]

Even after the Hankow incident on 3 April, the press reluctance to lose Shidehara's 'independent' diplomacy remained strong. True, there was some criticism of his failure to take any advance measures before this second incident.[38] On the other hand, any joint action

with the other Powers was virtually ruled out by the major newspapers. The Tokyo Nichinichi stated on 7 April:

> We find it difficult to agree to a joint protest because we believe that Japan's attitude towards China needs more clarification.... Secondly, we fear that such joint protest would as a natural course lead to a joint expedition.... In short, we are saying that cooperation for the sake of cooperation is undesirable. We cannot agree to such protest unconditionally because we fear that it would open the way for this situation.[39]

The disturbance in China did not seem to have shaken the belief of the more progressive critics either. Those whose opinions were normally heard through Chūōkōron and Kaizō maintained that the policy hitherto pursued by Shidehara still represented the right attitude. To them, the temporary turbulence in China looked another excellent opportunity to extend the fraternity of the Japanese people to their neighbouring nation. In this sense, a short-sighted 'unyielding' China policy should not be adopted by the government. Yoneda Minoru, a prominent legal scholar, wrote in Chūōkōron:

> The foreign policy that has been adopted by Japan since the tariff conference at Peking the year before, i.e. sympathizing with and supporting the fair demands and aspirations of the Chinese people, is the best as a basic policy. It should not be pressed to change according to the ever-changing Chinese situation or any other temporary phenomenon.[40]

There were, however, those whose attitudes considerably stiffened after the two incidents. Journals and contributors whose opinions had been leaning more towards Seiyūkai's view, began to advocate the idea of applying two sets of different criteria in dealing with

China. They argued that it was time for Japan to grow out of the 'non-resistance' policy towards the South and suggested that she should cooperate with the other Powers in dealing with the revolutionary government. Nor was Shidehara's non-intervention in the struggle among the Northern military cliques credible to these critics any longer. On 14 April, i.e. the day before the Seiyūkai decision to impeach the Wakatsuki cabinet on this score, the Fukuoka Nichinichi contended:

> We should prevent the sovietization of Manchuria and Mongolia in order to protect our own interests as well as to maintain the order of the neighbouring Japanese territory, Korea. To this end, we may need to support Chang Tso-lin or, should he fail, we may have to rely upon ourselves. We do not need necessarily to wait for the other Powers.[41]

While such criticism was rapidly gathering momentum, the Wakatsuki cabinet fell and a new Seiyūkai government headed by Baron Tanaka Giichi was established on 20 April. This was the direct result of Wakatsuki's failure to solve the chronic financial crisis whose culmination coincided with the two unfortunate events in China. With it, the 'Shidehara Diplomacy', which not only had won great popularity as an 'independent diplomacy' but had even persuaded, if temporarily, the traditional bastion of the 'hard-line diplomacy' to call for caution in taking any kind of 'interventionist' actions in the neighbouring country, came to an end.

To the liberal critic, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, who believed it essential to send expeditions to protect the life and property of the Japanese residents, the popularity of the 'Shidehara Diplomacy' was the product of the age rather than Shidehara himself who, Kiyosawa considered,

possessed no vision of any long-term foreign policy. Another indication of this trend, according to the critic, was the prompt acceptance of the U.S. call for a second naval disarmament conference at Geneva in February 1927 without any reservations by the Opposition parties as well as the government, in contrast to a few years earlier when the Washington naval conference had caused a great furore among many of the Diet members who cried out about the arrival of a 'national crisis'. Kiyosawa wrote in Chūōkōron:

> I repeat that it was inevitable for the Japanese foreign policy to become more liberal and compromising because of Japan's economic necessity for survival. It is noteworthy that this was enforced by Mr. Shidehara who happened to become Foreign Minister when the economic difficulty following the war was becoming more profound. The 'Shidehara Diplomacy' was, in my view, merely a resourceless diplomacy created in this situation and he merely acted accordingly. It is important to note that this policy acquired the support of the people.[42]

If Kiyosawa's contention is valid, Shidehara's - i.e. Japan's - acceptance of the U.S. invitation to the 'second' naval conference was the culmination of the economic hardship borne by the people rather than that of his high diplomatic principles. To what extent was this reflected in the attitude of the press to the conference?

5. Geneva Naval Conference: Background

On 10 February 1927, President Calvin Coolidge sent a Presidential message to the Congress proposing to put a stop on the construction of auxiliary warships. At the same time, he sent out a memorandum

to the governments of the four other signatories of the Washington naval treaty, inviting them to a second naval disarmament conference at Geneva. Two days later, France refused to take part followed quickly by her neighbour, Italy, with Britain undecided. Japan, however, accepted the invitation 'with a good grace' on 19 February, which in turn encouraged Coolidge to propose a three nation conference with Britain and Japan as the other participants on 8 March. Three days later, Japan once again accepted the invitation with the same spirit. By the time the actual conference started on 20 June, Baron Tanaka of the former Opposition Seiyūkai had been acting as Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister for exactly two months. In spite of the willingness of both Shidehara and Tanaka, however, the conference failed to reach any formal agreement and was officially closed on 4 August.

In many ways such a result had been predictable. The Washington naval treaty of 1922 had put a temporary stop only to the construction of capital warships. Moreover, the ratio agreed in the treaty had satisfied no one but, perhaps, the U.S.[43] The displeased France subsequently concentrated on the construction of auxiliary vessels which in turn encouraged Italy to follow her immediate neighbour's lead out of rivalry. Alarmed at such movements by her European rivals, Britain resorted to the same course, adding fuel to the already strong fire on the European front.

In the Pacific, Japan was also eager to increase her auxiliary warships, having had her demand for the 70% ration in capital ships against the theoretical arch enemy, the U.S., rejected at Washington.

Her gain, i.e. the halting of the construction of the naval bases in the Philippines and Guam by the U.S.
appeared to be fast disappearing when the U.S. enforced the 'Japanese Exclusion Act' in 1924,

providing the much-needed excuse by the Navy for its expansion plans in the age of acute economic hardships.

What prompted President Coolidge to propose the conference at this juncture was largely his wish to counter the Senate's approval of the $320 million naval expansion scheme in January 1927 in defiance of his publicly declared objection. The Presidential election which was due in the following year may well have been in his mind as well.[44] Whatever his motivations may have been, his original proposal for a five nation conference was rejected by France and Italy,[45] leaving Britain in a difficult position in Europe. Although Britain eventually joined the U.S. and Japan, it was largely this European situation as well as the rivalry between Britain and the U.S. that led to the failure of the conference.

6. Pre-Conference Press Attitude

The press support for the conference remained lukewarm throughout the pre-conference period. Despite their unanimous acceptance of its spirit, many critics not only saw the difficulty lying ahead of the conference[46] but also felt sceptical of the timing and the motivations behind the U.S. invitation. To those who believed in the ideals of the League of Nations, such a proposal from a non-member country like

the U.S. was almost an insult to the universal disarmament undertakings which had been officially sponsored by the League since May 1926. Three days after the Presidential message had been sent to the Senate, the Tokyo Nichinichi commented:

> Disarmament has been dealt with as an issue by the League of Nations since last year. Indeed, the stage has been set for a preliminary assembly in March. It may not be irrelevant but it is certainly unnecessary for the U.S. to propose a second disarmament conference which is nominally a part of the League of Nations disarmament conference but which is in reality an entirely independent one.[47]

The supposedly progressive journals such as Kaizō and Chūōkōron appeared equally unsympathetic towards the conference. No leading articles were published by either of these journals. Indeed, Kaizō's only effort was to publish the economist, Takahashi Kamekichi's rather cynical Marxist view of the proposed conference.[48] Chūōkōron, on the other hand, had invited Kiyosawa Kiyoshi to express his advocacy of total disarmament just before the U.S. invitation was sent out.[49] In its April edition, the journal included a special section on the subject, but its contributors did not sound very enthusiastic. Yamakawa Hitoshi, the noted socialist and the writer of a regular semi-editorial column in Kaizō, wrote:

> The true significance and aim of the conference does not lie in the discovery of a fair ratio but in the enforcement of an unfair ratio by the countries with the same vested interests on those with different interests ..... The naval disarmament conference is after all a conflict to gain this right of enforcement, and nothing more than part of an imperialistic conflict and its extension rather than a means to prevent it.[50]

Perhaps the only 'constructive' criticism in this section came from the naval critic, Nagaoka Gaishi. The recent development of aircraft, he argued, was already making traditional naval warfare increasingly obsolete as the Navy itself had learned through its experimental naval warfare in Saeki Bay in Kyūshu the year before. Unfortunately, the public had been kept out of this vital information as such 'military secrets' were prohibited for publication. Nagaoka continued:

> The main aim of the Imperial naval defence is to preserve the vested interests of Japan in her traditional land and sea as well as overseas. In other words, sheer defence should be the unfailing national policy of the Empire. We must therefore never dream of placing the 'attacking defence' in its place as advocated feverishly by naval soldiers.[51]

The most ardent advocates of the conference were the economic journal, Tōyōkeizaishinpō, and, rather surprisingly, the more nationalistic Gaikōjihō. Each journal supported it from a very practical but somewhat different point of view. Tōyōkeizaishinpō naturally based its argument heavily on the country's financial situation and perhaps because of this, its contention sounded more convincing to the public than that of any other journal. The editor wrote on 26 February:

> We insist that our country adopt total disarmament as its policy as we did last time. More concretely, Japan needs no such trivial arguments as the ratio of 10:7 or 10:6. If the U.S. wishes the 10:6, that is fine. We insist, however, that the naval force allocated to that ten be reduced to such an extent that it become virtually zero as a threat to our country. We believe that the U.S. government will not hesitate to accept such wish from us if its proposal for disarmament negotiations had come out of sincerity.[52]

Gaikōjihō's enthusiasm for 'international cooperation' on the disarmament issue was in marked contrast to its condemnation of Shidehara's 'cooperation diplomacy' and 'follow-up diplomacy' on the China issue. It may not have been surprising once its reasonings had been heard. Japan, the editor contended, would never be able to catch up with the U.S. once a full-scale naval expansion race had been launched. Secondly, the U.S. might well utilise the anti-Japanese sentiment among its own people to this end. Finally, the U.S. was likely to place all the blame on Japan if the proposed conference failed. It was particularly important not to drive the U.S. to do so, as Japan had worked for and had somehow managed to achieve an independent China diplomacy. Japan should not isolate herself over disarmament which was important but which would not too directly affect her life and death. The editor concluded:

> From these points of view, Japan had better cooperate with Britain and the U.S. It would be foolish and over-adventurous for her to isolate herself even in the disarmament issue. Should France and Italy not respond, it would be acceptable for Japan to participate in a three-nation conference. This way she will, in name and reality, be one of the three great Powers of the world.[53]

Before these arguments could gather momentum, however, public attention was greatly diverted to such events as the Nanking and Hankow incidents which took place only a few weeks after Japan's acceptance of the three-nation conference.

7. Geneva Conference

As the Geneva conference opened on 20 June, the Japanese public found press attention very much focused upon the Shantung expedition, which had been carried out by the new Foreign Minister, Tanaka Giichi, three weeks earlier.[54] It also looked quite clear from the press reports that whatever the Japanese attitudes might be, the Anglo-American rivalry would be irreconcilable and that, unlike at Washington a few years earlier, the conference would be dominated by naval officers rather than politicians, thus reducing the possibility of the conference producing any concrete agreements based on political compromises. In spite of, or perhaps because of, these obstacles, the Japanese press, which was still very idealistic in its pursuit of 'world peace' and 'progress of the human race', was anxious that the government should show its 'independent' initiatives in the promotion of disarmament. In the light of this, the following statement by Admiral Katō Kanji, then the Commander-in-Chief of the First Fleet and a fervent opponent of the London naval treaty three years later, needs a close examination:

> The most pleasing element in the disucssion of the current conference is that not only the Navy but the Foreign Ministry officials and public opinion are united .... Public opinion matches the opinions of the major newspapers which form the opinion of the nation. These are at one this time perhaps because the government has very carefully worked on this. Unfortunately, this unity was lacking at Washington, thus forcing us into great difficulties in the process of the conference.[55]

It is quite clear, however, that, apart from their pledge to the spirit of the conference, there was, contrary to Katō's view, little cooperation between the press and the government. Even before

the opening of the conference, the press had felt frustrated by the ambiguous and 'hypocritical' attitudes of the government. As the Tokyo Asahi wrote on 11 June:

> In the statement by the Navy Minister, he said, 'It would be a grave mistake if the people thought that Japan is trying to take advantage of this opportunity to put a limit on armament because of her financial reasons'. We do not see why it should not be so.... We would like to remind the reader of President Harding's public admission that the lessening of financial burdens was sufficient to be the main reason for proposing a disarmament conference.[56]

Ishimaru Tōta, a former lieutenant commander and a regular contributor for such journals as the Tokyo Nichinichi, the Fukuoka Nichinichi and Gaikōjihō, regarded this evasive attitude of the government as its unpreparedness. As a result, the public had been kept out of discussion on the significance of the conference, thus leaving the country's defence entirely in the hands of naval officers. If Japan was to avoid repeating her failure at Washington, the old, corrupt and secret diplomacy should be abolished immediately. Ishimaru urged the public through Kokusaichishiki:

> You, people, should be prepared to contribute to the formation of a national opinion of Japan. Her assertion should be the essence of your cry and her initial contentions at the conference should represent your opinions.[57]

Despite these public outcries for open discussion, the government remained no less distant and unpredictable than ever. The original Japanese claim of the 'minimum limit of national defence' in capital ships at 230,000 tons was subsequently lowered to 180,000 tons and Japan's rejection of the 60% ratio in auxiliary vessels did not reveal what ratio she intended to acquire. Nor did the government

disclose its objection to the 'protective' armament at Hawaii and Singapore.[58] Such 'indecisive' and 'incoherent' attitudes were considered the indication of her lack of 'independence' by the press in general which nevertheless regarded as desirable any modifications aimed at disarmament in real terms.[59] In the end, however, instead of making full use of the Anglo-American rivalry, Japan herself seemed to be trapped in the purely technical issues.

Few critics questioned the inevitability of a gradation in the ratio among the three Powers. Even fewer advocated more than 70% in auxiliary vessels.[60] Indeed, most of them agreed that the acceptance of an inferior ratio would not damage the prestige of a sovereign country so long as it was done of its own free will. Instead of paying unnecessarily great attention to the ratio issue, many argued, Japan should promote a mutual Pacific treaty with both Britain and the U.S. and demand that Britain rethink her planned expansion of Singapore. Some critics even went on to propose the total abolition of such ships as battleships, battle cruisers and submarines which were useful only in war and to urge the three governments concerned to return to the spirit of the Hague peace conference of 1899.[61]

This temporary flourishing in the discussion of disarmament was somewhat defused by the government's plea for a 'unified national opinion' in support of its 'policy'. Some influential critics such as Ishimaru Tōta began to feel a certain amount of sympathy towards the difficulty which the government faced at 'this crucial stage' in mid-July. Consequently, their critical tone was greatly modified and their contributions became less informative. Ishimaru himself confessed:

> The author of this essay is in a very free position as a third person to discuss the present disarmament conference. The time has come, however, when the conference itself is in the process of change. Faced with this grave moment, I cannot help thinking that unreserved criticism would greatly affect the national interests as the internal situation becomes clearer. It is inevitable, therefore, for me to relax my pen to a certain extent and I hope that the reader will understand it.[62]

When the Geneva conference failed, the general feeling among the critics was one of resigned relief. At least, they thought, Japan had not been and would not be the focus of criticism before the peace-loving nations of the world. Nevertheless, they felt that Japan had not been successful in her attempt - if she had attempted at all - to convince the world that the Japanese were a peace-loving nation and that their country possessed its own 'independent' policy to achieve disarmament. Indeed, they regretted, Japan had missed a heaven-sent opportunity to prove herself on these scores. The Tokyo Asahi summarised this feeling:

> It may be no exaggeration to say that the discussion at Geneva barely maintained its appearance as a disarmament conference thanks to the Japanese presence. The Japanese government, however, did not try to win over world public opinion by explaining its attitudes to the conference and the future of disarmament on this rare occasion. Instead, it ended up with a negative explanation on its failure of mediation [between Britain and the U.S.].... The failure of the Geneva conference was due largely to the increasing insincerity of Britain and the U.S., but was our government free from any responsibility?[63]

Such a far cry for an 'independent' policy based on Japan's economic necessities was, however, to be engulfed and forgotten in the

middle of the heated arguments over the China diplomacy conducted by the new Foreign Minister, Tanaka Giichi. From now on, the 'independent diplomacy' would be used almost exclusively in the China issue by the government rather than the press. Its connotation would also become more that of the 'positive', i.e. unyielding and even forceful, policy of 'Tanaka Diplomacy'.

CHAPTER III - 'Positive Diplomacy'

1. First Shantung Expedition, 1927

Praised or blamed, the 'Shidehara Diplomacy' came to an end and General Tanaka Giichi formed a Seiyukai government on 20 April 1927. Instead of appointing a full-time foreign minister, he himself assumed the portfolio of Foreign Minister with his pledge of a 'positive' policy. The press apprehension aroused by his rather ambiguous inaugural speech was to some extent erased two weeks later when Tanaka declared at the Imperial Diet his support for Shidehara's 'non-resistance' policy concerning the Japanese residents in China. To the great satisfaction of the press, Tanaka also made clear that he would not support any one party or clique in the Chinese civil war.[1] What gave much irritation to the press, however, was his pledge for international cooperation, especially with Britain, in his handling of China.

Such uneasiness was largely the result of the almost obsessive adherence by the press to 'independent diplomacy' at the time. This was particularly noticeable after the cooperation over the Nanking incident had been broken up by the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent modification of the British attitude towards the Nanking government. Japan had been the most reluctant participant in this cooperation, which was designed to 'punish' China. Tanaka's rejection of the British proposal for a joint expedition to the Peking-Tientsin area on 26 April had been hailed not only as a retaliation for such 'selfish' attitude of Britain and the U.S. but also as an indication of Japan's 'independent diplomacy' which was genuinely sympathetic towards China.[2]

Not surprisingly, Gaikōjihō wrote on 15 May:

> They [i.e. the members of the Tanaka cabinet] say that they support cooperative diplomacy. We wonder, however, if they really know that Britain, deep in her heart, had until recently treated Japan very coolly. ... If it is to be cooperative diplomacy, Britain should make the first move. At the same time, Tanaka should demand that she bring the U.S. as a surety since Japan cannot reach any agreementonly with Britain.[3]

The press unity was soon to be broken by the government decision to send troops to Shantung on 27 May for the 'protection of the life and property of the Japanese residents' in the area in the face of the advancing revolutionary army on its way to Peking. This sudden decision not only provided an excuse for the subsequent expeditions by Britain and the U.S. five days later but also made Japan the main target of the Chinese hostility that had hitherto been directed largely at Britain. An official protest was immediately issued not only by the two revolutionary governments at Nanking and Wuhan but, to Tanaka's surprise, by his 'protégé', Chang Tso-lin. A series of anti-Japanese boycotts followed, thus threatening the expanding Sino-Japanese trade. Faced with this grave situation, even the traditional bastion of conservatism was reported to be against such hasty government action.[4]

Press reactions to this development varied. What was clear, however, was the fact that the press seldom questioned the motivation behind such irresistible slogans as 'protection of the life and property of the Japanese residents'. What the press seemed to forget was to ask whether the expedition, however justifiable theoretically, would benefit Japan in the future. Indeed, it was not until after the Northern army had made a strategic retreat that the Japanese press in general started to publish arguments against the expedition. Even then, most critics appeared to believe that the presence of the Japanese troops had helped to 'calm' the situation.[5]

One journal which did question the wisdom of the Foreign Minister on the expedition was Tōyōkeizaishinpō. To this journal, it was his disregard of the parliamentary procedure that signified the beginning of the future troubles of Japan. Its Current Review column declared on 4 June:

> Seiyūkai had insisted on the convocation of an extraordinary Diet for the rescue of the Bank of Taiwan when there was a great financial panic to take place. Why then did it not do the same on the China expedition? We do not believe that Prime Minister Tanaka had the courage to do so. This is why we feel that this expedition will bring a great catastrophe upon the nation.[6]

Another staunch critic of the government action was Yoshino Sakuzō who was responsible for the regular column, 'Social Review', in Chūōkōron. To him, it was the selfishness of the two thousand Japanese residents at Tsingtao that provided Tanaka with the much needed excuse for his 'warning' to the revolutionary army in the form of an expedition of as many soldiers to 'protect' them. This was inexcusable to the revolutionary army and its supporters who were fighting for the life or death of their country and therefore, Yoshino asked:

> Should Japan not provide some small accommodations to their [revolutionaries'] activities even if she had to suffer a little inconvenience fo it? I even believe that the government, if at all possible, should order the total evacuation of the Japanese residents in north China in order to provide the Chinese a chance to act freely.[7]

These comments by Tōyōkeizaishinpō and Yoshino were as far as the criticism by most so-called 'liberals' went. Indeed, the general tone of press criticism remained somewhat lukewarm throughout the period. At worst, the government was accused of miscalculating the situation which had resulted in the protest from Tanaka's 'loyal

ally', Chang Tso-lin.[8] Even the Tokyo Asahi did nothing more than to repeat its fear eighteen months earlier when it wrote on 1 June:

> The government says that it has to protect the residents and that disorders in Manchuria and Mongolia are not welcome. One false step would, however, lead to some form of intervention.... Even if the government policy is clear, the stationing authorities may well complicate the situation because of their immediate interests or prejudiced views. We sincerely hope that this will not happen.[9]

Whatever the verdict by the 'liberal' and the more 'progressive' press may have been, the outright support for the expedition was most certainly in the minority. Apart from the 'Seiyūkai newspapers' such as the Fukuoka Nichinichi,[10] Gaikōjihō was more or less the only journal that supported it as an indication of Tanaka's 'positive' and 'independent' policy.[11] Even this belief began to wear thin as the troops remained well after the immediate danger seemed to have passed, the revolution having changed its direction westward to avoid clashing with the Japanese. Tanaka's disregard for the increasingly anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese as well as the growing discontent in Japan towards the remaining Japanese soldiers touched the nerve of its editor who wrote on 1 August:

> We do not know how many of the foreign ministers of the Powers today do not read important reports from their overseas representatives. There could be nobody, however, other than the Japanese foreign minister, who has publicly declared that the Foreign Ministry is the most 'carefree' place in his own country.[12]

What differentiated Gaikōjihō and the Fukuoka Nichinichi from the other journals was their firm belief that government action,

right or wrong, should not be criticised once it had been carried out. To them, such criticism from within the country would do nothing more than to jeopardise Japan's 'national prestige' as well as to provide a free 'weapon' to China which was eager to exploit such 'disunity' to its own advantage. It was this that Tanaka had been trying to put across to the people, though without much success. The following statement by a former career diplomat in Gaikōjihō is representative of such sentiment:

> It should be unthinkable for anyone to oppose or criticise such belief in the government, not to mention the provision of illegal propaganda material to China. The anti-Japanese movement over the expedition results not only from the inherent element in China but from the wrong assessment of the prejudiced Japanese by the Chinese agitators.[13]

While the heated arguments continued over the government attitude, the newly established main Opposition party, Minseitō,[14] had kept a complete silence. Indeed, it was not until after the stationing of troops had become an embarassment to the government as a result of the increasingly hostile press criticism of the Foreign Minister that its party leader, Hamaguchi Osachi, joined the chorus. By then, however, Tanaka had declared the withdrawal of the soldiers which was in fact to be completed hours after Hamaguchi's first public condemnation of the expedition. As such, the Minseitō was condemned universally. Ōyama Ikuo wrote in Chūōkōron:

> What authority does his delayed opinion carry if it is expressed after the issue has been settled? Such shameless following would do absolutely nothing but to put the party out of countenance, which boasts to be a great political party.[15]

2. Second Shantung Expedition and The Tsinan Incident, 1928

The day before the fifty-fifth Extraordinary Diet opened on 20 April 1928, the Tanaka cabinet decided to send troops to Shantung once again to 'protect the life and property of the Japanese residents' in the face of the northward advance of the revived 'Northern Expedition' army. This action had been anticipated for some time and both the Nanking government and its sympathisers in the Japanese press had been urging Tanaka not to embark on such an undertaking.[16] As such, the immediate press reaction was to condemn the decision on three scores.

Firstly, as the government had not consulted the Diet, the expedition did not reflect the will of the Japanese people. Secondly, the Chinese situation had not appeared to be as dangerous as the government presented to the public and the expedition was designed simply to impress the nation with its 'positive' policy. Finally and most importantly, the press feared that the current expedition with its greater number of soldiers[17] would affect the outcome of the civil war more in favour of the Peking government than Nanking. For these reasons, the press was almost unanimous in its criticism of the government decision. Even the more conservative Gaikōjihō which had steadfastly supported the 'local protection' of the Japanese residents doubted the wisdom of another military action at this stage. Its editor wrote on 1 May:

> The Tanaka cabinet has always accused the previous cabinet of its inaction and resourcelessness. It has often declared the need for a positive China policy as well. If, however, its 'positive' policy means nothing more than expeditions, we wish to withdraw our petition for such policy.[19]

Such strong objection to the expedition was temporarily halted when the Japanese and the Chinese armies clashed at Tsinan on 3 May. It was a time when the Tanaka government was heavily involved in confrontation with the press over its oppressive attitudes towards the latter.[20] The Tsinan incident with its wildly exaggerated casualty figures[21] was subsequently utilised by the government for sending further troops, thus making the total number of the expeditionary force 15,000, on 8 May.[22] Nanking in turn presented the case to the League of Nations two days later, followed by an official British request to Japan on 13th for prior consultation with her in any future actions concerning China.

Press reactions to this development varied to an interesting extent. The Tokyo Asahi, which had been considered the bastion of liberalism, rather hastily supported the government decision of 8 May.[23] The Tokyo Nichinichi was somewhat more sceptical of the government's intention and questioned the wisdom of solving the unfortunate incident solely through military means.[24] Some liberal critics such as Yoshino Sakuzō also voiced their opposition to the 'unnecessary' expedition.[25] Most surprisingly, however, it was the Gaikōjihō editor that confronted the government with the strongest criticism. He wrote on 15 May:

> We must accept that the ultimate solution of the incident lies in diplomacy however much we approve of the expedition policy. The government should, therefore, be well prepared for it. We cannot see, however, that it is employing any flexible measures towards a solution. It is too preoccupied merely with the incident and the fate of a certain Chang Tso-lin.... We cannot help predicting a national diplomatic crisis.[28]

Undeterred by, and defiant of, such criticism of his 'positive' policy, Prime Minister Tanaka issued a warning to both governments of China on 18 May which read:

> The warfare seems to be spreading to the Peking-Tientsin area and Manchuria is about to be subjected to its effects. Since the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria is the foremost concern of the Empire, it is the duty of the imperial government to prevent at any cost the creation of disturbances or the cause of such disturbances in this area. The government therefore may be obliged to take appropriate and effective measures should the warfare and its subsequent effects reach the area.[27]

This warning was regarded as the first public statement by Tanaka of his ambitions in Manchuria long suspected by the Powers. As such, it immediately invited protests from the United States which declared its non-acceptance of the warning on the following day. Moreover, not only the Nanking government but also Chang Tso-lin of the Peking government filed an official protest to Japan on 25 May claiming that the warning was an intervention in the domestic politics of China. Chang's declaration was his public defiance of the secret 'recommendation' by Tanaka which had accompanied the above warning, advising him to retreat to his power base, Mukden, if he was to enjoy the continuing support of Japan. In spite of such a brave gesture, however, Chang was eventually forced to follow Tanaka's advice and set out on a train journey back to Manchuria on 4 June only to be assassinated by the defiant young officers of the Kwantung Army who had been dissatisfied with the slow progress of Tanaka's Manchuria policy outlined in the Eastern Conference the year before.

3. Eastern Conference and Assassination of Chang Tso-lin

The controversial declaration of 18 May 1928 was a culmination of Tanaka's 'positive policy' which had been over-publicised ever since the Eastern Conference. This conference had been held in the period between 27 June and 7 July 1927 and its chief aim was to decide on how to handle the 'Northern Expedition' that had prompted the 'first Shantung expedition' by Tanaka a month earlier and on how to protect Japan's 'special status' in Manchuria and Mongolia. Its participants included many of his prominent subordinates.[28]

The press had long been critical of the lack of any permanent policy in the government's China policy. The Eastern Conference should, therefore, have been greeted with some satisfaction by the press had it not been for its rather clumsy handling by Tanaka. Instead, it closed merely with the publication of the vaguely worded 'General Principles of China Policy',[29] leaving the press as apprehensive about the possible consequence of his 'positive' policy as ever before. Gaikōjihō wrote on 15 September:

> However important the expansion of the party may be, it is too shameless for the cabinet to issue a pre-signed cheque by suggesting unobtainable diplomatic gains.... It is absolutely unforgivable if this results in Japan being treated as a defendant by other countries, thus repeating the precedent of the Twenty-One Demands.[30]

Such apprehension apart, the press in general failed once again to question the legality of the government notion of Japan's 'special status' in Manchuria and Mongolia which was reconfirmed at the conference.[31] This fundamental question was left to the few individual

critics, especially the Marxist economists, whose opinions were heard through Kaizō and Chūōkōron. Murofushi Takanobu, a fervent opponent of 'economic imperialism', denounced not only the 'military expansionism' of the government but also the 'petit-bourgeois opportunism' of the Opposition Minseitō as an unacceptable concept on which the 'special status' argument was based. He contended:

> It is time for the Powers not to send but to withdraw overseas expeditions and time for them not to intervene in China but to return the so-called vested interests to their rightful owner. Not only should the foreign settlements and the tariff autonomy be returned but every concession and privilege should be abandoned. Then and only then, can the imperialist Powers of the world be allowed to preach of justice to China.[32]

More concretely, the press, especially the major newspapers, had failed to grasp the contradiction between the acceptance of the 'special status' and the pledge to respect the independence of China. The 'special status' could not have existed without the assumption that Manchuria and Mongolia were not an integral part of China and that these areas could even be regarded as a protectorate of Japan. By the end of 1928, only a handful of critics and the conomic journal Tōyōkeizaishinpō, were still reminding the public of this contradiction. Indeed, the following declaration by Tōyōkeizaishinpō in its 1 December 1928 edition was, according to Eguchi Keiichi, an opinion 'widely different from that of the press in general' and an example of the 'profound attitudes' of the journal at the time:

> It [the separation of Manchuria and Mongolia from China] is imperialism which has fallen behind time

> and nothing different from the ghost which has gone too far to retreat. There is nothing more dangerous than to ask for his guidance. Such opinion, we trust, will not be taken seriously by anyone except those who have some ulterior motives.[33]

One issue on which the press did hold an accurate understanding was the abortive nature of Tanaka's continuing support for Chang Tso-lin. The almost unanimous press opposition to the Foreign Minister on this score gained momentum as the spring 1928 saw the rapid rise of the popularity of the revolutionary government among the Chinese people. Most critics agreed that Chang had come to be regarded as the main cause of the current civil strife in China and that Japan's association with him would be disadvantageous from her diplomatic point of view.[34]

As a 'warning' to the Chinese governments appeared imminent in mid-May, such sensitivity in the press towards the other Powers was greatly sharpened. Moreover, Tanaka's disregard of a 'national diplomacy' based on public opinion touched the nerve of almost everyone. The Gaikōjihō editor, Hanzawa Gyokujō, warned:

> It would have a direct and grave effect on the China policy of the Powers as well as the Sino-Japanese relationship if Japan recommended peace in the name of the government and if she started negotiations with China at an official level as a state policy. A matter that can be extremely delicate should never be decided hastily.[35]

The day after the 'hasty' warning of 18 May was issued, the major newspapers were still at pains in emphasising Japan's 'neutrality' in the Chinese civil war which they themselves now found difficult to accept without hesitation. The following passage in the Tokyo Asahi

seems to be more one of the newspaper's desperate efforts to convince itself than the expression of its firm belief in Japan's 'neutrality':

> It would be unbearable for Japan should her wish to maintain thorough peace in Manchuria result in securing the position of Mr. Chang Tso-lin who has become the sole target in the present Chinese upheaval.... Although we accept that the recommendation is not intended to help him, we cannot help wishing that the government had given more consideration to the action which is bound to be regarded as nothing other than assisting Chang in its consequence.[36]

At the height of these heated arguments, Chang was assassinated on 4 June and a total publication ban was placed on this matter, thus leaving the public uninformed of the truth.[37]

4. 'Unification of National Opinion'

The assassination of Chang Tso-lin and the fall of Peking to the revolutionary army five days later took much of the heat off the 'punish China' argument which had arisen after the Tsinan incident a month earlier. They also seemed to provide Japan with the long-awaited opportunity to solve the three most immediate China issues in a cooler and more objective light; the Shantung expedition and the settlement of the Tsinan incident; revision of the treaties; and the Manchuria issue. This sounded a reasonable wish on the part of the Japanese press as the Nanking government had acquired the appearance of a sole sovereign government of the whole of China, with the notable exception of Manchuria. Critics who had been sympathetic towards the revolutionary movement naturally felt it to be the right moment for Japan for her own benefit to give an official recognition to Nanking ahead of and regardless of the other Powers. The Tokyo Asahi wrote on 26 June:

> Japan need not necessarily be concerned with the Western, especially the U.S., attitudes towards her or China. Rather, if she is really concerned with the Sino-Japanese relationship, she should take diplomatic initiatives. It is a good opportunity for her to consider the recognition of the Nanking government not to forestall the others but to benefit herself as well as others.[38]

Such sentiment was clearly reminiscent of the press support for the 'independent diplomacy' which had once been so powerful under former Foreign Minister Shidehara and which had been almost totally been ignored since Tanaka's takeover at Kasumigaseki. To the disappointment of the more progressive elements of the press, however, Tanaka was determined to continue his support for the Mukden clique whose new head was the son of Chang Tso-lin, Chang Hsüeh-liang. To keep young Chang away from Nanking, Tanaka issued an 'advice' on 19 July warning Chang that Japan would object to his 'changing of the flag'. This was followed by a protest from Nanking two days later with the subsequent rekindling of the anti-Japanese boycott movement all over China.[39]

Unruffled, the Foreign Minister on 8 August instructed Hayashi Gonsuke the special envoy to the funeral of Chang Tso-lin, to convey the same message to Chang. He hinted that the Mukden clique would enjoy the continuing support of Japan so long as it remained 'independent' of the Nanking government. This 'secret' overture was quickly disclosed by the defiant Chang, adding more fuel to the already burning hatred among the Chinese population towards Japan.

While this highly personalised diplomacy proceeded, the press found itself in disagreement with the government over the proposed advisory council on foreign affairs. This was an attempt by Tanaka to 'unite' public opinion and the opinion of the council was

supposed to carry some weight on the direction of Japan's China diplomacy. Such a proposal was not a new idea on his part and like its unsuccessful predecessors, this council was to comprise of several retired Diet Members and diplomats as well as some acting Privy Councillors who were sympathetic towards the government.

The press reaction was predictable. Even Gaikōjihō, whose unfailing advocacy of 'unified national opinion' had undoubtedly encouraged the government at various stages, wrote on 15 August:

> It would be a far more effective way of concocting national opinion if the government forsook its clumsy diplomatic ambitions and tried to meet the thoughts and inclinations of the public more open-mindedly.... The question is not the unification of national opinion, or the success or failure of the proposed advisory council on foreign affairs. It is whether the diplomatic ability of the government can match the expectation of the entire nation or not.[40]

In addition to the council, however, the government was reported to be considering the possibility of sending such prominent scholars as Drs. Nitobe Inazō and Kaneko Kentarō, to 'obtain the understanding of the U.S.' over the China issue. Tanaka and his supporters in the press had claimed that the current suspicion on the part of the Powers, especially the U.S., over the Japanese actions in China was largely the result of Japan's unskillfulness in propagating her cause. Such reasoning did nothing but infuriate the press in general which regarded it as the cover-up of the mishandling of the Chinese issues by the government. Kokusaichishiki wrote:

> People always talk about propaganda, but the age of empty propaganda has passed. The presentation of sound facts is by far the best propaganda. If so,

> it is sufficient for the government to leave the matter to our own diplomats. There should be no need for anybody else.... Is it not pathetic if a late-comer should ask for understanding? Or has it got some feelings of guilt about its behaviour?[41]

Compared with the critics of the government, its sympathisers were much smaller in number and very much on the defensive. This was especially noticeable towards the end of 1928 when Tanaka was forced, if gradually, to reconsider his 'positive' approach in the face of the unyielding Chinese attitudes and international suspicion towards Japan. The government and its supporters in the press tried to label their critics as 'traitors' and the 'spokesmen of the Nanking government'.[42] Such attempts were, however, largely unsuccessful despite the strict censorship placed upon the 'traitors'.[43] On the other hand, it is to be remembered that the press in general was also highly critical of the Opposition Minseitō, at least until it clarified its position on the Shantung expedition and its consequences on 3 August, more than two months after the government decision in favour of the 'second' expedition. Even the August 3 declaration by its president, Hamaguchi, was so vaguely worded that the press in general was disappointed.[44] To the 'Seiyūkai newspaper', the Fukuoka Nichinichi, it was an insult to the nation:

> Blinded by its partisanship, Minseitō took attitudes which seemed to sacrifice the interests of the country. As soon as its popularity had begun to wane, however, the party began hurriedly trying to change them, arguing that the people have misunderstood the party policy etc. There is nothing more deplorable than the Minseitō attitudes.[45]

It was also this 'hypocrisy' of Minseitō that eventually made Gaikōjihō talk more in favour of the government in early 1929 when

Tanaka was exposed to vigorous personal attacks from the Opposition in the Imperial Diet. The editor despaired:

> Even if the Tanaka diplomacy has been a failure, who else would not have failed? Who hitherto has had the confidence to break the deadlock and with what policy?.... It is truly regrettable that those who have no concrete and constructive ideals dare say things which provide the other country with a free weapon and nullify the efforts of the government.[46]

5. Treaty Revision

In the controversy over the expedition and Manchuria, the treaty revision issue tended to be considered as of somewhat secondary importance. On the other hand, it was in this sphere that Shidehara was considered to have distinguished himself over Britain and the U.S., thus winning press support. Tanaka had inherited two unfinished negotiations from his predecessor concerning trade with China. One was the tariff conference between China and the Powers that had been postponed indefinitely since July 1926.[47] The other was the negotiation for the renewal of the Sino-Japanese trade treaty which officially expired on 19 October 1926. The Peking government had formally requested a temporary postponement of the negotiations on the same day, and in spite of Shidehara's and Tanaka's subsequent attempts to start formal negotiations, the Peking government had successfully delayed them.[48]

The Nationalist government, on the other hand, had challenged the Powers on the validity of the treaties concluded by the Peking government. Although its first public declaration to this end on 25 November 1927 had not been taken very seriously by the Powers, the

situation had completely changed by the time Nanking repeated its earlier declaration on 7 July 1928, thanks largely to the successful 'second Northern Expedition'. The somewhat over-confident Nanking government notified Japan twelve days later that the Sino-Japanese trade treaty had been unilaterally abrogated. This action was in fact a retaliation against Tanaka's secret 'advice' to Chang Hsueh-liang not to align himself with Nanking which had been delivered only hours earlier.

Uninformed of the cause, the Japanese press was outraged by this action of the Nanking government. This was understandable considering its long-standing sympathy towards China's, especially Nanking's, aspiration for the treaty revision. On the other hand, Nanking's declaration revealed the real extent of such sympathy. As Eguchi Keiichi points out, even the most progressive journal, Tōyōkeizaishinpō, showed 'unexpectedly severe attitudes' towards Nanking[49] when it wrote on 28 July:

> There must be some sequence in everything. What the author wishes to ask the Chinese government is whose fault it is to have had these unequal treaties up to now.... Politics is controlled by power and a declaration unaccompanied by power is idle talk, however admirable it may be.... Such talk will do nothing more than to complicate the situation as well as to lead the undertaking of the Nationalist government to failure.[50]

Such indignation was expressed not so much because the press was lacking in sympathy towards the Chinese action as because it feared that the 'unwise timing' would work to the disadvantage of the Nanking government itself. This is why, despite its support for Tanaka's retaliatory declaration,[51] the press was at pains to place at least

one half of the blame on the Japanese government. The Tokyo Asahi wrote on 21 July:

> On reflection, however, it is because Japan and the Nanking government have failed to construct any mutual understanding or communication. It is undeniable that the present cabinet is to blame for its intense dislike towards the Nationalist movement, its deliberate disregard of the general trend in China and its lack of any policy that constitutes the fundamental deficiency of its China policy.[52]

While these arguments went on in Japan, a new Sino-American trade treaty was announced on 26 July in which the U.S. approved of China's tariff autonomy. Britain followed the U.S. lead with a conclusion of a similar, and in some way more concessionary, treaty with China two weeks later. The Japanese press, although contemptuous of the more conciliatory and 'opportunistic' attitudes of the two Powers, feared Japan's further isolation on the treaty issue. This led to the intensification of criticism directed at the government. Yoshino Sakuzō challenged Tanaka in his regular column in Chūōkōron:

> We should not necessarily follow the doings of Britain and the U.S., but we can learn something from how they look at China today. Is it not that the people are dissatisfied with the Tanaka diplomacy partly because they do not agree with Tanaka's assessment of the Chinese situation?[53]

Some attempts were made by the government supporters such as the Fukuoka Nichinichi to defend the Tanaka diplomacy. They argued that Shidehara's follow-up' and 'weak-kneed' diplomacy had won little friendship and sympathy from China as well as the Powers.[54] They were, however, in the minority and the situation seemed hopeless for these critics as Japan was gradually forced to modify her unyielding attitudes

towards China until 1 May 1929 when Japan agreed to a revised trade treaty with China more on the latter's terms. The following contention by Nishiyama Eikyū of Yamguchi Commercial College in Kokusaichishiki was an exceptional rather than common opinion held in the press at the time:

> How can we make profit in great China if we abrogate the unequal treaties, accept her tariff autonomy, allow default on her debt and let our rights be taken away from us? Some trade will still be done even if the duty is increased greatly, but no significant future development can be expected. If we were to invest there, would it not be that even the original capital would be endangered, not to mention the interest, if we had the Chinese, who have no sincerity, as debtors?[55]

6. Collapse of 'Positive Diplomacy'

On 3 November 1928, the United States gave official recognition to the Nanking government. Encouraged, China announced on 22 November that she would halt the negotiations over the Tsinan incident unless Japan clarified the date for the withdrawal of her troops from Shantung. While Tanaka was trying to put on a show of indignation, Britain and France followed the U.S. lead on 20 and 22 December respectively. A week later on 29 December, Chang Hsüeh-liang ordered his Manchurian subjects to hoist the Nationalist flag, thus endorsing Nanking's claim to be the sole sovereign government of China. With it, Tanaka's 'positive policy' appeared to have failed completely.

The press had been warning the government of the possibility of Japan becoming a straggler. It had invariably maintained that the real competitor of Japn in her claim for 'special status' in Manchuria and Mongolia was not the Nanking government but the Western Powers. On the

other hand, most critics had also agreed that such 'special status' should be accepted only within the framework of the 'open door' and 'equal opportunity' to everybody in these areas, whose potential was too enormous for Japan to absorb on her own. The difficulty which these critics faced was that Tanaka and his supporters had been too afraid to lose Japan's 'prestige'. Shinobu Junpei wrote in Gaikōjihō:

> The main object of each power should lie in the promotion of general interests. The special interests should be recognised only so long as they do not clash with the general interests. This is what should be demanded equally from the countries concerned. Such action by Japan should not be regarded as a retrogressive attitude on her part.[56]

The recognition of the Nanking government by the U.S. and Britain and the alignment of the Mukden clique with Nanking spurred some critics to call for the resignation of the cabinet in early 1929. Predictably, most of them were Opposition Minseitō members such as Nakano Seigō. Nakano, though somewhat disillusioned with his own party, was the leader in the 'exposure tactics' employed by some Minseitō Diet members to embarrass the government over the assassination of Chang Tso-lin, which was becoming a big issue within the governing circles. They utilised every opportunity to voice their demand for the resignation of the government within and without the Parliament.[57] The press in general was in sympathy with these Diet members rather than the government which was busy labelling them as 'traitors'. Chūōkōron commented:

> There is no effective measure which the government can employ to stop the exposure tactics without the punishment of those responsible and definite

> guarantees that there will be no such reckless attempt again. The past career of Prime Minister Tanaka and the recent behaviour of Seiyūkai compels us to realise this.[58]

Such sympathy was not surprising, considering the frustration repeatedly felt by the press whenever the government expressed its purely verbal 'sympathy' towards the Nationalist government. As the spring of 1929 arrived, not only the government but also the Opposition Minseitō came under fire from the press for their silence over the recognition issue.[59] Indeed, the following observation by the influential Seiyūkai critic, Uehara Etsujirō, was an interesting but rather lonely voice in defence of the government:

> The Japanese press is so complex that it is not rare to find those who utter indiscreet words as if they were commenting on the sumō wrestling at Kokugikan or a play at the Imperial Theatre when criticising the government's foreign policy. Furthermore, there are those journals and newspapers whose sales policy is, without leave, to take excessively sympathetic attitudes to the weak and focus their criticism on the government. On the whole the Japanese newspapers are inclined to attack the government on every issue.[60]

On 28 March 1929, the Tanaka cabinet signed an agreement on the settlement of the Tsinan incident. It accepted virtually all the Chinese demands, followed by a similar agreement on the Nan-king and Hankow incidents of 1927 on 2 May. A new Sino-Japanese trade treaty was also concluded on 1 May with Japan following the step of the U.S. and Britain.

Most critics felt that although these agreements were a setback from the original Japanese demands, they were nevertheless the settlements that should have been reached long before. Some Minseitō members

and their supporters once again tried to capitalise on these 'disgraceful' agreements in their demand for the resignation of the government.[61] This time, however, they found that the press in general regarded their argument as unreasonable and that the majority opinion was in sympathy with the following remark by Gaikōjihō:

> There are some regrettable aspects in the settlement of the Tsinan incident from our point of view. In particular, it was an unnecessary decision for Japan to agree to a joint - if nominal - investigation concerning the damages.... Let us hope, however, that we forget about the incident once and for all with this settlement.[62]

The trouble was that, although the people and the press were willing to forget the Tsinan incident, the government was still faced with the two unresolved issues which led to its eventual downfall a few months later.

7. Kellogg-Briand Pact

Two weeks before the establishment of the Seiyūkai cabinet on 20 April 1927, French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, called for the conclusion of a Kellogg-Briand treaty between his country and the U.S.[63] The French intention was to ban all 'wars of aggression' acknowledging as legitimate only the 'war of defence'. The actual negotiations began in mid-December and on 28th, the U.S. Secretary of State, F. B. Kellogg, suggested the inclusion of other nations in the proposed treaty. Following the conclusion of a new arbitration treaty with France on 6 February, the U.S. sent on 13 April an official invitation to Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan to conclude a universal peace treaty aimed at the unconditional rejection of war. A week

later, France responded with the proposal of her own version of such a treaty, confining the rejection of war to the 'war of aggression' disapproved by the League of Nations. On 26 May, the Japanese government accepted the U.S. proposal 'on the understanding that it would not reject the right of self defence'.[64]

The Japanese press in general had been sceptical or even resentful of the U.S. proposal. The U.S. had been reported to be aiming at naval expansion on a grand scale following the abortive naval conference at Geneva, thus contradicting the spirit of a peace treaty.[65] More disturbing to the critics was its specification of certain cases to which the peace treaty would not be applicable but which appeared to be the only possible causes for war between the U.S. and other countries.[66] Gaikōjihō commented on 15 January 1928:

> Especially the exceptions proposed by the U.S. are every one of them the cause of 'non-peace' (fuheiwa). There are no other reasons for a war. Those who agree to the U.S. proposal without realising this are ideological slaves of the U.S. if not bourgeois pacificsts. It may be, however, acceptable for Japan to show her generosity by agreeing to the proposed peace treaty should the U.S. so require for its domestic reasons.[67]

Even among those who accepted the spirit of the proposed treaty, resentment of the 'selfish' U.S. attitudes was very strong. Indeed, they had feared that Tanaka would accept the invitation, if issued, not for the merit of the treaty itself but for the sake of 'prestige'. Machida Shirō, the head of the foreign affairs section of the Tokyo Asahi, wrote on 1 February:

> Japan should have her own diplomacy. Her international status should be acquired through her own efforts. It would be totally unacceptable

> for her to maintain her status as a Power by making an honour of being present at a useless conference of the Powers initiated by the U.S.[68]

The government's acceptance of the invitation on 26 May, not surprisingly, did not stimulate discussion over the treaty to any significant degree. This lack of press enthusiasm was not, however, simply the result of the heated arguments in progress at the time over the Shantung expedition and its consequences. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi contended that the Japanese public was not much interested in diplomatic issues in general, much less in the abstract ideological debate over the proposed treaty. This meant, according to him, that the press which tended to 'follow up' the public taste rather than initiate it almost completely ignored the subject, thus confining it to sheer academic discussion among the inellectual elites.[69] This view seems largely justified considering the actual state of discussion over the treaty by the press whose majority opinion was close to the following assertion by the Tokyo Asahi on 27 June.

> In short, we should accept that the conclusion of this treaty will force the U.S. to cooperate for the peaceful tasks from the same spirit as the League of Nations.... We should pay attention to its psychological effects rather than simply to the principle of law. Our main concern is that each country should accept that something is better than nothing and that it should not strain at a gnat and swallow a camel. Our authorities should do their best for the conclusion of the proposed treaty on this spirit.[70]

Perhaps the only concrete and constructive contention came from Shinobu Junpei writing in Gaikōjihō. In his opinion, the treaty would supplement the League of Nations Covenant rather than damage or weaken

the foundation of the international organisation itself as had been contended by many of the critics. One major weakness of the League was that the Council was required to agree unanimously to any question and the other was, Shinobu argued, that there were cases on which it could not recommend any solution once they had been accepted as domestic issues. The proposed treaty would, he concluded, fill these gaps:

> If these items of conflict are entrusted to an international committee buttressed by the new treaty - there is no article to prevent this - the strong emotions would cool down as the long process of stopping the outbreak of the war passes. The danger of a war would thus be further reduced and the treaty would contribute to the maintenance of peace.[71]

What eventually made the proposed treaty the focus of press attention was the seemingly harmless wording of a phrase in the second U.S. draft of 23 June. The 'phraseology', 'in the name of their respective peoples' had aroused some controversy only in the governing circles 'in connection with its bearing upon the provisions of the Constitution' before the signing of the treaty on 28 August.[72] Instead of reproaching the government for its failure to raise any questions either on the exceptional cases put forward by Britain and the U.S. or on her own reservations on any areas, the Opposition Minseitō immediately called for the cooperation of the Privy Council in its attack concerning the phrase which, the party contended, violated the imperial prerogative over foreign relations.[73] The Privy Council, which had customarily been consulted before the ratification of any treaty but which had never possessed the right to reject the already-signed treaty, appeared to be willing to collaborate with Minseitō out of its wish for the recovery of some of the authority which it

believed itself to have lost to the parliamentary institutions.

The press was unitedly behind the Seiyūkai cabinet on this particular aspect of the treaty issue. Indeed, it was perhaps the first time since Tanaka came to power that the Japanese press was solidly behind him in the foreign policy sphere. It deplored the 'hypocritical' and 'opportunistic' Minseitō declaration that the party approved of the spirit of the treaty but not the controversial phrase.[74] No less abominable was the 'desperate' attempt by the Privy Council to capitalise this issue for its own end. Even the more nationalistic Gaikōjihō felt that the time had come when the sovereignty of a state was to be considerably restricted through various international treaties, and that participation in the treaty without delay would add to the importance of the country in the international community. The editor therefore wrote:

> The spirit of the treaty and the wording of the articles have all been resolved in the wisdom of the Emperor and his sovereignty promulgated outwardly to conclude the treaty. There was therefore never any violation of his sovereignty. The controversial English phrase did not cast doubt on the sovereignty but merely expressed impressionistically the self-conscious desire of the entire population in common international language.[75]

In spite of the press support for the government, however, the delaying tactics of the Opposition Minseitō and the Privy Council somehow succeeded, causing many critics to express their concern over the possibility of Japan becoming an international 'laughing stock'.[76] Some newspapers such as the Tokyo Asahi even went on to publish the opinion of native English speakers to support the government declaration at the fifty-sixth Diet on 23 January.[77] Hugh Byas, the Tokyo

correspondent of The Times and The New York Times, wrote in the Tokyo Asahi on 25 April:

> Since this is a question of interpretation of the English language, we native speakers may be entitled to comment on this. The phrase does not possess such strict meaning as whether sovereignty lies in the monarch or the people ..... Whoever in Japan tries to reason it, we English speakers could not find any such meaning as to whom sovereignty belongs. This is the opinion of the world and we could not possibly imagine that the essence of the national polity dating back to three thousand years will be affected by such an ornamental phrase.[78]

While most critics were preoccupied with this superficial power struggle between the government and the Privy Council, backed by the Opposition Minseitō, the more important issue concerning the treaty was almost completely neglected. Britain had made reservations on her 'right of self defence' in her reply six days before the final Japanese reply for the ratification of the treaty was made on 25 May. Largely unrecognised at the time, Japan's failure to make any reservations in her reply was to become of vital importance in the struggle between her and China, and between her and the other Powers as the tension grew in Manchuria. The following remark by Shinobu Junpei in Gaikōjihō was an exceptionally shrewd opinion:

> Had Japan recognised the necessity to have room in the Peace Treaty for the protection of her special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, would it not have been better for her to clarify some kind of reservations like Britain's instead of replying on the doubtful right of state defence?[79]

This was, however, the end of discussion on this subject and it was not until the outbreak of the Manchuria crisis in September 1931

that Shinobu's foresight was to some extent recognised by the press as well as the government. In the meantime, the Privy Council forced the government on 18 June to declare that the controversial phrase would not apply to the Japanese Empire 'in the light of the Imperial Constitution'[80] and eight days later the treaty was finally ratified by the Tanaka cabinet. By then, however, the controversy surrounding the other unresolved issue, i.e. the assassination of Chang Tso-lin by the Japanese army officers, had become too powerful in the governing circles for Tanaka to control. Rather than disclosing the truth to the public, the government resigned on 1 July 1929, hours after it had declared its intention of punishing the officers responsible for the plot.

CHAPTER IV - London Naval Conference, 1930

1. Invitation

When the Minseitō cabinet headed by Hamaguchi Osachi came to power on 2 July 1929, its foreign minister, Baron Shidehara, seemed to have inherited an unusually quiet diplomatic situation. On the China issue, the Tsinan incident, along with the Nanking and Hankow incidents, had been settled. The Sino-Japanese trade treaty had also been successfully revised while Tanaka's eventual recognition of the Nanking government on 3 June had appeared to pave the way for a new entente cordiale between the two countries, leaving only the delicate 'special status' in Manchuria and Mongolia issue to be resolved. In the wider arena of international politics, the issue concerning the Japanese immigration to the U.S. had somewhat lost its initial impact. The much publicised Kellogg-Briand pact had also finally been approved by the Privy Council, and for once diplomacy and foreign policy had ceased to be the focus of press scrutiny.

This situation did not, however, last long. The simultaneous declarations on 24 July by President Hoover and Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald in favour of a partial shedding of the proposed naval construction plans of their countries drew attention back to the subject of naval disarmament and this was to occupy a large part of press discussion for the next twelve months.

The naval disarmament issue had been forgotten almost completely in the true tradition of the Japanese press following the abortive Geneva naval conference in 1927. Indeed, the major journals had kept

virtually total silence for two years prior to the declarations by the heads of the two super naval powers. Only Kokusaichishiki had voiced occasional criticism of the government's 'negative' policy towards disarmament such as when Matsushita Yoshio, an outspoken critic of the military cliques, wrote in its July 1929 edition:

> Frankly, I think that the attitudes of the authorities are far too conservative and transient. Whether we call it follow-up diplomacy or opportunism, it is always on the defensive. I feel sorry rather than dissatisfied about the recent remarks by Navy Minister Okada. Why should he not advocate some reduction more openly? Is it not an axiom that disarmament itself, even from a passive point of view, would be a way to relieve greatly the present situation in Japan?[1]

Once the U.S. and Britain had made the declarations, however, the press reaction was prompt and vociferous. The major newspapers which had previously ignored the opinions expressed by Matsushita and others in Kokusaichishiki were quick to urge the government not to fall behind the other Powers in the disarmament movement.[2] They embarked on their attempt to persuade the cabinet to select a civilian rather than military plenipotentiary even before the arrival of the official invitation to the London naval conference from Britain on 7 October.[3] Such enthusiasm on the part of the press was the result of its apprehension of Japan getting too involved with the technical details of disarmament as had happened at Geneva two years earlier. It was also an indication of the press fear of the possible - indeed, probable - consequences of the government's 'lack of independence' in disarmament. Ishimaru Tōta, who had been a regular contributor on the subject for the Tokyo Nichinichi, the Fukuoka Nichinichi and

Gaikōjihō and who was, together with Tagawa Daikichirō and Matsushita Yoshio, to dominate the pages of Kokusaichishiki on the London naval conference,[4] wrote in the September 1, 1929 edition of Gaikōjihō:

> Japan's attitudes have always been to participate willingly in the actual as well as the preliminary conferences and nobody has any objection to it. I cannot, however, help wishing further that she should make the utmost efforts not only to act as a mediator between Britain and the U.S. but to become the leader of the conference should the situation allow. If there is no chance to do so, she should act positively to create such an opportunity.[5]

Press criticism was by no means confined to the government. The Imperial Diet where the government and the Opposition appeared to be united in avoiding any discussions on the subject, thus leaving the public uninformed of the true significance of the possible naval disarmament conference, came under fire as it had done in 1927. Kokusaichishiki, for example, asked:

> If someone tries to question on aspects other than technical ones, the cabinet members just leave the platform saying that they should rely on expert opinions.... Would it not be the duty of the people to contemplate political solutions based on study by experts for the military budget, which is equivalent to 28 per cent of the entire national budget?[6]

The proposed London conference was accepted by the Japanese government on 16 October, nine days after the official invitation had been issued by the British government. Its aim was for the five signatories of the Washington naval treaty to discuss both capital and auxiliary warships. The Japanese government for its part remained as evasive and secretive on its policy towards the proposed conference as ever, leaving the press to draw its own conclusions.

2. 'Three Fundamental Claims'

On 28 November 1929, the government was reported to have given its official instructions to the Japanese delegation headed by former Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō. Wakatsuki had been instructed, according to the press, to declare at the conference that Japan renounced any intention of aggression against other Powers and that her only concern was her defence and security. Further, the press reported, the 'three fundamental claims' had been attached to the instructions. They were: (1) to demand a 70 per cent ratio with respect to the strength of the U.S. in 10,000-ton 8-inch gun cruisers; (2) to claim a 70 per cent ratio in gross tonnage for all auxiliary craft with respect to the U.S.; and (3) to oppose radical reductions or abolition of submarines, as well as to maintain the present strength of 78,500 tons, the tonnage being not below that of either Britain or the U.S.[7]

Before these instructions were published in the major newspapers, the press in general had always maintained that any amount of actual reduction in naval armaments, rather than the 70 per cent ratio fervently advocated by the Navy, was of supreme importance. Nor had the press felt obliged to support such a stand by the Navy without questioning the possible contradiction involved. Indeed, Gaikōjihō had been the only major journal to declare its unbending support for the claim as it wrote on 15 September:

> Japan's attitude towards the coming conference is simple: She would be satisfied with the 70 per cent ratio in auxiliary warships .... Britain and the U.S. are therefore free to conclude whatever treaty between them so long as they cut out the necessary tonnage so as not to exceed their ratio of 10 as against Japan's 7. We will not make any other difficult demands.[8]

The majority opinion, however, had considered the ratio of somewhat secondary importance and had advocated a political rather than a military or technical solution of the issue. The Tokyo Nichinichi, for example, had written on 11 October:

> The last key to the solution of this question is in the hands of the politician who takes his stand on the strictly political interests based on the national economy.[9]

The reported clarification of the government attitudes on 28 November seems to have brought a fundamental change in the press attitudes. Many of the major newspapers, notably the Tokyo Nichinichi subsequently went on to refuse the 'political solution' which they had previously advocated so ardently. The Tokyo Nichinichi editor wrote on 3 January 1930:

> This conference is to be one for discussing military affairs and therefore the issue should be confined to the area of military affairs.... In case of a U.S.-Japanese war, it is irrelevant whether or not Japan's economic situation gives her a chance to win. To tell us to accept a ratio insufficient for self-defence is to tell us to capitulate unconditionally to the U.S.[10]

What brought this change of attitudes was, according to Ogata Taketora, the chief editor of the Tokyo Asahi at the time, the 'request' from the Navy to the metropolitan newspapers for the 'unification of national opinion' in favour of the 70 per cent ratio.[11] It was not, however, the result of a single meeting but of a series of meetings 'for the exchange of opinions' which had been held both collectively and individually between the Navy and the executive editors of more

than ten newspapers who had fundamentally been the advocates of the 'political solution'. Indeed, owing to the strong objection from these executives, especially Ogata of the Tokyo Asahi, who feared 'losing face' if Japan failed to gain the 70 per cent ratio, it had taken the Navy more than six months of insistent persuasion to 'make the newspapers agree to the cooperative spirit if not the "absolute 70 per cent" '.[12]

What was significant in this development is that the newspapers were susceptible to pressure from the outside, in particular the military authorities. Some newspapers such as the Tokyo Asahi, perhaps because of its fear of any future embarrassment, stopped touching on the ratio in the leader, while on all the other aspects the newspaper advocated the enforcement of the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand pact throughout the conference.[13] Nevertheless, this was at best a gesture of 'negative defiance' and its immediate effect was most likely to leave the reader in confusion over its attitudes towards the conference.[14]

As it turned out, most major newspapers became the positive 'spokesmen' of the Navy in 'unifying' national opinion in favour of the 70 per cent as the 'minimum' for state defence. Accordingly, they began to fill their pages with sympathy for the Navy's declarations while the government kept almost complete silence on the subject, thus leaving the reader with the feeling that public opinion as reflected in the newspapers did support the 70 per cent ratio at any cost.

3. London Naval Conference

On 21 January 1930, the London naval conference officially opened. It was clear, however, that the Japanese government was determined to provide as little information to the press as possible. As a result, the newspapers were filled with speculative articles on the proceedings of the conference.

The major newspapers having succumbed to the pressure from the Navy, any critical comments on the naval authorities were left to individual critics. Their arguments were based on three grounds. First and most idealistic was that the moral disarmament based on the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand pact was almost completely ignored by the Japanese - and other - government as well as the Navy. Secondly, the 70 per cent ratio claim would only be valid if Japan was to fight one super Power with an additional smaller power like China. Finally, if the 70 per cent ratio had been so vital, Japan should have proposed at least more than 70 per cent in the first instance, thus leaving some room for negotiations.

Shinobu Junpei, whose opinion on the Kellogg-Briand pact had been so prominent in Gaikōjihō, felt that the acquisition of the 70 per cent was nothing more than a peace-time consolation. A more important goal to him was to eliminate the possibility of the outbreak of war in the Pacific through the expansion of the six existing international treaties.[15] Most important of all, however, was the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relationship, but this was not taking place. Shinobu regretted in Gaikōjihō:

> Unfortunately, as far as I can see, the Navy has been putting too much effort in - to put it kindly - trying

> to extract consensus for the technical demands from the people. Inevitably the nation has come to believe that the ratio was what disarmament is all about and that the security of the state depends on the acquisition of the 70 per cent ratio. I fear that Japan will have no room for negotiation because of this.[16]

Even more outspoken was Okamoto Tsurumatsu who labelled the Navy's claim as a 'child's trick'. The 70 per cent ratio would not, he felt, be enough if the U.S. sent its entire fleet to the Pacific although the Navy ignored this possibility. Nor was it credible for the Navy to present the strategic significance of Singapore as relatively small as the Navy liked the nation to believe. What was truly required was an agreement based on the Kellogg-Briand pact between the U.S. and Japan not to enter a war against each other. To this end, the dogmatic 70 per cent ratio argument should be abandoned. Okamoto went on to challenge the government and, tacitly, the Navy behind it in Gaikōjihō:

> If Japan's plenipotentiary sticks to the 70 per cent by accepting the expert opinion and if as a result the conference fails, is she prepared to take the entire responsibility on her shoulder? Concessions should be acceptable if political means for a solution are to be found. In this light, it is a great mistake for Japan to have provided a good excuse to the other Powers for a possible failure of the conference. This simply shows how incompetent the Japanese Foreign Ministry is.[17]

Opinions of the contributors in Chūōkōron and Kaizō were in line with Shinobu and Okamoto in Gaikōjihō. Although neither journal showed much interest in the subject so far as the leader was concerned,[18]

their regular contributors spared no criticism of the government. Machida Shirō, the head of the foreign affairs section of the Tokyo Asahi, regretted that people were confused by the 'dual' diplomacy followed by the Foreign Ministry as a result of the government's failure to declare publicly the 70 per cent ratio as its fundamental policy. He wrote in Kaizō:

> If the 70 per cent demand is just an opening gambit, then it had better be stopped unless declared by the Foreign Minister at the Imperial Diet to be the expression of state policy and the national belief. Only through this will the Japanese people understand the great spirit of the founding of the state, and the Powers grasp the national consciousness of Japan.[19]

Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, who had been appointed as a special correspondent by Chūōkōron to accompany the Japanese delegation, was given a special column in the journal and, for example, wrote in the February 1930 edition:

> Japan would no doubt claim a success should she acquire a 70 per cent ratio. But why should it be a a success for a country to be allocated a bigger ratio at a disarmament conference? How could it be a success for a country which claims to base its starting point on the Kellogg-Briand pact, to allow military or naval review to take place which entailed an enormous expenditure on such an unproductive thing as arms? Not all the Japanese should become military specialists.[20]

The most 'radical' suggestion came, not surprisingly, from Tōyōkeizaishinpō. This economic journal contended that even if Japan settled for the 60 per cent ratio instead of the 70 per cent, the saving resulting from it would still amount to only six million yens annually which would hardly help to revitalise the Japanese economy.

The editor wrote on 25 January:

> As we insisted strongly at the time of the Washington conference, we believe that if the Powers truly possess the sincerity to avoid war, they should not just limit but abolish their armament. Our people should not be a slave to the trivial ratio issue but show their intention to lead the world in the direction of total disarmament as well as the London conference a success.[21]

In spite of these critical comments, however, the propaganda by the Navy appeared to be succeeding and the major newspapers as well as the traditional supporters of the 70 per cent ratio such as Gaikōjihō repeatedly insisted that public opinion in Japan was solidly behind this claim. They contended that the united 'national opinion' of Japan would enable the Japanese plenipotentiary to acquire the 70 per cent ratio. Some even went on to argue that anyone who doubted this was a traitor.[22] The effect of such nationalistic fervour encouraged by the press led Kiyosawa Kiyoshi to utter the following remark of despair in Chūōkōron:

> Could we find any instance at all when the Japanese nation did not unitedly back up a diplomatic issue? So far as the attitudes to foreign countries are concerned, the Japanese government has never made a mistake. The stronger the demand by the Japanese plenipotentiary the more united the people tend to become.... So long as the entire nation wants the 70 per cent ratio ignoring others, it would perhaps be his duty as a pragmatic politician to provide the 'peace of mind' to the people by adhering to the defence line of the 70 per cent ratio.[23]

4. 'Final U.S. Proposal'

On 1 April 1930, the Japanese government decided to accept the U.S. proposal of 12 March. The U.S. had earlier presented a memorandum

to the Japanese delegation on 5 February which sought to allot Japan a 60 per cent ratio with respect to the U.S. in total tonnage for auxiliary vessels. This was subsequently rejected by the Japanese who were pressing for the 'three fundamental claims'. To break the deadlock between the two countries, a series of informal conferences were held between Ambassador Matsudaira, one of the Japanese plenipotentiaries, and Senator Reed which began on 27 February. On 12 March, the U.S. presented a third compromise proposal which had been reached as the result of the meetings and which was subsequently conveyed to the Japanese government for its final instruction two days later with the advice that Japan would not be able to obtain any more concessions from the U.S.

The 'final' proposal agreed to Japan's possession of 70 per cent in light cruisers and destroyers as well as a parity in submarines vis-a-vis the U.S. for which the Japanese Navy did not require any increase as it already held a de facto equality. On the other hand, Japan would be allowed to achieve only 60 per cent in heavy cruisers which the Navy regarded as the most important for her 'security and defence'. Nor was it allowed for her to interchange the tonnage between the different sorts of vessels, which the U.S. had agreed to at one stage at the Geneva conference in 1927. In all, however, Japan was to acquire a collective ratio of 69.7 per cent in auxiliary vessels vis-a-vis the U.S.

The process of accepting this proposal was by no means an easy one for the Hamaguchi cabinet. On the one hand, the Foreign Ministry was anxious to make the conference a success more or less at any cost. On the other hand, the Navy was determined not to concede any of the 'three fundamental claims'. After frantic efforts by the cabinet to reconcile the difference between the two parties,[24] the view of the

Foreign Ministry prevailed and the government decided to accept the U.S. proposal, thus opening the way for the subsequent conflict between the government and the Navy after the signing of the London treaty on 22 April.

In both Houses of the fifty-eighth Imperial Diet which opened on 25 April, the Hamaguchi cabinet somehow managed to weather the attack from the Opposition Seiyūkai and its sympathisers in the House of Peers. Seiyūkai was as anxious to take advantage of the difficult situation as the Minseitō in opposition had been at the time of the Kellogg-Briand pact, and pressed the Hamaguchi cabinet to answer on constitutional grounds its acceptance of the U.S. proposal.[25] The failure on the part of the government to clarify this point was seen as an opportunity by the Privy Council, whose authority had been waning in the face of the growing support for a constitutional government, to regain its former prestige. The Council therefore 'ganged up' with the Navy, in particular the Navy Staff, and the Opposition Seiyūkai in its attempt to embarrass the government until it finally succumbed to the unyielding attitudes of Prime Minister Hamguchi. The final approval of the London treaty by the Privy Council on 1 October 1930 came only after hard bargaining between the government and the Navy which included secret agreement to the 'supplementary plan'[26] submitted by the Navy, thus minimising the amount of financial relief due to result from the treaty.

5. London Treaty and Diplomatic Journals

Critical comments in this period can be divided into three

groups. Firstly, there were those such as the editor of Gaikōjihō and the Fukuoka Nichinichi who continued to support the Navy's original claims. The second group consisted of the opinions of those who had invariably been sceptical of the 70 per cent ratio argument and they included Chūōkōron, Kaizō, Tōyōkeizaishinpō and the majority of their contributors. Finally, there was the 'opportunistic' group which had, at least outwardly, supported the 'three fundamental claims' but which suddenly dropped its former view in support of the treaty signed by the government and the major newspapers belonged to this group.

The anti-American attitudes of Gaikōjihō persuaded the journal in this period to advocate the annulment of the treaty, thus becoming the leader of those, including the Navy itself, who were vehemently opposed to the government. Indeed, not only the government but the Privy Council and even the naval authorities themselves were condemned by the journal for their lack of foresight when the editor wrote on 1 September 1930:

> Unfortunately, the Japanese military cliques, the Privy Council, the scholars and critics have all been arguing as to whether or not the London treaty would be of danger to the state defence of Japan. I have never encountered arguments that are so lacking in foresight. The U.S. would never have proposed the treaty if they had believed that it would still keep Japan in a secure position.[27]

Such hostility was further extended to the League of Nations towards which the journal had previously almost invariably shown respect, if not sympathy. This rather unexpected change of attitudes had been the result of its growing suspicion that the League and the disarmament conferences were the essence of the efforts made by the 'usurers' to protect their interests and that the Kellogg-Briand pact had been designed to incapacitate the money borrower - in this case, Japan -

to engage in a war against them. The two parties therefore would never be reconciled. As the journal wrote on 1 January 1931:

> Although Japan is superficially considered a comrade by them, she is actually in the position to be criticised if anything happens.... Japanese diplomacy has not noticed it yet. On the contrary, Japan has become their guard dog and is even proud of herself reading a prayer for her self-destruction.[28]

Not a few of the Gaikōjihō contributors sympathised with the editor. A former ambassador turned critic, Honda Kumataro, for example, wrote on 15 August:

> In short, the amount of armament decided at London is, as Mr. Wakatsuki himself admits, unacceptable to Japan. I cannot find any reasons to push through the treaty from the national point of view except that it would be the life and death issue for the government domestically.[29]

Even if the ratio itself was not unacceptable, some critics felt disconcerted by the government's assertion that public opinion supported the treaty. They were convinced that the people had not been provided with sufficient information to judge the treaty. What was popular, they argued, was disarmament itself, which would in due course reduce their financial burden, and not the treaty as the government claimed. In this sense, the rumoured 'agreement' between the government and the Navy on the 'supplementary plan' would, the critics predicted, soon unmask the 'fraud' by the government. Ozaki Gō, the Tokyo Asahi reporter on the subject, commented in Gaikōjihō:

> I am inclined to believe that the treaty should be abrogated in the long run. The majority of the people, however, have for far too long lived

> such a hard life that they could not be more concerned about the defects in the state defence than their daily life. There is no reason why they should suffer both the heavy tax and the defects in the state defence as a result of the government's promise to the military authorities just for the sake of accepting the treaty.[30]

Not all the Gaikōjihō contributors were, however, so pessimistic as Ozaki. Indeed, some of them genuinely believed that the treaty was in accordance with the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand pact as the principle of armament 'sufficient to defend oneself but short to attack another' and that the actual reduction in armament had been fulfilled thanks to the treaty. As to the noisy criticism by the Navy and its supporters over the ratio, they felt it ill-founded. Kamikawa Hikomatsu, an influential professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University, wrote:

> Considering the past proceedings [at Washington and Geneva] among the three countries ..., Japan is the first to achieve her goal and the U.S. second. On the other hand, it is perhaps fair to say that Britain has come to accept the minimum success in comparative terms by lowering her demand so drastically.[31]

Direct attack on the Navy was also heard through the pages of Gaikōjihō. Critics such as Yasutomi Shōzō argued that the 'lack of state security' which the Naval Staff claimed would result from the London treaty required reconsideration on two scores. First was that the failure to achieve the 'three fundamental claims' had resulted from the lack of national strength. Secondly, the 'lack of state

defence' should be complemented by political means such as the acceptance of the obligatory countersuit to the International Court of Justice at the Hague which Japan was virtually the only major country to have ignored in spite of the embarrassing fact that one of her nationals was a judge there.[32] Yasutomi regretted:

> It would be the normal course if complaint and dissatisfaction came from young officers of lower ranks. The Naval Chief-of-Staff and military councillors on the other hand should take a far-sighted view and have a duty to calm the hot blood. Sadly, the reverse is the case.[33]

Kokusaichishiki took a fairly clear-cut attitude towards the signed treaty. It held that although Japan should have taken a greater initiative in the actual reduction of armament instead of sticking to the abortive 70 per cent ratio, the treaty nevertheless was welcome as it was to lessen the financial burden of the people. This view prevailed throughout the leader and the contributions alike. The June 1930 leader, for example, contended that the London treaty deserved some blessing because:

> It has recovered the cooperation that had been destroyed at the Geneva conference. At the same time, it has followed up the undertaking of the Washington conference. Moreover, it has contributed to the great task of the League of Nations for the gradual achievement of the comprehensive limitation and reduction of armament. The treaty has therefore marked a development in the peace movement.[34]

Presumably to back up this claim, three noted critics were each invited to contribute on several occasions. They were Ishimaru Tōta, Matsushita Yoshio and Tagawa Daikichirō. Ishimaru contradicted the

Navy's claim that the 'three fundamental claims' had been faultless with his assertion that these 'claims' had been 'incomprehensible, full of contradictions as well as illogical points and in disagreement with the progress of the age'.[35] The 'supplementary plan' agreed between the government and the Navy, Ishimaru feared, would not only virtually annul the reduction of the financial burden of the people but spur the other Powers to further armament expansion, thus in turn forcing Japan herself to build more unnecessary warships. The result, according to Ishimaru, would be 'absolutely no gains but harm should Japan go ahead with her egotistic rush'.[36]

Matsushita Yoshio was more concerned about the propaganda - official or unofficial - by the naval authorities which was being treated in the major newspapers as if it were succeeding, thanks to the generous space provided for the issue by the press. His criticism was directed mainly at the Navy's 'arrogant' claim that state defence could not be understood by anyone other than military experts. Matsushita challenged:

> Do they really believe that there will be 'state security' so long as there is no deficiency in armaments even when there are unfavourable diplomatic relations, poor financial state, lack of munitions and discontented public opinion?.... If it is their tactics to obtain a bigger slice of budget for their supplementary plan, I cannot help feeling outraged by the thought that they are making fools of the people.[37]

Finally, Tagawa Daikichirō concerntrated his criticism on the weak attitudes of the Japanese government towards its domestic foes. Quoting the example of the Washington conference and now the London conference, he wrote:

> The Japanese government would not listen to its own people's plea for tax reduction. It has in fact always been so.... If any tax cut is to be carriedout at all, it is solely owing to the foreign governments. Because their pressure has been enforced, if only indirectly, the tax cut will become a reality.[38]

6. Chūōkōron and Kaizō

What was indicated in these contributions in Gaikōjihō and Kokusaichishiki was the separation of the issue from the daily life of the people, and this was also the main target of attack by Kaizō and Chūōkōron. Kaizō, whose main preoccupation at this time was the level of unemployment in Japan, inevitably related the naval issue to this subject. To the journal, the resignations of Naval Chief-of-Staff, Admiral Kato Kanji and then Navy Minister, Takarabe, over the technicality of the conclusion of the London treaty[39] signified nothing other than the unbridgeable gap between high level politics and the ordinary people. Its July edition wrote:

> Faced with such sufferings by the nation as at present, the government does our country a disservice if the foundation of a cabinet can be disturbed simply because of a single formality issue. It is proof that the administration is not concerned about the mass interests of the people.... Every member of the 70 million people accepts that it would be absolutely impossible for the country to achieve the amount of armament desired by the Naval Chief-of-Staff under the existing financial situation.[40]

The most frequently discussed 'technical' point was whether the government had violated the 'supreme command' of the Emperor as defined

in the Imperial Constitution. To clarify this point, the major newspapers and journals alike asked some of the most respected legal scholars to write on this score. They included Professors Minobe Tatsukichi of Tokyo Imperial University and Sasaki Sōichi of Kyoto Imperial University who supported the claims made by the government that it had not contravened the spirit of the Constitution.[41] Chūōkōron, however, felt impatient with the fact that the press had to take such trouble at all and contended in July:

> The supreme command issue still remains the focus of concern among active politicians at the highest level. There is, however, not a single point which the mass of the people have to question. There seems to be an abnormal characteristic in our constitutional framework, for the issue which we consider totally unquestionable does strangely become a big issue in the political world.[42]

The increasingly conciliatory government attitudes towards not only the Navy but the military forces in general also rekindled the long-standing press advocacy of civilian ministers for the two service ministries. The press unity in encouraging the government to take its advice was, however, repeatedly frustrated.[43] Chūōkōron regretted:

> It is most unfortunate that the Hamaguchi cabinet has thrown off the honourable tradition of fighting against the military cliques.... This has prevented the chance of the national wish from materialising when the tone of opinions voiced by various newspapers which are considered to represent public opinion was unanimous in attacking the military encroachment into political fields. It is extremely disappointing that the absolute majority of the Minseitō does nothing more than boast about its supremacy over the Opposition in the Lower House.[44]

The enthusiastic welcome shown by the people at Tokyo Station on 18 June to the Japanese plenipotentiary, Wakatsuki Reijirō, upon his return from London was also widely quoted by the press as the best indication of public opinion concerning the London treaty. Not only were the 'delaying tactics' employed by Naval Chief-of-Staff Katō and the Privy Council labelled as 'childish' by some of the regular contributors of sōgōzasshi, but noted naval critics, such as Mizuno Kōtoku, argued that if, and when, the Japanese Navy was satisfied with its armament, that would be the time when the London conference had broken down. Mizuno contended in Chūōkōron:

> I wonder if Naval Chief-of-Staff Katō identifies an international conference with a baseball game and believes that other parties will yield to our demands if only we are backed by a vociferous public opinion....I fear that the national backing with such a fanfare would make the mood of the conference more tense and the conclusion of an agreement more difficult.[45]

Even the editor of the prestigious Tokyo daily, Jijishinpō, who had been the 'leader' of the 70 per cent ratio argument within the press ever since the Washington conference, disagreed with the Navy and the Privy Council. He clarified his view on the treaty and its effects in Chūōkōron:

> Respect and sincere cooperation are to be the answer to this question and the final responsibility in deciding the level of armament rests with the government. The consent by the Naval Staff should never be a necessary precondition for it. Whether the government has needed the military opinion or not, i.e. whether the proposed strength was appropriate in the wider context of state defence, should be judged ultimately by the people and not the military authorities or the Privy Council.[46]

7. 'Opportunistic' Newspapers

The Opposition Seiyūkai's attitudes to take advantage of the situation were most eloquently condemned by the staunchest critic of the government as well as the U.S., Hanzawa Gyokujō, the Jiron column editor in Gaikōjihō. It was not as surprising as it may have looked considering his opposition to the equally, if not more, 'opportunistic' attitudes of the Minseitō at the time of the Kellogg-Briand pact a year earlier. Hanzawa was simply anxious that such 'futile' effort by the Opposition would harm the basis of the constitutional government. He therefore wrote in his column on 15 May:

> What I cannot help asking here is whether Seiyūkai, whose skill has been known through the treaties of Versailles and Washington, could confidently have achieved a better result than the London treaty, however unsatisfactory it may have been. Even if it had the courage to say so, would the public believe what the party says?[47]

The major newspapers did not fall behind in condemning the attitudes of the Opposition Seiyūkai.[48] On the other hand, it seemed to be they who deserved blame for being 'opportunistic'. It is possible, as Itō Masanori recalled three years later,[49] that they had held grave doubts about the wisdom of insisting upon the original demands of the Navy. They had, however, certainly no courage to express their 'true' view for fear of being charged with 'disrupting public opinion'[50] until the government finally accepted the third U.S. proposal. The following remark by the 'Seiyūkai newspaper', the Fukuoka Nichinichi on 2 November 1930 echoed this view:

> The most incomprehensible event of recent times is the attitudes of the Tokyo and Osaka newspapers towards the Navy.... It was they who supported the 70 per cent ratio vis-a-vis Britain or the U.S. most ardently at the beginning of the conference.... What is the reason for these newspapers to reverse their attitudes so completely and why is it that they, instead of supporting the Navy, attack it as if it were a national enemy?.... We are in fact disturbed by their shameless behaviour.[51]

What was even more significant, however, the fact that although the leaders of these metropolitan newspapers supported the government, the members of Kuroshiokai, the correspondents' club attached to the Navy, continued to write articles more sympathetic to the Chief of Staff.[52] Such discrepancy between the leader and the reports had appeared and was to increase on the China issue. So far as the London treaty was concerned, however, Itō Takashi sums up its effect thus:

> As to the London naval disarmament issue, the 'reformation' (kakushin) tendency among the reporters may not have altered the leader. On the other hand, the leader and the reports were not consistent and the reports tended to be more sympathetic towards the Navy. Needless to say, it weakened the government's handling of public opinion.[53]

Indeed, it was this disunity within the press, which resulted from such factors as censorship, commercialism and rivalry, that opened the way for another and more drastic change in the press role after the Mukden incident in September 1931.

Chapter V - Press Control and Foreign Policy

For the first eighteen months, the 'second Shidehara Diplomacy' was not challenged on the China front to any significant degree, thanks largely to the London naval conference.[1] While there were some minor ripples over the so-called 'agrément issue' and the burning of the Japanese consulate at Changsha by the Chinese communist army,[2] the press in general was still very sympathetic towards Shidehara's more conciliatory attitudes towards the neighbouring country. The final acceptance of China's tariff autonomy by the Japanese government on 6 May 1930 and its decision to address China as the Republic of China in any future official document on 29 October the same year were welcomed with not a little enthusiasm as a further stepping stone for a new Sino-Japanese entente cordiale.[3] It was indeed a natural reaction to the previous 'Tanaka Diplomacy' which had appeared to lead the country into international isolation.

The press was reminded, however, that the revived 'Shidehara Diplomacy' was as secretive as the 'Tanaka Diplomacy'. The initial press effort to turn disarmament into a 'public' issue had been repeatedly frustrated by the government's silence on the subject, until it became an essentially domestic issue after Japan's acceptance of the U.S. proposal. Even more secretive, however, were Shidehara's dealings with China, especially on the 'railway issue'.[4] While the London naval treaty kept the press's attention, Shidehara escaped much criticism within Japan on this score. On the other hand, press control was being tightened up both with and without the knowledge of the Foreign Minister and this, coupled with his reluctance to disclose information concerning China, was to play a vital role in the subsequent change of press attitudes towards the 'Shidehara Diplomacy'.

1. Press Control Laws

The Police Bureau of the Home Ministry had been directly in charge of press control for at least forty years by the 1920's. It was this body with its subdivisions such as the newspapers section, the periodical section and the book section that exercised this prerogative as defined in the Newspaper Law of 1909 and the Publication Law of 1893.[5]

These two pieces of legislation were the successors of the Newspaper Act and the Publication Act which had been extensively used to suppress the Democratic Movement in the 1880s.[6] The two Acts were subsequently reformed in 1887 and under the reformed Newspaper Act, the administration was allowed to prohibit (kinshi) or suspend (teishi) the publication of any newspaper which had published an article that 'disturbed peace and order' or 'corrupted public morals'. This prerogative was fully utilised by the Itō Hirobumi cabinet eight years later in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War to 'calm down' the national rage over the Triple Intervention.[7]

The following Matsukata cabinet abolished this rather high-handed administrative prerogative and obliged the Police Bureau to obtain a court order before placing a ban on the publication of the newspaper concerned. Although this government also created a new prerogative for the Foreign Minister to stop any article concerning diplomatic affairs, the result was a dramatic decrease in the number of publication bans placed on articles in this particular sphere.[8] This change was brought about not so much because the government had come to acknowledge the increasing power of public opinion represented in the press as because the administration had learned how best to lessen the vigour of press criticism. Miyake Setsurei, one of the

best-known Meiji columnists, reflected thirty years later:

> So long as the publication ban existed, the newspapers resisted it, which in turn added life to their arguments and encouraged them to develop such a skill as to escape from it.... Once it had been abolished, however, there appeared the phenomenon of the commentaries becoming lifeless because the newspapermen had nothing to fight against and because no response came back, however much they argued.[9]

In 1909, the Newspaper Law emerged as a successor of the Newspaper Act. In this, the Home Minister was newly equipped with a new administrative prerogative to prohibit the sale and distribution of the newspaper which had 'disturbed peace and order' or 'corrupted public morals' (Article 23). He could also suspend the printing (keisai) by the same newspaper or any other publication of the article to which Article 23 had been applied (Clause 2, Article 23). In addition, this legislation empowered the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministers to issue an ordinance in order to prohibit or limit the printing of articles concerning their respective affairs (Article 27). Although superficially less high-handed to appease the press, in practice, the severe punishments inflicted upon the press for the violation of this law[10] and most of all, the fear of the financial damage resulting from the sale and distribution ban were enough to persuade the press to take more conciliatory attitudes towards the government. The Tokyo Asahi admitted on the Christmas Day, 1924:

> Although there is no clearly written system of censorship, the police authorities can ban the sale and distribution of, and seize, the newspaper if they decide that it disturbs peace and order or corrupts public morals. The newspaper therefore is sometimes forced to succumb to 'internal censorship' in order to carry out its responsibility and duty to the reader as well as to avoid the huge financial loss.[11]

2. 'Pre-Warnings'

The deterrent effects of the Newspaper Law and the Publication Law of 1893[12] were by no means entirely effective, as the Police Bureau soon discovered. Indeed, as the more liberal sentiment spread among the people in the Taisho era, so did the press resistance against the press control laws. In this process, the Police Bureau devised more subtle manoeuvres to fend off such resistance in the form of 'pre-warnings' (jizen keikoku). They were in general divided into three groups.

The first was called the 'suspended matters' and consisted of three varying degrees of warnings. 'Order' (shitatsu) was the severest and the publication of any matter in this category invariably resulted in the sale ban. 'Warning' (keikoku) implied that the 'offence' would likely be to invite the same treatment as that of 'order' depending on the current social conditions. 'Informal advice' (kondan) meant that the authorities would appeal to the 'morality' of the publisher not to print any matter in this category. Although its defiance was supposed to result in a much lesser likelihood of the sale ban than the other two, in practice the press was generally too afraid to reject this 'request'.[13]

The second group was 'deletion' which meant that the authorities still regarded the publication as 'contributory to ~~the~~ society and culture' even if the 'undesirable' parts were small enough in quantity to be easily deleted. The final group was labelled as 'advice' (chūi) meaning that although its defiance would not lead to the banning, the publisher would be severely reprimanded through the local police authorities.[14]

The matter referred to in these groupings were presumably within the definition of Articles 23 and 27 of the Newspaper Law, i.e. those which 'disturbed peace and order' or 'corrupted public morals' or those which concerned 'military or diplomatic affairs'. Yet the definition of these phrases was left in the hands of the Police Bureau or the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministers, thus contributing to their abuse of these prerogatives on occasions. How effective were these 'pre-warnings'?

There was an increasing number of the sale and distribution bans in the period between 1925 and 1934 as Table III (see Appendix p.302) indicates. At the same time, there was a general increase in the proportion of such bans in the 'peace and order' category as Table IV shows. Table V suggests that the ban through the Newspaper Law was mainly directed at those whose political views 'disturbed the peace and order' of the current society. On the other hand, the major newspapers such as the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo Nichinichi seldom received such treatment as Table VI indicates. This tempts us to suspect modification in their criticism of the government. Even so, as the China issue gathered momentum towards the summer of 1931, there was a noticeable increase in the bans placed on them in the fields of diplomacy or military affairs as is clear from Table VII. As to the three newspapers closely examined in this thesis, however, there was hardly any difference between them, and the Fukuoka Nichinichi received as many - or few - bans as the two metropolitan newspapers, as Table VIII (Appendix, p.305) shows. Indeed, so confident was the Police Bureau of the effect of the 'pre-warning' system that it wrote in 1933:

> The authorities therefore inform in advance the parties concerned of the matters which are likely

> to be banned and warn them not to publish them, thus enabling these parties to avoid unexpected damages. At the same time, we can expect the thorough enforcement of the rules in controlling newspaper articles. We believe therefore that this is the most effective as well as appropriate control measure.[15]

From the publisher's point of view, this method was the cause of sheer frustration in his fight for press freedom. As the well-known critic, Fuse Tatsuji, observed in 1927:

> In the case of a sale ban, [the publisher or the editor] cannot contest the rights or wrongs before he has been prosecuted on the evidence of the 'disturbing' sections. In other words, they suppress unilaterally with these laws, violate the freedom of publication and yet try not to arrest or prosecute. We can trace the hidden craftiness which is entirely different from the method used a few years ago which provoked counter-attack from the press.[16]

As to the content of the bans listed in Tables III - VIII (Appendix, pp. 302 - 305), only that of 1931 and 1932 has been readily available.[17] The number of 'suspended matters' (sashitome jikō), i.e. those which had been notified in the form of the 'pre-warnings', drastically increased from 11 to 64 in 1932 as a reflection of the outbreaks of such serious events as the Manchuria crisis, the Shanghai incident and the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi[18] as Tables IX - XI (Appendix, pp305/6) indicate. The most frequently quoted reason for the banning was the violation of 'order', suggesting that there was still a fair amount of resistance left among perhaps the more left wing newspapers (see Table IX, Appendix, p.305). One significant factor in this context is that until after the deterioration of the

situation in Manchuria, the definition of the 'disturbance of peace and order' had remained unclear, much to the dissatisfaction of even the less critical newspapers.

3. Reform Movement

The Newspaper Law and the Publication Law had in many ways been complementary to each other especially in their application to periodicals. Journals which dealt with current, especially political, affairs had been required to submit two copies each to the Police Bureau at least three days prior to their publication (Article 3, Publication Law) as opposed to the newspaper's submission at the time of publication (Article 11, Newspaper Law). On the other hand, these journals were subjected to the sale and distribution ban under Article 23 of the Newspaper Law. Such inconsistency as well as the harsh punishment clauses and the ambiguous wordings such as 'disturbance of peace and order' had prompted several attempts for the reform of the two press control laws even before Showa.[19]

The first serious attempt, however, came from the government in 1926 after the enforcement of the Peace Preservation Law the year before had clearly given the cabinet an opportunity to embark on a certain amount of modification in press control. This and its similar attempts in 1927 and 1928, though they failed to materialise, were significant for several reasons. Firstly, the regulations outlined in these proposals were to be 'revived in the subsequent administrative expedients devised by the authorities, permitted to walk in a grand manner and allowed to exercise violence' until the end of the Second World War.[20] The most obvious example of this phenomenon was the

proposed listing of matters which would not be permitted in print because they 'disturbed peace and order' or 'corrupted public morals'. Article 31 of the 1926 proposal and Article 25 of the 1927 proposal stated that the following were banned from publication:

No. 1 - Matters which degrade the dignity of the Imperial Family.

2 - Matters which aim at changing the national polity.

3 - Matters which change the general principles of the political organisation illegally, or which deny the private ownership system.

4 - Matters which harm the interest of the Empire concerning the secrets of military or diplomatic affairs.

5 - Matters which encourage or defend crimes distortedly and which praise or protect the criminal, criminal defendant or suspect.

6 - Matters which have been falsified or exaggerated to cause uneasiness in society and affect it seriously from the point of peace preservation.

7 - Matters which degrade good public manners through corruption of morals, indecency, brutality etc.[21]

Although this listing never legally materialised owing to the shelving of the proposals, it was nevertheless enforced by the Police Bureau as closely as possible in the early Showa period as one of its internal circulars recalled in 1933.[22]

The second significant point about these reform proposals was that they became the battle ground not only between the government and the press but also between the government departments, especially

the Home and the Foreign Ministries. Both in 1926 and 1927, the Foreign Ministry wished to replace the key word, 'secrets', in No.4 of the above list with 'affairs', thus extending the range of matters whose publication would result in the sale and distribution ban. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry desired to possess the same administrative prerogative as the Home Minister who alone could order the sale ban or the seizure of the publication concerned under the current legislations. The Foreign Minister could, of course, issue an ordinance in order to prohibit or limit the publication of the articles concerned, but such an ordinance in itself did not bear any implication of direct damage to the publisher in peace time. It was this dilemma that led the Foreign Ministry to propose to the Home Ministry in 1926:

> In order to make up these defects, [the Foreign Minister] proposes that the current plan provide the method through which he can seize or ban the publication which has published diplomatic matters. In addition, the Minister should be empowered to order a punishment for the publication of specific matters. On the other hand, Article 18 of the Publication Law and Article 23 of the Newspaper Law which tend to be regarded as the cause of suppression should be deleted.[23]

In 1927, the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry once again sent two alternative plans to the Home Ministry for the same purpose. Suggestion A was virtually identical with the 1926 plan and obliged the Foreign Minister to consult the Home Minister before issuing a sale ban order. This consultation, however, did not mean that the Foreign Minister accepted the 'intervention' by the Home Minister but simply that the Foreign Minister would listen to the latter's opinion on the ban. Suggestion B went further to propose that the Foreign Minister be the 'sole competent Minister' in exercising the sale ban or the

seizure of the publication concerned and that he need not consult the Home Minister at any stage.[24]

The reactions of the government departments which were closely involved with these arguments varied. The Legislation Bureau (Hōseikyoku) of the cabinet showed strong support for Suggestion A while the Justice Minister and, rather surprisingly, the Home Minister also indicated their initial acceptance of the plan. The Home Minister, however, subsequently changed his mind and rejected it. The Army Ministry, on the other hand, favoured Suggestion B, hinting that it had been thinking along similar lines for some time.[25] Although, owing to the objection from the Home Ministry, both suggestions failed to materialise in the final government proposal which also subsequently failed to pass the Diet, the desire on the part of the Foreign, the Army, and presumably the Navy, Ministries remained as strong as ever before and led to various forms of information control with and without the assistance of the Home Ministry. Meanwhile, the struggle between periodicals and the Police Bureau over press control was also intensifying.

4. 'Internal Censorship' and 'Self-Censorship'

When the 1926 reform proposal was being debated at the Imperial Diet, various 'mysterious documents' on domestic political scandals were frequently distributed among the people, spreading a considerable amount of anxiety.[26] It was also the time when the first sale ban placed on Kaizō prompted a direct protest to the Home Ministry from the Authors' Association and the Periodicals Association against the strict press control.[27] Their 'letter of protest', however, requested the Police Bureau to point out any undesirable sections in the publications submitted to the Bureau according to the existing press control

laws and to allow their sale once those sections had been deleted. At the same time, the letter urged the Home Minister to establish an advisory body jointly representing government officials and private members of the society in order to ease the arbitrary nature of press control.[28]

The result of this request was the introduction of 'internal censorship' (naietsu or naikenetsu). This meant that the galley proof of the publication concerned should be checked before publication by the Police Bureau, thus minimising the possibility of financial damage caused by a sale ban. The main beneficiaries of this arrangement were, however, the publications which would have 'corrupted public morals' rather than those which would have 'disturbed peace and order'. Indeed, the number of sale bans placed on the latter actually increased in the period between 1926 and 1928 as Table XII (see Appendix, p.307) shows. Nor was the advisory body suggested in the letter ever seriously contemplated by the Home Ministry in spite of the repeated requests from the two associations which followed it.[29]

Such willingness to 'cooperate' with the Police Bureau was not shared by everyone in the press. The newspapers at the time, in particular, were highly sceptical of the nature of such 'internal censorship'. The announcement by the Home Ministry of its own decision to abandon this arrangement on 28 June 1927 'owing to the staff shortage'[30] was therefore welcomed by them. The Tokyo Asahi wrote on 30 June:

> So long as the high-handed sale ban remains, the publisher asks for the 'internal censorship' and timidly publishes with blue-pencilled passages in order to avoid serious financial damage.... The abolition of the 'internal censorship' is very

> welcome and we hope that the publisher will realise why such high-handedness as a sale ban is unreasonable and that he will fight along with the author as well as the reader for the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the constitution.[31]

The abandonment of 'internal censorship' did not, however, necessarily lead to greater freedom of the press. The subsequent possibility of being ordered to delete or correct after publication heightened the fear of the publisher who in turn began to place further 'voluntary' restrictions on what his product should say.[32] It was therefore no surprise that Hoshino Junichirō, Chairman of the Periodicals Association, backed by the Authors' Association and the Editors' Association, sent a letter on 15 July, less than a month after the Home Ministry decision, urging the Home Minister to accept the following requests:

> 1. We hope that the Ministry will kindly let the publisher know its opinion on the sentences or pictures in the manuscripts... which would have been subjected to the previous 'internal censorship'.
>
> 1. The publisher will not file any complaint or protest if the sections on which he has consulted get subjected to the control after publication. Nor will he in any circumstances announce the fact that he has consulted the Ministry.
>
> 1. If the publisher feels uncertain on not just a word or phrase but the ideology, view or verdict contained in the essay, he will present the manuscript with the question marks at least one week before the date stated in the law.... The Ministry can rest assured that he will not use this as an excuse to avoid punishment.[33]

Even this humble petition was, however, rejected by the Police Bureau which attributed its decision to the chronic staff shortage.[34] The three associations subsequently felt compelled to adopt 'self-censorship' (jishu kenetsu), deleting the 'undesirable sections'

voluntarily to avoid a sale ban. This practice was to continue until the Home Minister decided in 1936 to stop it on his realisation that the journals had been escaping much of the legal control through this method.[35]

5. 'Voluntary' Censorship in Practice

Blue-pencilled passages were a very common feature in the journals in the late 20s and early 30s. Their appearance varied, however, from journal to journal and from one topic to another. Indeed, there was little trace of it on the issue of the two naval conferences at Geneva and London and the Kellogg-Briand pact in any of the major journals. One of these rare cases was an essay written by a Marxist critic, Noro Eitarō, in Chūōkōron on the London conference which was in fact the first and the last on this subject in this particular journal to receive such treatment. In the following passage of Noro's contribution, each separate underline, i.e. _, denotes one Chinese or Japanese character (hereinafter the same practice is to be followed):

> The 'non-threatening disarmament' is in fact the total colonisation by Japan of not only Manchuria but also China and the South Sea islands. In other words, it is nothing but ____ in order to _the __ of the Japanese 'Monroe Doctrine' in the Far East ....[36]

Even on the China issue, the evidence of this practice was not very apparent in the case of Gaikōjihō, Kokusaichishiki and Tōyōkeizaishinpō. Tōyōkeizaishinpō escaped it in spite of its comparatively harsh critical tone thanks largely to its smaller circulation and its nature as an economic journal whereas the two diplomatic journals did so perhaps mainly because of their somewhat milder tone. Nevertheless, at least the Gaikōjihō editor seems to have been rather sensitive about the possible anger of the Tanaka cabinet as the following essay on its controversial

'recommendation' of ceasefire to the two Chinese governments on 18 May 1928 by a 'hard-liner' and former career diplomat, Honda Kumataro indicated:

> Foreign Minister Tanaka should make public the above memorandum on the preservation of peace and security in Manchuria and Mongolia to the world. At the same time, I hear that he has ___ the main force of ___ at ___ and had arranged all the _____ around quickly. Unfortunately, I have also heard that ___ have been stranded after all ....[37]

As to sōgōzasshi, Kaizō inflicted 'self-censorship' on itself more often than Chūōkōron. This was not necessarily because Kaizō published more critical essays than its rival. Indeed, several authors such as Komura Shunzaburō, Yamakawa Hitoshi and Nakano Seigō contributed to both journals on the same aspects of the China issue almost simultaneously, but only the essays in Kaizō evidenced the blue-pencilled passages. Rejecting Tanaka's call for a 'unified national opinion' on the expedition to Shantung, Komura Shunzaburō, for example, wrote in Kaizō's July 1928 edition:

> The government was totally indifferent even when the fall of the Northern military cliques was imminent _____ to the advancing Southern forces. On the other hand, it showed _____ to the falling Mukden clique and went through hardships together like a double suicide.[38]

Yamakawa Hitoshi also wrote on the same accusation made by Tanaka on the 'unpatriotic' attitudes of the press in general at the time. In both journals, he contended that however hard the Foreign Minister tried to differentiate his style of 'positive' diplomacy, it would in the end have to come back to the more conciliatory style of

the Shidehara diplomacy for which there had always been a national concensus. Only his essay in Kaizō, however, contained deletions, as the following passage shows:

> This simply means that the 'economic diplomacy', i.e. the diplomacy of ___, whether we call it the Tanaka diplomacy or the Shidehara diplomacy, is equally right. Public opinion on China _____ has always been unified.[39]

Such evidence of 'voluntary' censorship was much less apparent, at least in the foreign policy sphere, under the Hamaguchi Minseitō cabinet. It was, in fact, not until the summer of 1931 when the Sino-Japanese relationship was reported to be at its lowest level that some critical contributions in sōgōzasshi began to carry a significant number of missing words.[40] This owed perhaps largely to the unwillingness of Foreign Minister Shidehara to be directly involved in any argument with the press while conducting his duty in strict secrecy.[41] Another possible reason was also illustrated in the following remark by Gaikōjihō on 1 February 1931 which had voiced and was to continue some of the severest criticism of the 'weak-kneed' Shidehara diplomacy free of any 'voluntary' censorship:

> However much hostility Foreign Minister Shidehara may have against this journal, he would not ask Home Minister Adachi with whom he is not normally friendly, to order a sale ban even if we make the following remarks....[42]

6. Army vs. Home Ministry

While the appearance of blue-pencilled passages was not infrequent in journals, especially sōgōzasshi, under the Tanaka cabinet, the reader could find no trace of 'voluntary censorship' in the major

newspapers until the 'second' Shantung expedition and the subsequent Tsinan incident in May 1928. Even then, only the matters which were considered strictly 'military secrets' such as the number or name of the troops to be sent to China were deleted from the articles.[43] The leaders, however, contained no missing words although they had often been as critical of Foreign Minister Tanaka and the Army behind him as sōgōzasshi.

An important turning point in the history of press control arrived when Marshal Chang Tso-lin was assassinated by discontented Japanese officers in Manchuria on 4 June 1928. This event was significant because even if the newspapers were in possession of factual information, they were too afraid to publish it for fear of receiving a sale ban.[44] The fact that the Army succeeded in persuading the government and the Home Ministry to issue a 'pre-warning' in the name of 'supreme command' of the Emperor was in itself an 'epoch-making' event according to Tokawa Isamu, the former Yomiuri correspondent.[45] Even more important was the failure on the part of the newspapers to mount any public protest against such interference with the 'freedom of speech' for which they had so vehemently fought throughout the 'Taisho Democracy' period. Ogata Taketora, the chief editor of the Tokyo Asahi at the time, reflected on this development twenty-four years later:

> The prevention of the Pacific War would probably have been possible had the major newspapers seen through the domestic situation, especially that of the military forces, and had they made determined efforts to prevent the catastrophe then. Naturally, the guarantee of the freedom of the press should have been its precondition and a unity among the newspapers would have been necessary.... It is also true, however, that the efforts made by the editors of these newspapers were not sufficient to achieve this end.[46]

The most significant result of this development was the strengthening of the Newspaper Unit (Shinbunhan)within the Army. This was based on its belief that the 'understanding' by the press of its intention would be vital for the 'conquest of Manchuria'.[47] The main task of the Unit was to extend the range of 'suspended matters' with the cooperation of the Home Ministry. To this end, it sent in the name of the Army Minister a leaflet entitled 'Request from The Military Authorities Concerning Censorship of Publications' to the Home, Foreign and presumably the Navy Ministers in September 1928. In it, the Army regretted the recent increase in the number of newspapers and other publications which published 'anti-military' articles, thus 'endangering the existence of the service forces with falsified as well as exaggerated remarks'. This had been affecting the morale of the occupying force in Shantung and that is why, the leaflet claimed, the Army Minister had decided to urge the Home Minister to 'pay more attention' to censoring the publications more specifically than before. Among the matters recommended in the request for 'more attention' were:

1. Those which harmed the mental education of the service forces as well as those which degraded the concept of the military duty.

   (3) Those which propagate the total abolition of armament by emphasising the misery of war and by fervently advocating anti-war arguments and those which aim at making the service forces the focus of condemnation through the exaggerated misery of the soldiers.

   (5) Those which delude the mentality of the soldiers and cast doubts upon it by raising objections to the expedition which had been carried out as part of the national policy.

2. Those which destroy military discipline.

3. Those which alienate the population from the military forces or those which make the people misunderstand them.[48]

Considering the relatively mild tone of criticism of the expedition itself expressed in the major newspapers and journals at the time, this appears to have been the result of the Army's eagerness to seize any opportunity to pursue what it had failed to achieve through the reform of the press control laws in 1926 and 1927. Indeed, not only had the military action in itself never been criticised by the metropolitan newspapers but there had been a considerable number of sale bans placed on the 'anti-war' publications.[49] Such being the case, the Home Ministry may not have paid as much attention to the leaflet as the Army had hoped. A confidential circular of the Home Ministry called 'Publication Police Law', for example, reported in March 1929 that almost all the cases which had received banning orders belonged to the first three clauses in the reform proposals of 1926 and 1927. In other words, they had been defined as 'suspended' in the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 whose main victims were still the left-wing publications. Indeed, those which 'concerned military or diplomatic secrets' or which 'would be of hindrance to [Japan's] relationship' with other countries had seldom been classified as the 'suspended matters' because, the circular stated:

> These two groups belong to a rather special category insofar as the banning is concerned. We have therefore decided to avoid a detailed explanation about them.[50]

The authority of the Home Ministry over press control began to wane gradually after the inauguration of the Hamaguchi Minseitō cabinet in July 1929. Although the Home Minister was still the sole competent Minister in issuing a sale ban, the Army began increasingly to resort to more direct means to pressurise the press.

7. Physical Threat

Employment of physical threat against the press had not been uncommon in Japan. On 5 September 1905, the misguided mobs who were outraged by Japan's acceptance of the 'humiliating' Portsmouth treaty attacked the pro-government newspaper, Kokumin Shinbun. In 1912, the mobs once again raided the same newspaper for its support of the 'unconstitutional' behaviour of new Prime Minister Katsura.[51]

The situation had changed considerably since the end of the First World War and it was the police and hence the Home Ministry rather than the misguided public that played a major role in this direction. Their utilisation of right-wing organisations in immobilising the printing machines of the Osaka Asahi and their rumoured involvement in the assassination attempt against its chairman, Murayama Ryūhei, in the earlier half of the 1920s can be seen as the result of their failure to suppress the press criticism of the government policy through legal channels.[52] Such systematic assault on the press was not so successful as the government may have hoped while the more liberal sentiment of the 'Taisho Democracy' still prevailed over the people. Captain M. D. Kennedy, a long-term British resident in Japan, observed at the time:

> In adopting this liberal attitude, the Japanese press is almost universally up in arms against the Government of the day, and it is a striking fact that the more a paper attacks the Government the greater does its circulation tend to increase. Conversely, as amply demonstrated in the case of the Hōchi, which supported the Marquis Ōkuma when he was in power, circulation drops radically whenever a paper seeks too consistently to defend the Government policies.[53]

The return of the 'Shidehara Diplomacy' in July 1929 under the

Hamaguchi cabinet marked another turning point. Although the Home Ministry was still actively engaged in physical threat against the press, it was the Army that played the major role in this field. This development was due largely to the Army's failure to persuade the Home Ministry to extend the range of 'suspended matters' in the sphere of foreign policy and military affairs. The policy popularly adopted by the major newspapers at the time of employing well-known ex-soldiers as military correspondents made it particularly sensitive to the press criticism directed at its policy towards Manchuria and disarmament.[54] Foreign Minister Shidehara's somewhat aloof attitude towards the press criticism of these issues did not help to calm down the frustration felt by the Army. The result was that ambitious and rebellious soldiers who held a grandiose scheme for Manchuria and military expansion came to regard the newspapers as an enemy.[55]

The initial method used by the Newspaper Unit was to issue to the press protests, verbally or in writing, in the name of the vice Chief-of-Staff or the bureau chiefs whenever Army policy was criticised. If this did not work, the Imperial Reservist Association was activated to form a 'boycott alliance'. Alternatively, right-wing organisations were employed to bring about even more direct physical damage to the staff or machinery of the newspaper concerned.[56] Not surprisingly, it was the Asahi of Tokyo and Osaka that became the main target of these attacks.

The Army's hostility against the two sister newspapers was based on their influence rather than their content, considering the virtual uniformity in the tenor of the opinions expressed in various newspapers at the time. The Osaka Asahi whose critical tone against the military

adventurism had been the harshest among the metropolitan newspapers under its chief editor, Takahara Misao,[57] remained under constant physical threat from the Army and its collaborators. The Tokyo Asahi, on the other hand, was a little more 'conciliatory' and thanks to the efforts by its chief editor, Ogata Taketora, to acquaint himself with the top level officials of the Army through various 'meal meetings', it somehow managed to escape the same fate as its sister newspaper. Nevertheless, the Tokyo Asahi was forced, if gradually, to modify its attitudes until the Osaka Asahi finally dropped its vehement anti-military tone in late summer 1931 in return for the promise from the Chief-of-Staff not to mount any attack on Takahara in public.[58] By then, however, the press unity had already been seriously undermined from within as well.

8. Newspaper Executives vs. Reporters

Shidehara may have been 'tolerant' towards press criticism, but his cabinet colleague, Home Minister Adachi, was not. The Minseitō cabinet turned out to be even more ruthless than the previous Seiyūkai government so far as sale bans were concerned. As Tables III - V (See Appendix p.302/3)indicate, the number of sale bans placed on the newspapers increased under the Hamaguchi cabinet even before 1931 although as Tables VII and VIII (see Appendix p.305) show, the major newspapers were still mostly exempt from such treatment. The press hope for the easing of press control under the new cabinet should have been high, as Prime Minister Hamaguchi made the following remark in his inaugural speech in July 1929:

> We are especially grateful to the press which presented authoritative criticism on behalf of society. We should henceforth realise that although the government needs the assistance of the party in the enforcement of various policies, we cannot do ~~so~~ without the support of the press organisations.[59]

It was in fact this statement that encouraged the Authors' Association to organise immediately public debates on the reform of the censorship procedure, though not the entire press control mechanism as in 1926 and 1927. Its members who had unsuccessfully fought for the same cause under the Tanaka cabinet, however, soon discovered that the new government was as reluctant to comply with their wish as ever.[60] The increasing number of 'pre-warnings' issued by Home Minister Adachi began to cause some anxiety even among the major newspapers which had basically been sympathetic towards the Hamaguchi cabinet. It was no surprise, therefore, that the detention of a Jijishinpō correspondent, Hosokoshi Masao, by the police over the condition of hospitalised Hamaguchi on 7 December 1930 led to a joint public condemnation of the government signed by the Cabinet Correspondents Club which read:

> The government attitude towards the press has recently been increasingly violent and the unjustifiable suspension of articles and the seizure ofnewspapers are more frequent than ever....It is extremely regrettable that the government threatens the freedom to report. We do not accept it simply as the willful neglect of correct procedures on the part of the police authorities, but recognise it as a systematic assault on the press by the government. We strongly censure it on this issue.[61]

What was significant about this declaration was that it indicated the growing disunity between the executives and reporters of the member newspapers of the Club though the reader may not have realised it. Unlike at the time of a similar confrontation between the press and the current Seiyūkai government immediately preceding the Tsinan incident in 1928,[62] the declaration was made in the name not of the newspapers themselves but of the correspondents' club, and received far less publicity. It was, in fact, the result of the conflict in process between the executives of the newspapers and the correspondents' clubs.

The correspondents' clubs in Japan were the product of the unique Japanese situation in which there was no single powerful news agency for the government to release news through. The ever intensifying sales war among the newspapers had also prompted each Tokyo newspaper to keep its own reporter at every major government department. Originally despised as 'news hunters', these relatively young, inexperienced, impressionable and yet proud reporters had been encouraged by their employers to form their own clubs at the department to which they were attached. They included Kasumikai at the Foreign Ministry, Kuroshiokai at the Navy Ministry, Rikugunshō Kisha Kurabu at the Army Ministry and the Cabinet Correspondents Club.[63]

The first real test for Kasumikai to be accepted as a semi-autonomous body of any significance came when Katō Takaaki, the Foreign Minister of the Ōkuma cabinet, tried to silence the criticism from its members by issuing Foreign Ministry Ordinance No.1 over the Twenty-One Demands in 1915. Although this motion was strictly within the legal framework (Article 27 of the Newspaper Law), the outraged club members forced Katō to back down through the mediation of the informal group of the chief editors of the Tokyo newspapers called Shunjūkai[64] which was sympathetic to the cabinet.[65]

The second and more important confrontation between Kasumikai and the Foreign Ministry took place three years later when the club members questioned the wisdom of the Siberian expedition in their articles. Public opinion on the whole supported their argument and Foreign Minister Gotō Shinpei was forced to recognise, albeit unofficially, the 'independence' of the club once again through Shunjūkai.[66] This, however, proved to be the turning point for Shunjūkai.

The initial cause for the decline of its authority was its failure to keep up with the discontent of the people during the Rice Riot which coincided with the controversy over the Siberian expedition.[67] The Great Earthquake of 1923 and the subsequent increase in the relative influence of the two Osaka newspaper concerns within the press finally persuaded their Tokyo rivals to agree to the replacement of Shunjūkai with the 21st Day Club whose members consisted of the chief editors or their equivalents of not only the Shunjūkai member newspapers in Tokyo but also the Osaka newspapers and the two major news agencies.[68]

The increased influence of the new group was amply indicated when public opinion with its full backing finally forced the government to accept the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1925, although the simultaneous enforcement of the Peace Preservation Law somewhat overshadowed its achievement. It was also largely the united press opposition led by the 21st Day Club that killed the reform proposals for a new Publication Law in 1926 and 1927.[69] This was, however, the height of its authority as a major Opposition force.

The first major challenge to test this unofficial body came when the government issued a suspension order on the assassination on Chang Tso-lin in 1928 to which the press failed to voice any public protest. The credibility of the 21st Day Club was further undermined when the Navy successfully persuaded it to support the 'three fundamental claims' at the London naval conference. Most significant was, however, the open defiance of its authority by the reporters attached to the Navy in the post-London conference dispute between the government and the Navy.

This defiance appeared in the form of the 'anti-treaty' articles

written by the members of Kuroshiokai, the correspondents' club at the Navy, while the leader composed by the 21st Day Club members or their immediate subordinates within the editorial department suddenly reversed its former attitude and became 'pro-government' and 'pro-treaty'. It was indeed the growing degree of 'independence' among the correspondents' clubs, which culminated in this defiance, that led the 21st Day Club to embark on its attempt in November 1930 to reform them. It was no surprise therefore that when the Hosokoshi affair took place a few weeks later, the declaration was signed only in the name of the Cabinet Correspondents Club without the endorsement of the editors of its member newspapers.[70]

Such a development at this juncture did nothing but ~~to~~ strengthen the determination of the reporters in their fight against their employers. Although the 21st Day Club managed, with the tacit approval of the Minseitō cabinet, to dissolve the semi-autonomous correspondents' clubs on 21 April 1931, its subsequent attempt to establish the much less influential 'committees' in their place failed in the face of the unanimous opposition from the reporters who organised the United League of Newspaper and News Agency Correspondents as a countermeasure.[71]

The repercussions of this 'defeat' by the 21st Day Club proved much more serious than it may have realised at the time. As the eventful summer arrived, the disunity within the Club which had arisen, if gradually, from the ever increasing sales competition between the member newspapers and the hitherto hidden differences in their attitudes towards China began to surface.[72] By the time the group met on 21 September, three days after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese

hostility in Manchuria, its decline as an Opposition force had been so total that its members 'did nothing more than have a cup of tea and a chat'.[73] Meanwhile the correspondents in China continued to send in increasingly 'anti-government' and 'anti-Shidehara' articles, often contradicting the still relatively 'pro-government' tone of the leader.

CHAPTER VI - China Correspondents

1. Control of Overseas Communication

Overseas communication with Japan was under the legal control of the Communications Ministry rather than the Home Ministry. Article 48 of the Overseas Telegram Act (Gaikoku Denpō Kisoku) obliged the newspaper or news agency to send out or receive the telegram at the local telecommunication office where it had to submit either the original or a copy of the telegram simultaneously. This telegram was subsequently forwarded to the Communication Ministry from which other government departments could obtain a copy.[1]

Censorship placed upon overseas telegrams had been rigorous and, not surprisingly, became a main point of conflict between the government and the press when the two abortive reform proposals for a new Publication Law were debated at the Imperial Diet in 1926 and 1927. On 21 August 1926, a conference sponsored by the Tokyo branch of the League of Nations Secretariat was held between fourteen metropolitan newspapers and two news agencies which passed a resolution calling for the abolition of censorship in peace-time. A year later when discussing their policy for the coming international conference of newspaper experts at Geneva,[2] they reconfirmed this view claiming that censorship by itself could neither stop the incoming or outgoing of falsified or wrong reports across the state border nor prevent the fabrication of news by those ill-disposed towards the government. Their final resolution which was to be presented as their proposal at Geneva was sent to several government departments and contained the following clauses among its 'minimum' demands to be guaranteed by every government of the world:

1. Telegrams should be censored by experts and be despatched as soon as possible thereafter.

2. Instructions given to these experts should be notified in advance so that the correspondents could also modify the telegrams.

3. The correspondents should be notified of the deleted parts and of the exceptional delay of communication. They should also be able to choose whether to despatch or withdraw the censored or delayed correspondence.

4. Every correspondent should be given equal treatment without exception.[3]

The relative ease for the government to influence the selection of overseas telegrams for publication by the newspapers was often evident to the reader especially at the time of the Shantung expeditions in 1927 and 1928. The tenor of the published despatches from China was decisively in favour of the Northern clique suggesting that the law and order of the area had become lax when the Nationalist influence expanded whereas the recovery of the North was usually described as a return to normality among the local residents.[4] Yoshino Sakuzō regretted this phenomenon in Chūōkōron:

> I find it very difficult to understand such a heavy suppression of the discussion of the China expedition, not to mention the fact that the present cabinet is too obsessed with the opposing arguments among the people.... The government claims that if it allowed such arguments to spread, the morale of the expeditionary forces would be adversely affected. Do the people, however, really have to keep silent so as to let the government force through its own mistakes?[5]

On the other hand, there were various ways to escape the legal control channels if the newspaper or news agency so wished. The correspondents could and did use illegal transmitters to despatch telegrams to Japan at least until January 1932 when Iwanaga Yūkichi, the deputy

Communications Minister and the president of the news agency, Rengō, came under fire from the military authorities for such usage by his company.[6] Some of the telegrams which appeared under the guise of 'received somewhere' (bōsho chakuden) may well have been these illegal despatches.[7]

An equally common practice was to send reports in a letter to Moji, the first port of call from Manchuria and other parts of China, whereupon the resident correspondent conveyed them to his head office in Osaka or Tokyo on the uncensored domestic telephone.[8] Alternatively, the correspondent in Manchuria could telephone or write to his colleague in Peking or Tientsin from where the reports were forwarded to Japan as 'Peking (or Tientsin) telegrams', thus escaping the vigorous censorship placed on despatches sent out from the Japanese administered post office in the railway concession zone in Manchuria. Indeed, it was this method that was used to disclose the secret Sino-Japanese 'railway negotiations' in Manchuria in 1928 much to the embarrassment of the Tanaka cabinet. Not only had the publication of reports on the subject in the concession zone been banned by the Kwantung Government-General but under the same order their transmission to Japan had also been closely monitored by the local post offices. Nevertheless, some articles on this very subject had started appearing in the newspaper in Japan from mid-September onwards. The local Japanese language newspaper subsequently filed a request to the Kwantung Government-General to lift the suspension order, which was promptly carried out without consultation with the Consul General at Mukden, Hayashi Kyūjirō, who in turn wrote to Tanaka on 18 October:

> Considering the current situation in the negotiations, I, together with the South Manchuria Railways which holds similar views, immediately proposed the reinforcement of the suspension....The reply [of the Kwantung Government General] was that it would be difficult to comply with my request so soon after the lifting. We have therefore decided to leave it as it is for the moment in the light of this inescapable situation.[9]

Hayashi and those involved in the railway negotiations were also dissatisfied with the 'lax' control of overseas communication. The Overseas Telegram Act did not oblige the newspaper to publish the telegrams unaltered and the 'fabrication', 'restructuring' and 'enlargement' of the original despatches under the name of 'special telegrams' by the editorial department was a constant embarrassment to the Foreign Ministry.[10] This led Foreign Minister Tanaka to establish a coordination committee between the three government departments closely involved in this issue. Tanaka wrote to chargé d'affaires at Peking, Hori, on 12 January 1929:

> Considering the articles and the telegrams from China . . ., it was thought necessary for the Foreign Ministry and the Metropolitan Police to keep close contacts with each other in order to provide prompt and appropriate measures to control them. It was therefore decided to establish a committee which consists of a member from each of these three bodies. They will be meeting regularly once a week at this Ministry and the first one should be held on the coming 14th.[11]

What Tanaka should not have forgotten was to include the military authorities, who had been working to win over the correspondents in China since the Tsinan incident in May 1928.

2. Correspondents and the Army

When the Tsinan incident broke out, the press had been voicing anti-military views for some years. The conclusion of the Washington

naval treaty in 1922 and the abolition of four army divisions a year later had been strongly supported by public opinion initiated by the press. It was also the time when the former war correspondents, some of whom had become the staff members of the editorial department, still remembered the ill treatment provided by the military authorities during the Shantung campaign in the First World War and the Siberian expedition.[12] A Dentsū correspondent who had been sent to Shantung recalled twenty years later:

> Correspondents from the newspapers in Tokyo and the provinces were assigned to Tsingtao, but their treatment [by the military authorities] was not much better than at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. They were not allowed to engage in active reporting and some spirited ones were outraged and even gave up their duty on the front to return to Japan.[13]

Such antipathy towards the military authorities was, in spite of their more cautious handling of the press in the earlier half of the 1920s[14], still prevalent when the Tanaka cabinet sent the 'second' Shantung expedition in 1928. A month after the Tsinan incident, the Consul General at Tsinan, Nishida, wrote to Tanaka:

> The correspondents of the newspapers which have been opposed to the expedition such as the Asahi and the [Tokyo] Nichinichi tended to pick holes in the army. They tried to find evil influence in the stationing of troops. On the other hand, those of the local [Japanese-owned] newspapers in Shantung, as well as the newspapers from whose provinces the troops came, praised the military exploits and emphasised the need for the permanent stationing of the troops. Each party put forward its own selfish arguments.[15]

On both occasions, however, it was the supposedly 'anti-military' and 'anti-Seiyūkai' metropolitan newspapers which seemed more eager to

sensationalise the telegrams which either praised the military actions or, in the case of the Tsinan incident, labelled China as 'evil'. Indeed, the 'Seiyūkai newspapers' such as the Fukuoka Nichinichi and the Shin Aichi of Nagoya, with their smaller headings than their metropolitan rivals, appeared much quieter in their reporting.[16] Tables XIII - XV (see Appendix pp308/310) indicate the number of telegrams from China which were published in the Tokyo Asahi, the Tokyo Nichinichi and the Fukuoka Nichinichi in the week immediately after the outbreak of the incident. Communications between Tsinan and other cities in China and Japan had been cut off for two days prior to the incident and telecommunication between Tsinan and Tsingtao was not revived for two weeks. Most of the telegrams listed in the tables were therefore despatched from cities like Tsingtao, Peking and even Shanghai rather than Tsinan itself. Moreover, they had been sent in the first instance by an army officer, Sakai Takashi, who was attached to the consulate at Tsinan but who virtually monopolised the only communication means available, i.e. the wireless at the consulate, without the knowledge of the consulate staffs.[17]

The way in which the newspapers published these unconfirmed telegrams was no different from that during the Manchuria crisis a few years later. While there was little criticism directed at the military authorities in these despatches, China - in this case the revolutionary army - remained the villain with such headings as 'ALAS, THIS ATROCITY! ' (from Tsingtao), 'HEAVEN FORBIDS THIS BRUTALITY! ' (from Tsingtao),[18] and 'JAPANESE RESIDENTS MASSACRED BY SOUTHERN CHINESE ARMY AT TSINAN' (from Tientsin)[19] were attached to the short telegrams

which often contained nothing more than a rumour. The following Tokyo Nichinichi telegram was a typical example of the manner in which the text of such unconfirmed despatches were presented to the reader:

> There is a rumour that ON THE MORNING OF 3 MAY ABOUT ONE HUNDRED JAPANESE RESIDENTS WERE MASSACRED BY THE CHINESE SOLDIERS.[19]

This willingness on the part of the newspapers to sensationalise the telegrams had always existed. What was different this time was that these telegrams had originated, if nominally, from their own correspondents or the news agencies rather than the government departments such as the Army or the Foreign Ministry. As Tables XIII - XV (see Appendix pp.308/310) indicate, the number of 'official' telegrams published in the newspapers was negligible compared to that from the commercial sources. This was in marked contrast to the situation at the time of the Siberian expedition when the majority of the telegrams were marked as 'received by the Army Ministry'.[20] This did not mean that the content of these despatches had changed very much but it meant that the potential role played by the corespondents had become more important than ever before. Conversely, it meant that the Army needed to utilise them more systematically if it was to overcome the hitherto apathetic attitudes of the Japanese people towards it. This it did with a considerable degree of success in the immediate aftermath of the Tsinan incident.

The monopoly of the communication facilities by the military authorities continued even after 15 May 1928 and the consulate general at Tsingtao had little information to offer, whereas the army officers were very well informed, as The New York Times correspondent, H. Abend,

discovered.[21] This readiness on the part of the Army was largely due to the following instructions which had been given to the stationing troops from Matsumoto Kenji, the chief of staff of the occupation Sixth Division:

> [The China section of the intelligence department] should follow up public opinion in China and make direct use of the Japanese press organisations and utilise the Chinese ones if possible to propagate favourable opinions for the enforcement of our national policy and international relations.... [22]

It is hardly surprising that the Japanese military authorities at Tsinan exercised indiscriminate censorship on the outgoing despatches from the correspondents which subsequently led to a public accusation in the Chicago Tribune against the Japanese government.[23] Foreign Minister Tanaka, who was sensitive to the bad effect that such action might have on public opinion abroad, wrote on 26 May to acting Consul General Nishida at Tsinan:

> Needless to say, you should never take any action such as censoring mails or telegrams which can be regarded as the enforcement of military administration unless it is absolutely necessary. Our army should therefore refrain as much as possible from getting involved with the censorship carried out by the Chinese in the name of assistance and correspondence. Please make sure to inform this to the military authorities in your area. I have already consulted the military authorities here.[24]

Unlike the foreign correspondents, however, many of the Japanese correspondents were only too willing to accept such 'assistance' from the army. The correspondents of the two giant newspapers were given every imaginable help from the divisional headquarters to shoot a film

about Tsinan after the incident, which was subsequently advertised and released free to the public under the headings like 'FILMED WITH DO-OR-DIE SPIRIT BY OUR CORRESPONDENT'.[25] They were also supplied with the written impressions of the incident collected almost forcibly from the Japanese residents, especially refugees and the hospital staff in charge of the wounded, which were duly published in Japan. The local Japanese language newspaper, Seito Nippo (the Tsingtao Daily) was also taken over by the intelligence section which sent out over one thousand copies of this newspaper to various organisations in China as well as in Japan. Influential visitors from Japan such as Diet members were provided with the fullest possible explanation of the 'real' situation. It was, according to the divisional headquarters, all to 'correct any wrong observation being presented by the press to the people in Japan and to create a unified national opinion in support of the occupying troops'.[26]

These tactics worked so long as the consulates remained ill-informed. As the temporary hysteria over the incident subsided, however, the press in Japan, armed with the more accurate later accounts of the situation provided by the Foreign Ministry as well as those of the more 'anti-military' correspondents, revived its criticism of the military authorities. It was in this context that the divisional headquarters at Tsinan realised the need to 'educate' the correspondents more systematically as the intelligence section suggested:

> Among the newspapers in Japan, those which were opposed to the government published articles disadvantageous to the troops. This in turn was sometimes utilised by the Chinese newspapers and diplomats as material which they could turn to advantage in the Sino-Japanese negotiations, especially over the Tsinan incident. Even

> the disorganised Chinese newspapers did not publish articles which disregarded national defence consideration. We believe that we should not only provide the method to educate the correspondents but to study further how to control them.[27]

Such realisation by the military authorities at this juncture was to prove of vital importance as the Foreign Ministry, confronted by the growing anti-Japanese sentiment in China and embarrassed by the assassination of Chang Tso-lin, looked set to conduct the Sino-Japanese negotations even more secretively than before, which in turn was bound to increase the hostility among the correspondents who were eager to obtain more, if not full, information over the negotiations.

3. Correspondents and the Foreign Ministry

The Japanese press had long looked to the government for official guidance[28] and the establishment of the Information Bureau by the Foreign Ministry in 1920 was designed to fulfil this need with its twice-daily interviews with the Japanese press and three times weekly meetings with the foreign correspondents.[29] The growing, if superficial, bond between the Bureau and the press was reflected in the support given by the Foreign Ministry for the establishment of the cooperative news agency, Rengō, in 1926.

On the other hand, the relationship between the consulates and the correspondents in China had never been so close as that in Japan. No press officer to deal with the correspondents was attached to any of the consulates in spite of their repeated request to the Ministry.[30] The difficulty was enhanced by the strict secrecy in which the consulate officials had to conduct the negotiations. It was perhaps too wishful for the Foreign Ministry and the consulates to hope that the correspondents and their employers in Japan who aspired for 'scoops' would not

outwit them, and the first occasion arrived towards the end of 1928.

Consul General in Shanghai, Yata Shichitarō, who had been engaged in the negotiations over the Tsinan incident, decided to stop the correspondents coming into his office for interviews and to let them see vice-Consul Iguchi in the drawing room instead. On 18 January 1929, the day before Minister Yoshizawa was due to arrive from Peking, however, Yata himself met the correspondents from fear that any misjudged report on the negotiations would be detrimental to the delicate Sino-Japanese relationship. Despite doing so, his apprehensions were to be realised.

Hōchi Shinbun, the Tokyo daily, either misquoted or 'fabricated' a telegram concerning this interview under the name of 'Rengō telegram' on 19 January which quoted Yata to have said that 'owing to the inconsistent China diplomacy of the present government, China will take advantage of this weakness of Japan'.[31] The Foreign Ministry immediately instructed Yata to release his views in the form of a statement rather than an interview so as to avoid the recurrence of such an incident. Yata was, however, to utilise this development to make the current negotiations even more secretive as he wrote back to Foreign Minister Tanaka on 22 January:

> I believe that I have acquired a good excuse for my manoeuvring of them [i.e. the Japanese correspondents] and I will most certainly refuse any future interviews. I should be grateful if you arrange to make Hōchi Shinbun publish a statement withdrawing the telegram according to the Newspaper Law. It is necessary for my tactical dealings with them.[32]

Although this particular telegram was supposed to have originated from Rengō which received subsidy from the Foreign Ministry, the company which most frequently annoyed the consulates was the independent

news agency, Dentsū. Dentsū's leaning towards sensationalism had been known for a long time and as such it had received repeated warnings from the Ministry. On 2 March 1926, for example, Foreign Minister Shidehara received a letter from Yata on a small incident on the Yangtse which had been grossly distorted by Dentsū:

> Fabrications by the correspondents are, to some extent, forgivable owing to the competitive necessity to report quickly. Those by the head offices are, however, totally inexcusable. When I summoned and questioned the head of the Dentsū Shanghai office which had always supplied 'sensational' telegrams, his answer was: 'I thought that I had sent a resolute telegram, but I was scorned by the head office that it was not enough'. When I enquired into it further by saying, 'but how can you find materials?', he replied, 'I can always make them up' in a matter of fact way. I was struck dumb with amazement.[33]

By the spring of 1929, Dentsū had already been barred from collecting materials at the government departments of China in Peking owing to its sensational reportings over the Tsinan incident. Its correspondents in the city therefore had been forced to rely more or less solely on the regular interviews at the Japanese legation and the 'news' from the military officers attached to it.[34] The increasing secrecy surrounding the negotiations over the Tsinan incident and the railways in Manchuria had turned the Dentsū and other correspondents further towards these service officers. This in turn caused more embarrassment to the Foreign Ministry and the consulate which were incapable of preventing this trend, as the following note from chargé d'affairs Hori on 7 March suggested.

> Considering that the Dentsū correspondent concerned is sometimes reported to have conveyed propaganda reports based on the information provided by the military attaches, it probably originated from these

> officers. Although on every opportunity I have warned them not to distribute their propaganda reports, I have not been successful.... As you know, the Japanese authorities have been troubled by the various unfounded reports sent and received by the correspondents in the wake of the situation.[35]

Such a tendency on the part of Dentsū may well have arisen partly from its hostility towards the Foreign Ministry which subsidised its rival, Rengō, whose 'reliability' and 'respectability' had, in turn, been enhanced in spite of its late start as a news agency. At least, this was the general feeling among the consulate officials. As Hayashi Kyujirō, the consul general at Mukden, reported on 29 November 1928:

> It has been a very noticeable trend recently that factual reports have to be obtained from Rengō as much as possible. Dentsū's Mukden office is prompt in its reporting activity, but a lot of imported reports [from Japan] are 'sensationalised'.[36]

As Hayashi's letter suggested, the local offices of the two Japanese news agencies in China were acting not only as the 'exporter' of news to Japan but as the 'importer' of news from Japan. Indeed, they had been supplying reports from Japan and other parts of China to the local newspapers in China regardless of their ownership. The more sensational the reports from Japan they supplied, therefore, the greater the possibility of these telegrams being 'utilised' to further the anti-Japanese sentiment in China, as Hori regretted in his letter from Peking to Tokyo on 28 March 1929:

> Dentsū tends to rehash the articles in the newspapers in Japan and to distribute 'sensational' reports. As a result, it has often been utilised by some quarters here, thus getting us into trouble.[37]

The effects of such a tendency had not been confined to official quarters. Although the Japanese newspapers tended only to report the hardening attitudes among the Japanese residents as a reaction towards the growing anti-Japanese sentiment of their Chinese neighbours, even though this had itself often been of their own making, the more conscientious among them had felt genuine concern over this tendency. In 1927, just after the expedition had been carried out, a Japanese merchant in Manchuria wrote to the Tokyo Nichinichi editor in the Tsunobue column:

> Japanese residents are facing enormous obstacles in their business transactions because of the 'nonsense' [yota] telegrams filled with false information which have been published all over Japan. We have been much affected, directly or indirectly, and the situation is becoming more like that of 'nonsense telegrams kill the residents'. I urge you that you will give cool judgments on the telegrams not only from Manchuria but also from China.[38]

A year later, a Japanese resident critic in China, Gotō Chōtarō, criticised the Japanese press for preventing the establishment of 'national diplomacy' between the two peoples which the press had always claimed to be its final goal. The publication of only those which reported the anti-Japanese movements or murders of Japanese residents by the 'bandits' simply encouraged, according to him, the protagonists of anti-Chinese movements in Japan. Gotō contended in Gaikōjihō:

> The attitudes of the Japanese people are too obvious and honest and contain too little latitutde. They get furious too easily and tend to acquire an acute pleasure from making every Chinese action an object of attack. Some earnest ones are even convinced that they want to be in the forefront of this constantly. I believe that this is nothing more than 'a ricecake in a picture' of those who do not understand China.[39]

The protagonists in the 'forefront' were exactly what many of the Japanese correspondents in China were becoming in the spring of 1929. Predictably, an increasing number of protests to the Foreign Ministry were issued by the Chinese government requesting the tighter control of the anti-Chinese articles in Japan, which in turn flowed into China in an exaggerated form. The inability on the part of the Foreign Ministry to comply with the Chinese request in spite of its cooperation with the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry and the Communications Ministry forced the consulates to devise a standard reply to the Chinese government. Although the wording may have varied slightly, the content of the following telegram of 30 October 1929 by Shigemitsu Mamoru, the consul general in Shanghai at the time and later the Minister to China, to Foreign Minister Shidehara was often repeated by himself and his colleagues:

> I told the Chinese authorities that it was difficult for Japanese officials to control the newspapers and news agencies officially. I also said that it was clear that the Japanese people felt sympathy with the Chinese people and that Japan would not benefit from her involvement in the disturbance of the political situation in China. I added, however, that I would do my best in my capacity. I shall be giving guidance to the parties concerned in the belief that it would be effective in inducing the Chinese to comply with our demands concerning the control of the anti-Japanese articles.[40]

This was mere platitude, however, and less than two months later, impatient with the ineffectiveness of such protests, the Chinese government resorted to direct action by suspending the activity of Dentsū and warned the other correspondents of the danger of receiving the same treatment. This finally prompted Shigemitsu to request Shidehara to ask for the cooperation of the military authorities in Tokyo as well

as the long overdue installation of a press attache at every major consulate in China. Shigemitsu wrote on 23 December:

> The correspondents do not like the fair observations provided by the consulates and are willing to contact the military organisations, thus inviting the misunderstanding that they are aiming at the confusion of the Chinese situation. Needless to say, this is not the true intention of the military authorities. I believe that to eliminate such abuse, it is advisable for the military authorities in Tokyo to issue strict instructions to the outstation authorities in order to make it totally impossible for the latter to supply materials to the newspapes and news agencies. I urge you to work to this end.[41]

Such attempts had already been made under the direction of Shidehara and Tanaka before him, and the Foreign Ministry had been able, to some extent, to establish a closer working relationship with the military authorities in Tokyo. The Military Affairs Section of the Army Ministry, for example, had sent the following instructions, four months before Shigemitsu's request, to the officers attached to the legation in Peking and the consulates in other Chinese cities:

> The use of the shortwave owned by the Foreign Ministry for military telegrams is under negotiation.... It is advised that you take the utmost caution to prevent the lack of understanding [between you and the consulate officials] which has, in the past, sometimes been reported concerning the communication facilities.[42]

The closer cooperation in Tokyo did not, however, necessarily lead to a similar situation in China. What Tokyo did not fully realise was that the officers and the correspondents in China had sufficient in common to become more sympathetic than antagonistic towards each other. As Shigemitsu realised, the Japanese correspondents in China were not very well acquainted with international relations. Like their fellow reporters in Japan, they were generally young and

inexperienced, and to most of them China was their first overseas assignment. At the same time, they were eager to outdo their colleagues in Europe and the U.S. who had been regarded as the 'elite' among the employees of the newspapers and news agencies. Much of this applied also to the military attachés at the consulates in China who were becoming increasingly impatient with the more moderate attitudes of their superiors in Tokyo, and were therefore supplying audacious criticism of the political situation in China mainly from their rather narrow military point of view. Shigemitsu wrote to Shidehara on the effect of such affinities between the correspondents and the military attachés in China on 23 December 1929:

> Looking at the current state of the Japanese correspondents, they are all too eager in their chase after novel materials. They pay little attention to what the reports from Japan as well as other parts of China will have on the Sino-Japanese relationship. They tend deliberately to accept and despatch these clearly propaganda reports and rumours so long as their contents are 'sensational'. Such tendency has been particularly noticeable recently. As a result, it is not rare for them to have had bad effects on the relationship between the two countries which is filled with difficult questions.[43]

4. Correspondents and the Chinese Goverment

While press attention during most of the year 1930 was focused on the controversy over the London naval treaty, the conflict between the Japanese correspondents and the Chinese government had been simmering quietly until it finally came to the surface towards the summer. This time it was the Osaka Mainichi, the parent company of the Tokyo Nichinichi, that was the centre of dispute.

It all started with the publication of a lengthy 'telegram' sent by its correspondent, Tanaka Yukitoshi, in the two sister newspapers on 19 June. This despatch was entitled 'Interview with Mr. Chiang Kai-shek at the Front' and was presented as the 'top article' on the front page covering six columns.[44] Despite the headline, however, Chiang had apparently never given the interview. Still more infuriating to the Chinese leader was its reference to his 'female companion' who was not his wife, and who accompanied him 'even on his inspection tour'.[45] Chiang subsequently sent a formal complaint through the Chinese government to the Japanese correspondents' club in Shanghai and threatened to file an official protest with the Japanese government. Alarmed, Consul Kamimura at Nanking summoned the Osaka Mainichi correspondent in the city, Yoshioka, who subsequently confessed that his employer, having heard of Chiang's reaction, had sent Tanaka Yukitoshi to Shanghai to find out and report back immediately on

(1) the private behaviour of both the Chinese leader and his wife,

(2) his 'extravagant' conduct and her past history,

(3) the emotional strains between the couple caused by the 'interview'

etc. Kamimura wrote to Shidehara on 26 June:

> Such personal attack will not only damage the prestige of a major newspaper like the Osaka Mainichi but also affect considerably the Sino-Japanese relationship. I therefore strongly instructed Yoshioka to refrain from despatching such 'reports' and he expressed his sympathy towards my view. I believe that you should likewise instruct Shanghai to show utmost caution on this subject and the Osaka Mainichi head office should be admonished from the Foreign Ministry itself.[46]

This incident, however, did not end here. The Asahi of Tokyo and Osaka published a report on 7 July quoting Chiang's outrage over

the unfounded 'interview' by Tanaka Yukitoshi,[47] which in turn led to the immediate launching of a 'positive campaign' against the Chinese government by the executive committee of his employer, the Osaka Mainichi. Only hours after the appearance of the Asahi article, the Osaka Mainichi Shanghai correspondent, Sawamura, was warned to be prepared to follow this campaign and his colleague at Nanking, Yoshioka, to be ready to leave at a moment's notice. Such was the rivalry between the two newspaper concerns that Shigemitsu, now chargé d'affaires, reported to Shidehara on 9 July:

> Sawamura added that though he did not know the detailed policies of the campaign, he thought that they were (1) to expose the fact that Nanking had been working on every Japanese trading company to get its war expense, (2) to side with the Northern cliques, (3) to disclose the private conduct of Chiang Kai-shek .... I had hoped that this matter would not become a big affair. I believe that should the Osaka Mainichi resort to such policies henceforth because of its rivalry against the Asahi, it would not only affect the relationship between the two countries but also damage the reputation of both newspapers. I urge you therefore to advise the Osaka Mainichi in an appropriate way.[48]

While these requests poured into the Foreign Ministry from China, the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichinichi went on to publish another article by the unrepentant Tanaka Yukitoshi to challenge the Asahi report. It read:

> Why did they take such attitudes? Those who have read my telegram carefully or who know how I outwitted the other correspondents in reaching the battlefront would dismiss it with a laugh. I simply wrote the factsand had no other intentions. As I composed it on the busy battlefront, however, I cannot guarantee that there was absolutely no mistake in the telegram.[49]

Shidehara, who had been very reluctant to get involved with any

affairs of this kind, remained surprisingly lenient to such development and wrote back to Shigemitsu two days later on 18 July:

> I believed that this affair had arisen mainly from the rivalry between the two newspaper concerns and felt it advisable not to get involved too much. I let, however, the vice-Foreign Minister immediately advise the Osaka Mainichi through the General Manager of the Tokyo Nichinichi, Okazaki, for more caution at the time. The despatch from Tanaka published on 16 July could be taken as an apologetic one in some way. I have so far not seen any articles which we should be concerned about.[50]

What the Foreign Minister did not realise was that the hostility of the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichinichi towards China had been growing, if steadily, since the establishment of the East Asia Research Centre (Tōa Chōsakai) by their chairman, Motoyama Hikoichi, on 27 July 1929, barely three weeks after Shidehara resumed his duty as Foreign Minister of the new Minseitō cabinet. Consisting mostly of the staff members of the editorial department of the two sister newspapers,[51] the chief aim of this Centre was to 'study the national policy' on its own initiative because, Motoyama claimed, the political parties were too preoccupied with the immediate power struggle within the country to produce any coherent policy towards the''grave crisis in East Asia'.[52] At its second conference on 8 February 1930, the Centre passed resolutions on what it considered the five most immediate issues between China and Japan including extra-territoriality and anti-Japanese boycotts. When the conclusions of this conference were sent out to various government departments and private organisations, both within and without Japan, in Japanese, Chinese and English, however, the resolution on railway construction was left out owing to, according to Motoyama, 'its possible effects on the Sino-Japanese

relationship at the time'. Even so, as he himself recalled two years later, the repercussions of this action by the Centre were considerable:

> The spirit of these resolutions was that we should not follow behind Europe or the U.S. in dealing with China or Russia but pursue forceful (kyōkō) diplomacy. Nobody disagrees with it today, but in those days even the government officials were very embarrassed to receive them. Some people misunderstood it and called us reactionary. It was only after the outbreak of the Manchuria incident last September that the nation realised how influential these resolutions had been.[53]

When press attention was recast on China following the subsidence of the controversy over the London naval treaty towards the end of 1930, its focus was, not surprisingly, the 'railway issue'. The press in Tokyo started to publish articles demanding an early settlement of this sensitive issue especially after Chang Hsüeh-liang's visit to Chiang Kai-shek during the months of November and December. The increasing number of 'anti-Chinese' despatches in the major Japanese newspapers led to a similar situation in the number of official protests filed by the Chinese government which in turn made the Japanese consulates more defensive.[54] The continuing silence on the subject by the Foreign Ministry and the South Manchuria Railway which were to begin the negotiations with the Chinese at Mukden at the end of January 1931 even tempted the Foreign Ministry-subsidised Rengō to distribute fabricated 'despatches from Mukden'. Only this time it was the head office rather than the correspondents that was directly responsible.

These 'telegrams' claimed (1) that China would restrict the South Manchuria Railways with a plan to build a railway network based

on the anti-Japanese decision taken by both Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsüeh-liang, (2) that China intended to establish a bank at Mukden with 30 million yuans jointly financed by Britain and China, and (3) that the anti-Japanese tendency at Mukden had been espeically noticeable recently. The Rengō ~~head~~ office also released a 'telegram from Nanking' suggesting that the relationship between Chang Hsüeh-liang and his influential uncle had been deteriorating, thus increasing the possibility of civil war in Manchuria etc.[55] The result of these reports was illustrated in the following Tokyo Asahi leader of 24 January:

> What we cannot overlook is his [i.e. Shidehara's] misunderstanding of and conclusions about the Chinese situation.... Why has he not, in the name of the Japanese people, demanded that the Republic of China reflect its behaviouror shown his determination to settle the situation in, as he put it, an appropriate manner? We cannot help feeling appalled by his total silence over the wrong-doings and real situation and his assertion that the Republic has no intention of endangering the position of the South Manchuria Railways.[56]

Alarmed at such repercussions not just in Japan but also in ~~China, Consul~~ General Hayashi summoned the Rengō Mukden correspondent who denied any involvement in these 'telegrams'. Subsequent inquiries by both parties discovered who had been behind this controversy, as Hayashi wrote to Shidehara on 31 January:

> The head office [of Rengō] replied that these reports had come from the military authorities. As you know, the anti-Japanese sentiment here in Mukden has been, if anything, on the decline in the last couple of years.... A news agency such as Rengō which should be impartial should not be utilised by some ambitious people to hurt the feeling of the Mukden authorities. The harm, direct or indirect, will not be small today as we are to start the railway negotiations. May I therefore bother you, to give a severe warning to the Rengō head office?[57]

What Hayashi did not realise was that even while he was composing this letter, there was developing a major confrontation between the correspondents and the South Manchuria Railway over the secretive handling of the negotiations. On 30 January, vice-chief of the Negotiation Bureau of the railway company, Ishikawa, decided to ban visits by the press to his office. The ostensible reason given for this sudden action was that the office was too small for his staffs to cope with the corespondents while carrying out the normal work efficiently. The real cause was, however, that Ishikawa, like Hayashi with whom he was cooperating over the negotiations, had been annoyed by the harm done to the preliminary negotiations by the press and that he felt it impossible to keep the strict confidentiality of the official negotiations if he allowed the press access to his office. Outraged, the correspondents from thirteen organisations including the two giant newspaper concerns and the two major news agencies filed on the following day a formal protest to the company which read:

> We regard the notification from the Negotiation Bureau as most contemptuous. We therefore demand an apology from the bureau as well as the immediate withdrawal of the notification.[58]

Even more infuriating to the correspondents was the official order a few weeks later that the Chinese Post Office should refuse any of their telegrams to and from Japan. Nanking also instructed the Chinese newspapers not to publish any Rengō telegrams. Although the Rengō correspondents had encountered similar treatment in Manchuria since the 'telegrams from Mukden' affair in January, it was the publication of another Rengō telegram by the Japanese newspapers on 4 March

that led to these measures from Nanking. This telegram sent by the Nanking correspondent, Sasaki, claimed that the leader of the Board of Legislation, Hu Han-min, had been under house arrest because of his disagreement with Chiang Kai-shek.[59] Although Nanking lifted its orders on the telegrams, other than those from Rengō, within a month, the correspondents took the case to Kamimura, the consul general at Nanking, who informed Shidehara on 4 April:

> The correspondents said that the time had come for them to regard it as their common problem and asked me to understand that there was no way other than to start a fight against the Kuomintang government.... I gave necessary instructions and warnings to the Rengō office here to try to resolve the issue on this occasion, to which it agreed. I fear, however, that the subject might be reported in an exaggerated manner.[60]

Indeed, the correspondents were no longer interested in a local settlement and sent an appeal jointly to the Foreign Minister on the same day asking for diplomatic intervention by the Foreign Ministry itself. This appeal was also published by the newspapers in Japan two days later as a joint declaration in the name of the China correspondents and read:

> We specially deplore their unjust suppression of the press organisations.... To ignore such abuse of the Japanese press organisations is not only to accept its [Nanking's] contempt for the press but to damage the dignity of the state. We therefore unitedly wish to appeal to the opinion of the people in order to protect our right as well as to correct the arrogance of the Kuomintang government.[61]

Such public condemnation of the Chinese government by the correspondents made the resolution of this issue even more difficult. The executives of the Japanese newspapers and news agencies who belonged

to the 21st Day Club may have wished to help Shidehara but seemed to have no choice other than to back this motion.[62] The dilemma which faced the Foreign Minister even before the eventful summer was, however, undoubtedly the most difficult. As Shigemitsu observed on 18 April:

> The Foreign Office [of China] would not respond with an unconditional surrender in this atmosphere. The propaganda [by the Japanese press] will not only complicate the situation further and delay its settlement but worsen the general mood [in China] to the extreme. At the same time, it appears probable that there has been a fairly complex anti-Foreign Ministry and anti-government plan behind the agitation of these correspondents. I hope that you will take appropriate measures to prevent such a plot by Rengō and others on this understanding.[63]

5. Summer 1931

While the conflict between the Japanese press and the Chinese government remained unresolved,[64] there occurred two unfortunate incidents which were to be fully exploited by the military authorities through the correspondents in their attempt to win over public opinion. Korean peasants, who had settled in the Chientao area in Manchuria clashed with the local Chinese farmers over an irrigation ditch on 1 July. The issue concerning Korean immigrants in Manchuria had come up to the surface occasionally, but neither the Foreign Ministry nor the press had ever treated it as an urgent issue.[65] This time the situation was somewhat different in spite of the fact that there had been no fatalities. Sensational telegrams from Manchuria about the 'persecution' of Korean immigrants by the Chinese authorities led to a series of brutal raids by the Koreans on Chinese residents in Korea. Ironically, however, the subsequent 'sensational' telegrams from the

Japanese correspondents about the brutality of the misguided Koreans in their home land created a more reflective mood in the Japanese press. The Fukuoka Nichinichi, for example, sparing no criticism of the government's neglect of the Korean immigrant issue, wrote on 13 July:

> The blame lies with the Koreans and the Japanese authorities. It will not be an honourable attitude for a great nation if Japan tries to equivocate in this situation with ambiguous statements. Nor will it in fact be the wish of the people. Most of all, it would be unforgiveable to many of the dead Chinese who had been sacrificed in the event if Japan tried to draw a settlement more favourable to her through the misrepresentation of the situation.[66]

The other incident, which was to be fully exploited, as a result of a somewhat unexpected sequence of events, by the antagonists of the 'Shidehara Diplomacy' was the murder by the Chinese soldiers of a Japanese spying mission headed by Captain Nakamura Shintarō in the Hsing-an-ling area on 27 June. Spying activities by the Army Staff officers in the unpermitted areas of Manchuria and Mongolia had been reported to the consulates at least since the summer 1930,[67] and the Nakamura mission had also been known to them for a few weeks when the incident took place. The murder was kept secret by the Chinese authorities for a month before the news finally reached the Japanese authorities. Since the nature of the mission was likely to invite unfavourable publicity internationally, the Army and the Foreign Ministry agreed to keep silent on the issue until the situation became clearer and by means of 'informal advice' through the Home Ministry, they effectively prevented the publication of any articles concerning this incident.[68]

While the press hysteria over the Sino-Korean clashes seemed to be gradually cooling off, Army Minister Minami delivered a speech before the conference of commanders of divisions and fortified zones on 4 August in which he overtly criticised Shidehara's 'failure' in the Sino-Japanese negotiations and called for a 'stronger sense of loyalty and public service' from every soldier. Minami also accused the critics of the Army's retrenchment programmes of spreading propaganda to discredit the military authorities through their advocacy of disarmament in 'total disregard of the actual situation in Manchuria'.[69]

The press reactions were prompt and almost unequivocal in condemning the political implications and suggestions in the speech, which in turn led to an unprecedented move by the Army Minister to refute specifically the Tokyo Asahi leader through its pages.[70] Minami and his subordinates may have anticipated a more favourable reaction in the light of the recent surge of antipathy towards the 'weak-kneed' attitudes of the government in its dealings with the 'contemptuous' China. They must have been aware that the positive defence of the 'Shidehara Diplomacy' which used to appear even in the more 'anti-Shidehara' Gaikō-jihō until the spring had disappeared from virtually every journal.[71] At the same time, they were aware that an increasing number of former advocates of international cooperation in the development of Manchuria and Mongolia had started to favour a more monopolistic policy in these areas.[72] No less encouraging to them perhaps was the reported hardening of the hitherto 'pro-Nanking' attitudes of Ōnishi Sai, the head of the China section of the Tokyo Asahi, since his 'fact-finding tour' throughout China during January and February which had caused much anxiety among the Chinese leaders at the time.[73] What they may not

have realised, however, was that such 'anti-China' and 'anti-Shidehara' sentiment did not necessarily lead to sympathy towards them. Indeed, even the Tokyo Nichinichi whose hardening attitudes towards the China issue had been more noticeable than those of its main rival wrote on 6 August:

> The Army Minister termed the current demand of the people [for the reduction in the military expenditure] as an opinion by 'those who are irresponsible outsiders or those who have no deep concern over state defence'.... It is his argument which is 'blind to the actual situation of the state' that ought to be corrected.[74]

It is perhaps not unreasonable to assume that the unfavourable publicity caused by Minami's speech pushed the Army to press for the disclosure of the Nakamura incident on 17 August. Not surprisingly, neither Nakamura's military rank nor the nature of his mission were provided, and the government made four relatively moderate demands to Nanking, namely, a future guarantee for travel by Japanese nationals in the Liaoning province, an official apology from the Mukden authorities, punishment of those responsible, and compensations for the damage to the lives and property of those involved.[75]

Immediately, sensational telegrams from the correspondents in Manchuria began to flood in, claiming that the 'proofs' about the murder of Captain Nakamura by the Chinese provided by the military authorities at Mukden were 'unquestionable'.[76] This in turn rekindled the anti-Chinese sentiment of the public which demanded the 'once and for all' settlement of all the pending issues lying between Japan and China. The hysteria caused by the way in which the press dealt with the issue could only be described, according to Sasa Hiroo, the Marxist critic,

as a 'nationwide ceremony' to 'kill a fly with a long spear'.[77] Rōyama Masamichi of Tokyo Imperial University regretted this phenomenon in Chūōkōron:

> I believe that the opinion which is currently leading the people lacks in reality the appropriate foundation for the structure of the national concensus which we desire. The strong opinion does not necessarily mean the right opinion. The ready countermeasure cannot always be the appropriate one. I cannot believe that the people have been presented with every aspect to think about, to judge from and to anticipate the result from.[78]

Such criticism was, however, confined to the more liberal journals such as Chūōkōron and Kaizō[79] and by the end of August, the chief editor of the Tokyo Nichinichi, Takaishi Shingorō, had come to surprise even the higher echelon of the military authorities in Tokyo with his 'positive' Manchuria scheme which was, according to Ogata of the Tokyo Asahi, ahead of the Army's.[80] The Tokyo Nichinichi comment on 5 September seems to confirm Ogata's observation of the changing attitudes of his rival:

> We do not lag behind others in admitting the danger existing between the soldier and politics. We believe, however, that so far as the Manchuria and Mongolia issue is concerned, we should not restrict it to such trivial wordings as 'politics' any longer.[81]

Such change in public opinion was undoubtedly a pleasing phenomenon to the military authorities. On the other hand, they were not totally satisfied, as the following comment in an Army Staff leaflet dated 10 September indicated:

> It is clearly recognisable that the newspapers are proceeding with united willingness for the preservation of the vested interests [of Japan] in Manchuria

> and Mongolia....At the same time, we fear that they may be misunderstanding the incident as if it were an opportunity to resolve the Manchuria and Mongolia issue once and for all, and that as a result of such a settlement, the current public sentiment will vanish instantly.[82]

While the telegrams from Manchuria filled the pages of newspapers, there appeared a Rengō telegram from Nanking which added more fuel to the already burning hatred among the Japanese people towards their Chinese neighbour. This telegram reported that Dr. C. T. Wang, the Foreign Secretary, had denied China's responsibility for the Nakamura incident.[83] Its source was none other than Sasaki, whose telegram on the 'row' between Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min six months earlier had become the direct cause of the still unresolved dispute between the Japanese correspondents and the Chinese government. His latest telegram was based on information obtained from other reporters who had attended the interview on 3 September during which the alleged remark by Dr. Wang was made. The immediate denial by the Foreign Secretary and the subsequent official protest from the Chinese government did nothing to quell the anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan, which in turn hardened Nanking's attitudes towards the negotiations over the incident. Even so, Shidehara was unwilling to get involved with the current hysteria created by the press. As he wrote back to Consul General at Mukden Hayashi on 10 September:

> Another 'informal advice' may well touch the nerve of the newspapers again, which will be unpleasant. I am also told that to issue a banning order is difficult according to the Newspaper Law. We have therefore accepted that the authorities concerned will not try to advise the press not to publish any articles on the incident.[84]

Minister to China, Shigemitsu, nevertheless feared that the latest controversy over Sasaki's telegram would develop into a 'second Rengō affair'.[85] His apprehensions were understandable considering the fact that, on the very day Shidehara wrote the above reply to Hayashi, he finally managed to persuade Nanking to sign an agreement with Rengō whereby both parties expressed their 'regret for the occurrence of such an unfortunate development' in connection with the 'first Rengō affair'. Shigemitsu had in fact had to obtain a secret promise from the news agency for Sasaki's immediate transfer from Nanking to Manchuria for this settlement.[86] Before Shigemitsu's fear materialised, however, there occurred a minor railway explosion inside the Japanese concession near Mukden that proved to be the death knell for the 'freedom of the press'.

CHAPTER VII - Manchuria Crisis

1. Mukden Incident

The Mukden incident on the night of 18 September, and its subsequent development, brought no discernible change to the Japanese correspondents in China, especially Manchuria. What little resistance they could or dared mount against the military authorities in their reporting activities disappeared almost immediately after the initial death threat by the Kwantung Army officers at the Japanese-owned telecommunication offices.[1] Satō Yukio, the Rengō Mukden correspondent, who had disapproved of the fabrication of 'telegrams from Mukden' by the head office eight months earlier, apparently noticed the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese clash one hour earlier than his rivals and sent out reports only to discover that the newspapers on the following morning were filled with despatches not from him but his Dentsū rival. Sato recalled this episode after the Second World War:

> As I could not possibly believe that it had been a railway bombing by the Chinese soldiers, I did not use those words but composed a report which implied it to be a clash between the Japanese soldiers and some unknown bandits. The telegram did not reach our head office and therefore I believe that it had been stopped at Mukden by the army. Some time after this, one of our correspondents rang me and said, 'We have to make it a clash between the Chinese regulars and the Japanese soldiers....' After that, I finally handed in my resignation.[2]

Within Japan, criticism of the unauthorised military action by the Japanese troops in Manchuria and Korea[3] was immediately voiced by most newspapers but lasted only a few days.[4] A series of 'pre-warnings' were imposed from 22 September onwards on articles concerning

'military or diplomatic secrets' and their application was so extensive that, according to the editor of the English language Japan Advertiser, Wilfrid Fleisher, they often 'constituted a reliable official source of information' for the editors who had been unaware of the events concerned until they received the official notifications.[5] Even so, the Tokyo Asahi was still very critical of the political manoeuvre made in the Kwantung Army declaration of 4 October which was distributed among the Chinese residents in Manchuria as the following comment on 6 October suggested:

> We cannot help feeling that the declaration is the admission by the commander-in-chief [of the Kwantung Army] that he has interfered with politics and diplomacy which are beyond his authority.... If the Army insists on its independence according to the supreme command, it should also respect the diplomatic prerogative [of the government] and stick to the principle which separates politics from military affairs. This is the duty of the Imperial Army soldier who observes the Constitution and who obeys the law of the state. We urge the Army to refrain itself [from political interference].[6]

Such criticism was natural considering the improvement, albeit slight, in world public opinion which had seemed to follow the government's declaration on 24 September.[7] The unanimous resolution on 30 September by the League of Nations Council, in which Japan was one of the five permanent members, calling for the immediate stoppage of the war had also helped to mollify foreign opinion. At least this was how the Tokyo Asahi saw the situation.[8] Its editor had also expressed his doubts on the 'independence' movements in Manchuria which followed the retreat of the Mukden clique headed by Chang Hsüeh-liang.[9] It was therefore no surprise that the Tokyo Asahi showed much concern about the international repercussions caused by the unauthorised bombarding of the city of Chinchow on 8 October which had come to house

Chang's headquarters. This time, however, its critical tone sounded very restrained:

> The Chinchow affair is regarded as an evidence of Japan's expansionism overseas. Needless to say that it was an unexpected event rather than an indication of any policy.... Nevertheless, we hope that the troops in Manchuria which have hitherto been cautious will take even more caution in the future as even the slightest movement which they make is likely to be considered a reflection of our national policy by the outside world.[10]

The moderate tone of this leader was partly due to the hardening attitudes of the Kwantung Army towards the press. The day before the Chinchow bombing, it had suggested in the name of its commander-in-chief to the vice-Chief of Staff in Tokyo that such seemingly inoffensive matters as the negotiations between the Finance Ministry and the Army over the proposed budget should be made the object of a 'pre-warning' because their disclosure would provide the Chinese with 'signs of financial weakness of Japan to carry out a prolonged war'.[11] Moreover, even the somewhat restrained comments by the newspapers on the Chinchow bombing were regarded by the Kwantung Army as a 'treacherous' act.[12] By the end of 1931, not even the details of the proposed or actual armament of the whole Army could be published without risking a sale and distribution ban,[13] thus making the number of actual bans placed on newspapers and journals seven times as big as in the pre-Mukden incident period.[14] This led to a direct appeal from the 21st Day Club to the Home Minister on 28 January 1932 for the clarification of the matters whose publication was likely to invite such treatment.[15] The following list was provided by the Home Ministry as the answer to this request:

1. Articles which do not regard the action of the Imperial Army on 18 September 1931 as self-defence.

2. Articles which regard the defensive military occupation in Manchuria as an act of aggression by Japanese imperialism.

3. Articles which regard the action of the Imperial Army in Manchuria as an act designed to acquire markets or to plunder natural resources by the imperialist Japanese capitalism.

4. Articles which regard the action of the Imperial Army in Manchuria not as based on national consensus but as a military action designed to secure the survival of some military cliques endangered by the [proposed] disarmament.

5. Articles which regard Manchuria as nothing more than a life-line for some capitalists or military cliques but not as one for workers and peasants.

6. Articles which regard the new Manchu state not as based on the voluntary initiatives of the Manchus but merely as a puppet regime invented by the Japanese military cliques and some of the party politicians and which regard the actual power of the new state as in the hands of the Japanese Empire whose fate is bound to follow the path of Korea in due course.[16]

The Army was by no means content with the indirect pressure on the press exercised through the Home Ministry. The Newspaper Unit not only checked the leader and reports of the newspapers but also threatened to censor the galley proofs of the Tokyo Asahi.[17] Some right wing organisations and the Imperial Reservist Association were activated under the supervision of the gendarmerie. By the spring of 1932, it was, according to the liberal critic, Ashida Kin, the Reservist Association that had come to initiate national opinion. So vicious had its attack become on any criticism directed at the military authorities that Chūōkōron felt obliged to speak up for two of the most outspoken individual critics in its October 1932 edition:

> It is all very well to fall upon Drs. Nitobe [Inazō] and Nagai [Ryūtarō] because they have criticised the military actions. You are, however, a group that is treated very favourably by the public purse and society in general. We hope that you will rethink more deeply about how best you could serve society and the people.[18]

The tightening of press control alone, however, does not entirely explain the change in the tone of the newspapers. Some newspapers, notably the Tokyo Nichinichi, had already started to change their views in favour of the Army's political participation even before the outbreak of the Mukden incident on 18 September 1931 while others such as the Tokyo Asahi had remained steadfastly opposed to it. Such disunity among the newspapers undoubtedly contributed to the failure of the 21st Day Club to take united action towards the development in Manchuria when it met on 21 September.[19] It was perhaps not surprising that the East Asia Research Centre set up by the chairman of the Tokyo Nichinichi, Motoyama Hikoichi, held an extraordinary meeting on 25 September and passed a resolution to 'encourage' the government to protect the 'life-line' of Japan, i.e. the vested interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, which was immediately delivered to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Leaders of both Houses of the Imperial Diet.[20] On the other hand, the Tokyo Asahi remained somewhat indecisive perhaps largely because of the disunity within its editorial department. Its chief editor, Ogata Taketora, reflected on this score after the Second World War:

> Immediately [after the Mukden incident], I called for a consultative meeting of the editorial staff to discover that the opinions of people like Messrs. Ōnishi Sai and Machida Shirō were noticeably uncompromising [towards China]. In the end, I felt obliged to accept that we could not shoot our own soldiers from behind. We were subsequently dragooned by the fait accompli.[21]

The anti-military tone in the Tokyo Asahi disappeared almost completely after the meeting of the League of Nations Council on 15 October which followed the controversial Chinchow bombing a week earlier. The Council decided to invite the U.S., a non-member state of the League, to be an observer by a thirteen to one vote with Japan as the sole objector. This was followed by another Council resolution nine days later which called for the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway concession zone before the next scheduled meeting of the Council on 16 November. Instead of casting an opposing vote, however, the Japanese delegate abstained this time, but the count was nevertheless declared as thirteen to one.

The press reactions to these two Council resolutions were almost violent. Their arguments, like those of the government which had by then come to be dictated largely by the Army Staff, were based purely on the technicality of these votes.[22] Moreover, the way in which the newspapers presented these arguments was such that Tagawa Daikichirō, a director of the League of Nations Association in Japan, wrote in Kokusaichishiki:

> Our people misunderstand the Council proposal to stop Japan's military action for intervention. I doubt if I can say that they understand the situation correctly. I feel ashamed and regret that our daily efforts and activities [to enlighten the people on the functions of the League] have not been sufficient.[23]

It was perhaps unfortunate that the more liberal and 'internationalist' journals such as Kaizō, Chūōkōron and Kokusaichishiki could not make their first post-Mukden incident edition officially available until 1 November because of its monthly publication.[24] In

their absence, Tōyōkeizaishinpō was the only journal of any significance to welcome the U.S. participation at the League of Nations as well as to voice its opposition to the continued military action in Manchuria.[25] Among the individual critics, Yokota Kisaburō was probably the first to support the Council votes. He was not, however, invited by any commercial newspaper to voice his view but did so only through Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun published by and distributed mainly within Tokyo Imperial University where he worked as a professor of law. As such, the impact of his opinions on the public was perhaps not very significant.[26]

When the November edition of the monthly journals eventually appeared in the street, it was at once clear to the reader that they had already accepted, if reluctantly, the fait accompli presented by the Kwantung Army. True, they still maintained that Japan should neither act like a 'thief at a fire' nor support the 'independence' movements in Manchuria which had been reported since the end of September. On the other hand, none of them questioned the 'justice' or legality of the 'self defence' claimed by the Kwantung Army for its actions. Kaizō in fact had come to refer to the South Manchuria Railways as the 'life-line' of Japan for the first time in its history.[27] Chūōkōron and Kaizō also seemed to fear possible sale and distribution bans to the extent that even the discussions on the division between the Foreign Ministry and the Army contained the trace of much blue-pencilling as the following extract from a contribution by Sasa Hiroo suggests:

> The military authorities are ahead of the Shidehara diplomacy. Even if the attack on the North Barracks [of the Chinese army at Mukden] had been an unforseen accident, _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ can be said to have made the first positive step. Further, the second step _ _ _... _ _ _. The third step, i.e. _ _ _...

> ____ owed to some extent to the __ of the military authorities. When it looked ___ ..., ____, it invited the objection from the Foreign Ministry and the issue ended with the surrender by the Army Ministry.[28]

While the monthly journals were trying to avoid sale and distribution bans by imposing self censorship on their contributions, the Tokyo Nichinichi chairman, Motoyama Hikoichi, sent out on 30 October to The Times, The New York Times and some other influential journals overseas a declaration based on the September 25 resolution of the East Asia Research Centre which defended the Japanese action in Manchuria as 'self defence'. This inspired the Japan Newspapers Association, to which most of the Japanese newspapers belonged, to send telegrams for the same purpose to the League of Nations and the individual governments of the major countries on 14 November. On the following day, the Tokyo Nichinichi repeated its earlier action, which in turn prompted the Tokyo Asahi on 16 November to follow its rival, thus creating a 'patriotic race' among the newspapers.[29]

Behind this enthusiasm, there lay the fierce sales war among the newspapers. The difficulty of surviving which faced them and, to a much lesser extent, the journals after the Mukden incident was considerable. In addition to the threat from the state authorities and private organisations, they were confronted by an active radio broadcasting organisation which had excelled them in speed, if not accuracy, of reporting. Following the Mukden incident, the broadcasting corporation also started collecting reports by itself which were broadcast immediately, rather than simply waiting for the regular deliveries from the two news agencies.[30] This increased the number of its subscribers from 300,000 before the incident to one million in May 1932 and

eventually to three million in 1936.[31] This challenge from the radio was at first countered by the newspapers with more sensationalism in their reporting, such as more extra editions, more pictures and larger headlines. In the case of the two large newspaper concerns, a separate section was even created within the editorial department to produce news films such as the 'Tokyo Nichinichi-Osaka Mainichi International News' and the 'Asahi International News' which were to be released through cinemas all over the country.[32] Even this, however, was no answer to the appeal and advantages of the radio, and the 21st Day Club was forced to negotiate with the broadcasting corporation through the mediation of the Communication Ministry which controlled it. It was in fact not until the autumn of 1932 that the two parties reached an agreement whereby the regular 'flash news' programmes on the radio were to be cut from a daily total of 75 minutes to 50 minutes.[32] In the meantime, most of the newspapers had been compelled to engage in an excessive sales war among themselves and, according to Itō Masanori, only about ten newspapers in the whole of Japan were able to continue to operate profitably throughout the Manchuria crisis. Among the major victims of this development was the erstwhile most prestigious Jijishinpō which was taken over by a textile tycoon in 1932, only to be bought up again four years later by one of its main rivals, the Tokyo Nichinichi. Another equally famous newspaper, Kokumin Shinbun, also fell prey to the same phenomenon and came under the management of the wealthy provincial 'Seiyūkai newspaper', the Shin Aichi, of Nagoya in 1933.[33] It would have been surprising had the newspapers not been tempted to exploit whatever means were left for their survival including the promotion of 'patriotism' among the readers. Nishinihon Shinbun, the

post-War successor of the Fukuoka Nichinichi recalls what effect this commercial war had on the newspapers:

> At the time of the Manchuria crisis, many newspapers . . . unwittingly tended to concentrate on sales expansion arising from their commercialism and paid little attention elsewhere. At least in retrospect, they showed their vulnerability to the right wing movements and are partly to blame for it. This tendency was especially noticeable among the influential newspapers. Most of the other newspapers unquestionably followed their lead.[34]

Even if we accept that there is some element of rivalry in this remark, it still commands a fair amount of respect as it comes from the newspaper which is generally considered to have fought against the military authorities more outspokenly and longer than any other commercial newspaper.[35] Indeed, the Fukuoka Nichinichi was the only newspaper of any significance that sent a telegram of protest in the name of its editorial staff to the Prime Minister when the Chinchow bombing took place on 8 October 1931. It was also the condemnation of the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai on 15 May 1932 by the same newspaper in another telegram to the government as well as its leader that provoked the extreme displeasure of the Army, a displeasure which lasted more or less to the end of the Second World War.[36] Moreover, the leader writers of the six biggest newspapers themselves confirmed in 1934 that the absence of any blue-pencilled passages in the leaders throughout the Manchuria crisis had been the result not so much of any tolerance on the part of the government as of self-censorship deriving from commercial and 'psychological' pressure.[37] It was perhaps this pressure that led the newspapers to project the League of Nations as a 'villain' who 'lacked the understanding' (ninshiki

busoku)of the Far Eastern situation. The following comment by the Tokyo Asahi was made on the Council vote of 24 October 1931 which called for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the railway concession zone:

> We cannot tolerate or overlook the latest decision by the Council, because it is intended by those countries which occupy the influential positions within the League to force Japan to follow their wish in a high-handed manner by making her look isolated before the world public.[38]

This statement, though relatively mild in tone, gave the impression that the Tokyo Asahi was getting closer in its view of the situation to Gaikōjihō, which had regarded the Chinchow bombing as part of the 'heaven-sent punishment' and which began to advocate the 'liberation' of the League from the 'slavery by one or two Powers' after the Council votes on 15 and 24 October.[39] The difference between the two journals became even smaller as the Kwantung Army occupied Tsitsihar on 19 November and revived its drive on Chinchow towards the end of the month. The subsequent 'warnings' from Secretary of State H.L. Stimson on 20 and 28 November seemed simply to harden their determination to support the military action as well as to prevent any 'intervention' in the Far Eastern affairs by the other Powers by advocating a regional settlement through direct negotiations between the two Asian neighbours rather than through the League.[40] Some of the most nationalistic critics in Gaikōjihō, notably the ex-career diplomats, had started to argue in favour of Japan's withdrawal from the international organisation even before the resolution by the Opposition Seiyūkai to the same end on 11 November. Uchida Teitsui, for example, wrote in its November 1 edition:

> If the League of Nations not only refuses to provide facilities for Japan to carry out her national policy overseas but also becomes an organisation to restrict her right of self defence, it will be most advantageous for Japan to withdraw from the organisation and stand on the same basis as the U.S.[41]

The attitudes of Gaikōjihō at this stage could also be traced through its treatment of letters from its readers. Before the Mukden incident, the journal had published those which criticised and contradicted the argument presented by its editor, Hanzawa Gyokujō.[42] No longer, however, did such letters appear in print and those which did appear seemed to be in line with the editorial policy of the journal or even ahead of it in their advocacy of Japan's withdrawal from the League or in their support for the 'independence' movements in Manchuria.[43]

In the heat of the 'patriotic race' initiated by the major metropolitan newspapers and some journals such as Gaikōjihō, the more outspoken critics of the military authorities found it increasingly difficult to voice their view. True, the Special Police Branch, which had been established two decades earlier mainly to suppress socialist movements, 'watched' the opinions and statements by the opponents of the government and took action against outspoken opponents of the war in Manchuria.[44] Nevertheless, it did not mount any physical attack on any individual critics of the government in the sphere of war or diplomacy until the outbreak of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war in 1937.[45] It was probably the 'voluntary' restraint on the part of the major journals that stopped the expression of views by Chinese critics such as the writer, Lu-hsün, in the post-Mukden incident years.[46] The noticeable increase in the blue-pencilling from November 1931 onwards was also due to the caution on the part of the journals although its extent

differed from journal to journal. Gaikōjihō, with the assurance of its 'pro-military' reputation, seems to have felt much less need of self-censorship, judged by the tone of its contributions. For example, Nakamura Yasanji, a liberal critic, wrote about the strained government-military relations in Gaikōjihō in its January 15, 1932, edition:

> Such discord within the institutions which carry out our national policy, above all the contradictions between the military and the diplomatic institutions, have led China to resort to a clearly xenophobic anti-Japanese policy. The uncontrolled military action, worsening of international realtions and the bad effect on the great principle of the sacredness of the Emperor resulting from the independence of supreme command. We have already witnessed them.[47]

In fact, some other major journals, such as Chūōkōron and Kaizō, felt obliged to delete any direct reference to the 'contradictions' between the two government institutions as the following comment by Takayama Jōji in Chūōkōron's December 1931 edition suggested:

> In short, Kasumigaseki [i.e. the Foreign Ministry] is ____ by Miyakezaka [i.e. the Army Staff]. The evils of long-standing resulting from the 'vice-ministerial diplomacy' (jikan gaiko) at Kasumigaseki have been exposed through the present situation. It had pretended to be trusted with Japan's diplomacy although it did not have its own. This has finally come to the surface in the face of _____ being dragooned by the ___.[48]

Not all the missing passages resulted from the 'voluntary' self censorship. Indeed, an essay by the Marxist critic, Inomata Tsunao, in Chūōkōron's November 1931 edition, entitled 'Monopoly Capitalism and the Crisis in Manchuria', had four entire pages (pp.29-32) replaced by a red leaf with a statement, 'deleted by censorship'.[49] The main reason for this deletion by the Home Ministry was perhaps because Inomata

had argued that the Mukden incident was 'designed to secure the survival of some military cliques' and to secure the 'life-line for some capitalists or military cliques'.[50] This treatment undoubtedly influenced the tenor of criticism in the subsequent contributions and leaders of the two sōgōzasshi. This also explains, at least partly, the increasing trace of blue-pencilling in these journals,[51] while others such as Gaikōjihō and Kokusaichishiki continued to publish the essays virtually free from it, thus creating a seemingly paradoxical situation wherein the reader found more overtly critical and coherent comments in Gaikōjihō than in the supposedly more 'liberal' sōgōzasshi. Perhaps the most outspoken individual who voiced his criticism of the 'patriotic race' through Gaikōjihō was Okamoto Tsurumatsu.

Writing in its January 15, 1932 edition, Okamoto regretted that the people had come to believe it their duty to speak ill of and blame the League as if they had forgotten Japan's status as one of the permanent members of its elite body, the Council. At the same time, he reminded the government as well as the people of the need to differentiate renmei gaikō (the League diplomacy) which respected and acted upon the spirit of the League Covenant from tai renmei gaikō (diplomacy directed at the League) which was designed to lead the League to take actions favourable to the country. Japan, according to Okamoto, lacked tai renmei gaikō owing mainly to the lack of a totally united policy between the Foreign Ministry and the military authorities and it was the duty of the military authorities to follow the policy established by the Foreign Ministry rather than vice versa if she was to avoid international criticism. Okamoto continued:

> Those who believe that Japan can behave as she likes once she has withdrawn from the League are megalomaniacs. The combination of renmei gaikō and

> tai renmei gaikō should become the main object of the Japanese foreign policy from now on. To this end, the military authorities and the Foreign Ministry should take concerted action.[52]

Okamoto's view was, however, no longer shared by many. Indeed, the major newspapers seemed by then to have come to regard the military authorities as the initiator of Japan's diplomacy which the Foreign Ministry should follow. They seemed to have 'indoctrinated' themselves to support this view by then. Machida Shirō, the head of the Tokyo Asahi's foreign affairs section which handled the news concerning the League and public opinion overseas, declared through the newspaper on 27 January 1932, two days before the Sino-Japanese warfare spread to Shanghai:

> We need to correct our understanding now.... Our tragedy has been that we have lacked the understanding not of the Manchuria incident but of the military actions. We should have realised where the national policy of our empire lay before trying to check them.... Even now, some people are still claiming that the government, the people and the press organisations have equally been dragooned into this situation by the military authorities. There is, however, nothing more absurd than this notion.[53]

2. Shanghai Incident and Recognition of Manchukuo

The powerless Wakatsuki Minseitō cabinet was replaced by the new Seiyūkai government headed by Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi on 13 December 1931. The establishment of another one-party cabinet at this juncture, however, did not provide much assurance to the nation whose hope, if any, had existed in the formation of a 'whole-nation' cabinet if it was to hold together internally as well as externally.

To those who had felt the military action to be excessive, the cabinet as composed was a warning of worse to come as Seiyūkai had generally been considered more conciliatory to the military authorities. Even to those who supported Japan's action in Manchuria, it was little more than a change of the name of the cabinet since the new government seemed to possess no concrete policy to resolve the deadlock on the Manchuria issue.[56] Such anxiety was soon confirmed.

On December 23, the Kwantung Army began its advance to Chinchow which invited a 'warning' not only from the U.S. but also from Britain and France. On 27 December, the government asked the three Powers not to interfere with the issue, thus giving de facto recognition to the military action. The occupation of the city on 3 January 1932 was the final blow to Secretary of State H .L. Stimson. On 7 January, he notified both the governments of Japan and China of the disapproval by the U.S. to any de facto situation which had occurred since the Mukden incident ('Stimson Doctrine'). The British government, however, officially declined the U.S. proposal for a joint protocol to Japan four days later.

While the complicated proceedings over Manchuria continued within and without Japan, there occurred a clash between the Chinese and Japanese soldiers in Shanghai. Its initial cause was the alleged attack on the five Japanese Buddhist monks by the Chinese on 18 January, which was, however, subsequently utilised eleven days later by the Japanese to occupy large part of the city. In response to the Chinese appeal, the League Council issued a warning to Japan on 16 February to stop military action. In spite of its initial 'face-saving' refusal to

comply with the warning, the government was anxious to settle the matter as soon and as quietly as possible in view of the implication of such hostility in a city of such a truly international status. Even the major newspapers, by now the willing spokesmen of the military authorities, shared this view.[55] Perhaps the only exception among the influential critics was Hanzawa Gyokujō who wrote on 15 February:

> The outbreak of the Shanghai incident indicates Japan's intention to reconstruct China and to reform the Far East as well as her demand for a fundamental re-assessment in the understanding of the area by the Powers in Europe and the U.S. The true feeling of us Japanese is that we believe that it is more effective to explain and prove them through action on the spot rather than the diplomatic letters or negotiations.[56]

Few critics questioned the legality of the Japanese action in Shanghai, at least overtly. Indeed, even the contributors to sōgōzasshi tended to present almost purely explanatory instead of critical essays and this phenomenon was particularly noticeable among the legal scholars. Whatever the reasons behind it may have been, they sounded to have completely abandoned their raison d'être as critics. Matsui Hitoshi, a well-known figure in the legal world, wrote in Chūōkōron's March 1932 edition on the latest Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai:

> What step should Japan have taken before the outbreak of the war on 29 January? What kind of plan for settlement should she establish for the future? These political arguments are not my main task. I would simply like to observe the Shanghai incident quietly as a student of oriental history.... At the moment I only have the mind to pray like others that the situation would not spread further.[57]

The tendency among the legal scholars to withhold their own conclusions was confined neither to the Shanghai incident nor to

sōgōzasshi. In spite of their somewhat apologetic remark that they did not wish to draw too hasty a conclusion on the situation concerned, it was quite clear that they shied away from committing themselves to any particular view in case it provoked the wrath of somebody, perhaps the military authorities. Matsubara Kazuo, another widely respected legal scholar and one of the most regular contributors of Gaikōjihō and Kokusaichishiki throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, commented on the declaration of 'independence' by the newly established regime at Hsinking in Manchuria which was made on 1 March 1932:

> I will not attempt to advocate the recognition of the new regime here. At the same time, I am not going to claim that the recognition is too hasty at this stage.... I would simply like to provide the reader with the materials with which he can judge the issue for himself.[58]

The 'independence' day for Manchuria under the name of Manchukuo was in fact the day before the 'fact-finding' mission headed by Lord Lytton of Britain arrived in Tokyo from Geneva on its way to Manchuria. This commission had originally been proposed by the Japanese government with most of the Japanese newspapers supporting it and had been accepted by the League Council on 10 December 1931.[59] Ten days after its arrival in the Japanese capital, the General Assembly of the League passed a resolution not to recognise Manchukuo to which the Japanese government immediately replied with the 'Summary of Principles in Dealing With The Manchuria And Mongolia Issue' (Manmō Shori Yōkō) in order to guide the new regime.[60] The government, however, refrained from giving formal recognition to Manchukuo until six months later. Meanwhile the Shanghai incident was settled with the signing of the cease-fire agreement on 5 May, thanks largely to the good offices of the British Minister to China, Sir Miles Lampson. Ten days later, Prime

Minister Inukai was assassinated by the rebellious officers and the non-party cabinet headed by Admiral Saitō Makoto was established on 26 May.

Few critics advocated the immediate recognition of Manchukuo. The international outcry against Japan which followed the outbreak of the Shanghai incident and their fear that the recognition might lead to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations[61] were perhaps the two main reasons for their initial silence on this issue. Indeed, even Hanzawa Gyokujō did not seem to feel safe in declaring 'Japan's unshakeable determination to fight against the world, not to mention the League of Nations' until after the formal recognition of Manchukuo by the government on 15 September.[62] Their anxiety was perhaps best expressed in the following comment by the editorial staff of Kokusai-chishiki in the editorial note column of its May 1932 edition:

> We believe that the government would not dream of the withdrawal from the League. We also believe that whatever the metropolitan newspapers say, the people would not follow it. We cannot, however, as a journal whose mission is to carry out the spirit of the League, ignore it. We have therefore decided to nip the illusion of withdrawal arguments in the bud by publishing the clear and eminent opinions of Drs. Tachi and Kamikawa [of Tokyo Imperial University].[63]

The publication of the contributions by the two prominent professors of law may not have had the desired effect. True, they argued against Japan's withdrawal from the League. On the other hand, their arguments were based on the assumption that the League would eventually accept Japan's recognition of Manchukuo or at least the mandate of Manchuria by Japan but never questioned whether such a solution would be acceptable to the League or China.[64] Indeed, these scholars and their colleagues such as Matsubara Kazuo contended elsewhere that the recognition would not infringe international law 'so long as the new

state had been firmly established',[65] which few critics dared question. Some people like Sugimori Kōjirō in fact expressed their view that the reorganisation of the League, the Kellogg-Briand and the Nine Power Pacts would be required for a newly established 'equilibrium' in the Far East. Sugimori wrote in Kaizō's April edition:

> Scholars should make it a subject to theorise (gakurika) and study (gakujutsuka) this [the reorganisation of the existing international order]. Activists should concentrate on carrying out this learning sincerely.[66]

The attitude of Kokusaichishiki itself had been changing, if slowly, since the Council vote on 24 October 1931. The editor had already claimed the 'lack of understanding' of the Far Eastern situation on the part of the League and had begun to advocate the establishment of a regional organ within its framework to deal with the Sino-Japanese conflict.[67] By the summer of 1932, his commitment to the spirit of the League Covenant seemed to have faltered so much that he wrote in the August edition:

> Serious issues concerning interests between Powers cannot, after all, be solved other than by direct negotiations between the countries concerned.... From this viewpoint, it would be a mistake for us to try to solve the Sino-Japanese conflict through the Council or the General Assembly. Rather, we believe that we should encourage direct negotiations between them and that the Council should simply concentrate on the role of promoting such negotiations.[68]

The dilemma which confronted the critics at the time was that the 'credibility' of the Chinese government was in doubt in their mind. As Kokusaichishiki saw it, there were three possible ways to settle the Manchuria crisis; conclusion of a treaty concerning Manchuria with a 'reliable' Chinese government; annexation of Manchuria; and

recognition of Manchukuo. Since the annexation seemed certain to invite vigorous opposition from the Powers, the recognition of Manchukuo appeared to be the only feasible solution to Kokusaichishiki.[69] Kaizō also seemed to favour the immediate recognition largely because it believed that it was the only choice that would enable Japan to withdraw from the costly involvement in Manchuria while not isolating the country too much internationally.[70] On the other hand, Chūōkōron was more concerned about the possible international repercussions of such an act by the government and felt it best for Japan to 'act free from responsibility by not recognising Manchukuo'.[71] The 'responsibility' lay, however, with Japan, whatever action she was to take, and this is why even Tōyōkeizaishinpō, the erstwhile most outspoken critic of de facto situation in Manchuria among the major journals, had come to comment just before the declaration of 'independence' of Manchukuo:

> Good or bad, we cannot forsake the new state as we have already embarked on this undertaking. It is the inescapable duty of our people to do their best in helping the new regime to turn Manchuria and Mongolia into a truly safe and peaceful paradise.[72]

It is noteworthy that on 5 May, the Tokyo Asahi which had kept silence on the recognition issue demanded for the first time that the government give full recognition immediately.[73] It was in fact the day on which the Sino-Japanese ceasefire agreement on the Shanghai incident was officially signed. On 14 June, the Lower House of the Imperial Diet unanimously passed a resolution calling for the immediate recognition of Manchukuo, which led to the following remark by Machida Shirō, the head of the foreign affairs section of the Tokyo Asahi, in Kokusaichishiki's July edition:

> If the people are ready but the government is not, that must be because of the latter's lack of foresight. To hesitate to recognise Manchukuo at this stage in deference to the anger of the Chinese government or people would do nothing but invite the contempt of the Chinese nation. It would certainly not contribute to friendship between the two countries.[74]

Few critics questioned the legality of Manchukuo or advocated the postponement of recognition as Chūōkōron did. Yanaibara Tadao of Tokyo Imperial University was unusual in asserting that the establishment of Manchukuo could not be regarded as the independence of an oppressed nation, as most of the critics did, from an imperialist empire such as Russia, Turkey or Austria. Unlike the newly independent countries in Europe which had freed themselves from the control by another nation, the majority of the people in new Manchuria, Yanaibara reminded the reader, were of the same Chinese origin as in the Republic of China. Investment of hundreds of millions of yen or an immigrant population of tens of thousands did not automatically mean a 'special status' which should command special protection politically as well as diplomatically, and which had in fact never been enjoyed by Japan. Nor was the principle of national self-determination, which had come to be recognised in Europe, applicable in the case of Manchukuo, Yanaibara argued in Kaizō's April edition.[75]

Yoshizawa Kenkichi, the Foreign Minister under the Inukai cabinet and the head of the Japanese delegation at the League of Nations when the Mukden incident broke out, was also the sole voice in Chūōkōron's October edition to advocate the postponement of recognition. This edition was officially phblished two weeks after the announcement of Japan's formal blessing of Manchukuo, but Yoshizawa had clearly finished his

essay by then. In it he argued that the rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria were based on the Sino-Japanese treaties and that the creation of Manchukuo obliged her to take appropriate measures to clarify where these rights and interests stood before giving formal recognition to Manchukuo. It was essential for Japan to obtain the understanding of the Powers on these measures and even if such understanding was not forthcoming, the fact that she had tried would count in the future. For this reason, Yoshizawa contended, Japan should not recognise Manchukuo too hastily.[76]

These opinions by the 'internationalist' critics perhaps were never given the attention of the government or the Foreign Ministry. Even if they had been and had found sympathisers within these institutions, it would have made little difference to the course of Japanese diplomacy. In fact, many critics felt that there was no longer a necessity for the Foreign Ministry, which had become nothing more than the 'foreign affairs bureau' of the Army Staff. This protocol became especially strong after Uchida Yasuya, the former president of the South Manchuria Railways, had assumed the portfolio of the Foreign Minister on 6 July 1932. Those who were still critical of the Japanese policy over Manchuria accused Uchida of his 'figurehead diplomacy' because they wished to express their disapproval of the military authorities behind him.[77] The majority of them, however, criticised him because Uchida seemed to be incapable of presenting Japan's case to the League other than to repeat that the Japanese actions including the establishment of Manchukuo had been carried out for 'self defence'. Sugiyama Shirō, for example, referring to the conversation between Uchida and Lord Lytton on 12 July, proposed the abolition of the Foreign Ministry in Chūōkōron:

> Uchida totally lacks the wisdom and effort needed to touch the heartstrings of the Lytton commission with orderly logic and friendly explanation. Further, a brainless man! Nobody can deny the very fact that Manchukuo is already a totally independent country and it would be natural for Japan as a neighbour to provide recognition to this firm fact. He has completely forgotten to remind the commission of the core of this issue.[78]

If the abolition of the Foreign Ministry was considered appropriate by some, others felt that the newspapers were also unnecessary, for neither the Ministry nor the newspapers seemed to possess their own view. The newspapers may not have been able to 'reconsider', 'correct or avow' or 'touch upon the merits and demerits' of the opinions hitherto held by themselves and others. Nor perhaps did they have any choice other than to 'devote the entire pages to the efforts to carry out the inevitable war'.[79] This was probably why they showed such indifference to the opinions of their readers on the China issue as to publish hardly any letters in columns such as Tessō of the Tokyo Asahi and Sankakuten (the Triangular Point) of the Tokyo Nichinichi. Sankakuten, which was the successor of Tsunobue, in fact refused to present any 'parliamentary, general or savourless' arguments, thus excluding the possibility of any critical comment by the reader on the government or the military authorities.[80] Tessō sounded equally defensive when it commented on 2 September 1932:

> Those who consider that this column gives the cold shoulder to such topics as the rescue of agrarian villages and Manchuria are mistaken themselves. We are simply waiting for those people who write in such a way that their letters are suitable for publication in this column.[81]

This remark does not seem to carry much weight when the same editor went on to express his delight at the fact that approximately

two-thirds of the letters received during the previous month had come from 'well-known figures'.[82] Not a single published letter in the column in August, however, discussed Japan's official recognition of Manchukuo and its possible effect on her relationship with the League of Nations. The following remark by Baba Tsunego, one of the few free-lance journalists, in the Yomiuri on 27 July may well have expressed the feelings held by the readers whose letters were not published by the newspapers:

> The printed opinions are not public opinion. The true public opinion is kept unsaid and could be found in silence. If the government officials wish to know it, there is no way other than to read the eyes of the people in the street and to hear the sighs of the workers and peasants.[83]

The obsequious attitude of the newspapers to the military authorities was to escalate even further as the autumn approached.

3. Lytton Report

On 15 September 1932, the Japanese government gave full recognition to Manchukuo. The recognition itself had been expected especially since the controversial address by Foreign Minister Uchida on 25 August in which he declared in effective language that the government had decided to accord de jure recognition to Manchukuo in the near future.[84] The major reason for this ultimate action at this juncture was because the scheduled publication of the long-awaited Lytton Report on 1 October seemed certain to contradict the government propaganda to the people. Indeed, Chapter 4 of the Report subsequently refused to accept that the Japanese military action on 18 September 1931

had been an act of self defence, while Chapter 6 rejected the Japanese contention that Manchukuo had been created by genuine and voluntary movements among the people in Manchuria.

The rejection by the Lytton Report of the Japanese claims added more fuel to the traditional tendency of the Japanese press to confuse refutation with abuse.[85] The condemnation of the Report and the personal attack on Lord Lytton by the major newspapers, especially the Tokyo Asahi, were so violent as to anger Prince Saionji and the cabinet ministers.[86] Even Kokusaichishiki which was published by the League of Nations Association in Japan went on to make the following comment:

> These two conclusions are indeed the two large poison fangs pointed at Japan. If ever she gets wounds because of this report, they would derive from these fangs.... Even if Japan is not subjected to any sanctions, it will leave an eternal smear in the history of Japanese diplomacy as a violation of international treaties.[87]

Unlike the emotional tone of the leader, most of the contributions in Kokusaichishiki were more reflective. Some critics who were supporters of the Japanese claims nevertheless regretted the personal attack on the members of the Lytton Commission found in the major newspapers.[88] Others raised questions directed at the military authorities in conjunction with the Report. Suehiro Shigeo, a noted legal scholar and one of the most outspoken opponents of Japan's withdrawal from the League, wrote in Kokusaichishiki's November edition:

> The published picture [of the bombed railway at Mukden] had shown nothing more than the completely repaired railway and a few small pieces of the sleepers and rails which were too poor a material to let the people recognise the seriousness of the situation. The publication of such a picture was not only totally useless but seems to have spoiled Japan's contention that her army had been forced to take such a large-scale action in self defence.[89]

Another of these outspoken critics was Tagawa Daikichirō who had constantly expressed his anger at the newspapers which claimed Japan's withdrawal from the League to be more 'manly and natural' than her obedience to the League Covenant. He had, for example, written in the May 1932 edition of Kokusaichishiki:

> The League of Nations is supported by public opinion which approves its principles and spirit. Only those countries, therefore, which possess such public opinion have the qualification to participate in the League. Those which do not, have no qualification to join the organisation.[90]

Following the publication of the Lytton Report, however, Tagawa's critical tone sounded somewhat modified. The official recognition of Manchukuo and the outrage among the people towards the Report may have influenced him in not drawing any conclusions on the different attitudes shown by the Japanese government and the Lytton Commission. Nevertheless, he wrote:

> I would not say which of these ways of thinking is more modern and effective, but I believe that we need an attitude which lets us listen to the arguments of the League of Nations and to look at the world trend with this in mind.[91]

Another notable feature of Kokusaichishiki in this period was the sudden activation of the 'letters to the editor' column which had been almost totally neglected since its establishment in the September 1931 edition in which an enthusiastic young farmer wrote:

> Diplomacy without the support of public opinion cannot exist. It is the age in which even the ideology of us youths in agrarian villages is expressed as credible diplomacy through newspapers, journals etc. via the Foreign Ministry officials.... I believe that the invitation of letters from readers starting in this edition is a big step forward by the journal in this direction.[92]

In fact, following the outbreak of the Mukden incident, this column became nobody's column and the journal had repeatedly had to ask its readers to contribute to this column[93] until it came to life in the autumn of 1932. Even then, few anonymous readers contributed as the farmer, and perhaps the editor, had hoped. Instead, the published letters in this period were mostly from well-known critics such as Akiyama Yasuke who wrote in the December edition:

> Is it not too hasty for the Foreign Ministry and the Army to provide wings to their fancy and declare their intention to deal with the entire world before world public opinion has given any judgement? I do not believe that the world is so unfair.... Should there be anything for us to reconsider, it would be manly to do so. It would be advisable for Japan who, as a permanent Council member, has subscribed to the League principles of impartiality, justice and peace, not to leave a smear on herself.[94]

Taoka Ryōichi, a legal scholar, also wrote to the editor a month later contending that 'lack of understanding' of the League was found among the Japanese people rather than vice versa as had been reported by the newspapers.[95] By the same token, a reader under the pseudonym of Midōsugi ('a temple cedar') filed a challenge to the civilians who had kept silence on the issue in spite of their proclamation for peace. He asked:

> How do the groups of pacificsts, religious leaders, educationists and politicians who advocate peace at a normal time see this situation? What duty are they intending to carry out in this unprecedented crisis for Japan? I feel desolate that there is not a voice of criticism other than that from some leftists.[96]

The 'lack of understanding' on the part of the Japanese government and people concerning the Lytton Report and the League procedure did not come under fire very often in Gaikōjihō which was dominated by the protagonists of the outright rejection of the Report. The

journal, however, published a letter from Ueda Kyōsuke who had in the past been one of its contributors but whose opinion had not for some time been requested. Ueda's letter contended that the Foreign Ministry was responsible for the furore among the people which resulted from reading the incomplete translation and its summary of 'only the unfavourable points', and commented:

> If we examine in detail the entire original of the Lytton Report by forgetting our position as Japanese, it contains more unfavourable points for the Nanking government than Japan.... Had she not made such noise, I suspect that China would have denounced the report and that the argument in favour of withdrawal from the League would have developed there.[97]

The utilization of the 'letters to the editor' column to criticise the attitudes of the newspapers was not confined to the diplomatic journals such as Kokusaichishiki. Kaizō also set up a column called Kaizō Antena in its October 1932 edition to hear the opinions held by people other than the 'so-called academics and critics'.[98] Unlike those of Kokusaichishiki and Gaikōjihō, this column remained a place for the ordinary reader, at least until Japan's withdrawal from the League in March 1933, who accused the major newspapers of having become the pawns of the military authorities. A reader in the city of Kōbe, for example, expressed his hope in the role played by sōgōzasshi:

> The immediate task is to lead them [i.e. the newspapers] back to their original raison d'être and the only way to achieve this will be to press them to reflect by putting on external pressure. In other words, it may well be a way to get them back into the right path by activating the authoritative 'journalism by periodicals' (zasshi jaanarizumu).[99]

A certain Arai from Tochigi Prefecture, writing in the aftermath of Japan's withdrawal from the League, regretted that the Japanese people, in particular the working class, had no journalistic institutions to deny and refute what the commercial newspapers said. To Arai, there had never been a consensus among the people to back the withdrawal, contrary to the newspaper reports, and therefore, he wrote:

> The 'newspaper journalism' accepts the distorted patriotism of the ___ and the ____ and make up 'newspaper public opinion'. This is what is treated as the public opinion of the so-called people in Japan.[100]

Unlike its rival, Chūōkōron let its regular contributors speak up against the newspapers in a specially established column entitled 'Contemporary Criticism Of The Newspapers'. This column was started in its September 1932 edition and was the first and most comprehensive criticism of the newspapers mounted by a major journal in the pre-war period. Indeed, insofar as foreign policy was concerned, this was perhaps the last occasion on which the newspapers were subjected to systematic criticism.[101] Baba Tsunego, writing as the first contributor, argued that the 'short review' columns in the evening editions of the Tokyo newspapers were often full of 'phrases clearly intended to flatter someone' with their ill comments on foreign countries. Such behaviour was unforgivable for the newspapers which should at least keep silence, if not speak up against, the disgraceful attitudes of the government, and this, Baba contended, would inevitably lead to the fall of the newspapers themselves.[102]

Ishihama Chikō, a professor of law at Kyūshū Imperial University, alleged in the same column a month later that the Japanese newspapers

had not been informative on the Manchuria crisis and argued that the financial reason could not be utilised as an excuse as every action of the Japanese team members of the current Olympic Games at Los Angeles was being reported by them. The reader, according to Ishihama, could find the truth only through the foreign language newspapers. He regretted:

> The newspapers seem to have lost resistance and fighting spirit and have been following without criticism the government and other central forces.[103]

In the December edition, Yamakawa Hitoshi charged that it was in fact the newspapers that had labelled Lord Lytton as a Don Quixote and Secretary of State, H.L. Stimson, as a twisted as well as ill-natured man, thus forgetting their mission as the reporters of the truth. Yamakawa wrote:

> It is no longer an important issue whether the opinions of the newspapers have a leading power or not. Their role today is not to guide the people with a principle based on a certain concrete view or policy but to lead the nation to have a mental attitude adaptable to the fait accompli.[104]

Similar criticism was also found in the provincial newspaper, the Fukuoka Nichinichi, which regarded the reaction of the major newspapers and their reporters towards the Lytton Report as the best indication of the deterioration of the journalistic standard that had been in progress for the previous twenty to thirty years.[105] Most regrettable, according to the editor, was the fact that the Report, which was based on the prolonged research carried out by the impartial experts on the subject, was treated as nothing more than a

worthless sheet of paper by the newspapers which had become the spokesman of the governing circles. He remarked on 5 October 1932:

> It is truly dangerous for those who should be cautious and silent to be the first people to talk about the determination of Japan and the policy of the Empire etc.... The thoughtful Japanese people demand that the state authorities, especially the Foreign Ministry, take the utmost caution.[106]

4. Opinions Overseas

The 'discreditable' attitude of the major newspapers seemed to appear most clearly in their coverage of opinions overseas concerning the Manchuria crisis. The Japanese newspapers, according to Kakegawa Tomiko, quoted views critical of Japan's foreign policy from the foreign press in a deliberate attempt to 'avoid direct association with anti-government statements' and the American press received most attention for this reason in the period between 1931 and 1941.[107]

So far as the eighteen months of the Manchuria crisis were concerned, it was the British rather than the American newspapers that were quoted most often by the Japanese newspapers. Tables XVI and XVII (see Appendix p.311) indicate how often foreign newspapers were quoted in the Tokyo Asahi, the Tokyo Nichinichi and the Fukuoka Nichinichi in the period between September 1931 and February 1933. The figures in the brackets show how many of these quotations had been sent by the staff correspondents of each of these two Tokyo newspapers. As the tables suggest, the British newspapers were quoted more often than the American or the French newspapers throughout the crisis, The tables also indicate that the Tokyo Asahi quoted foreign newspapers most often

and the Tokyo Nichinichi the least while the provincial Fukuoka Nichinichi regretted the tendency among the major newspapers to 'give cold shoulder to the foreign press'.[108]

Tables XVIII and XIX (see Appendix pp.312/314) show which American and British newspapers were more often quoted by each of the three Japanese newspapers. Among the British newspapers, The Times was quoted most often by everyone followed by other 'Conservative' newspapers such as the Daily Mail, the Morning Post and the Daily Telegraph, which tended to be more restrained in their criticism of Japan. On the other hand, with the exception of the Tokyo Asahi, the more outspoken criticism of Japan voiced in such newspapers as the News Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian (both 'Liberal') and the Daily Herald ('Labour') was much less frequently quoted. Even the Tokyo Asahi tended to neglect these newspapers after Japan's recognition of Manchukuo and the publication of the Lytton Report. As to the American press, The New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune and the Washington Post were more frequently quoted than others largely perhaps because the staff correspondents of the two Tokyo newspapers were there to monitor the views of these most influential newspapers in the U.S. It is noteworthy that an American newspaper was seldom quoted to buttress an argument by a Japanese newspaper or critic while some of the British newspapers were utilised to the full to this end as a 'just argument' (seiron) or 'gratifying argument' (tsūron). The following remark by Professor Takagi Nobutake of Chūō University in Gaikōjihō was a good example of this phenomenon:

> The Times [of London] of 23 November [1931] went so far as to say that the nature of the advance by the

> Japanese army in such situations was different from invasion of one civilised country by another and that it was impossible for one to judge the situation according to general law. As everyone knows, The Times stands out more prominently than the politicians at the League of Nations. Had there been politicians with such insight, the League would not have been perverted so much.[109]

The problem was that such 'just' and 'gratifying' arguments were increasingly rare and some Japanese newspapers such as the Tokyo Nichinichi and the Osaka Mainichi began to present such distorted pictures of the foreign press that, for example, an anonymous reader of the Fukuoka Nichinichi wrote to its editor under the pseudonym of 'an inhabitant of Regent Street' on 20 November 1931:

> Why should the Osaka Mainichi refer to the [Daily] Mail or the [Daily] Express as 'great newspapers'?... The fact is that the quieter newspapers such as The Times, the Guardian and the [Daily] Telegraph deserve the acclaim though their circulations may be smaller.... Perhaps there arises a difference inevitably between those who regard the newspapers as saleable goods and those who consider them as the forum to advocate their principles and ideologies.[110]

Even if the Japanese newspapers had published press opinions from overseas which disapproved of the Japanese actions, as the Tokyo Asahi certainly did at least until the end of 1931, it is doubtful whether the reader would have paid much attention to them. Indeed, Shimomura Kainan, the noted columnist of the Osaka Asahi, regretted at the time that the people almost totally disregarded world public opinion and that the entire nation had come to demand so passionately 'national diplomacy based on public opinion'.[111]

The unwillingness of the Japanese newspapers to provide a more balanced view on public opinion overseas did not derive from a shortage

of materials. In addition to the regular supply of news from their own correspondents as well as Reuter, Havas, AP and UP through Rengō and Dentsū, the major newspapers in Tokyo and Osaka - and some influential critics - received constant supply of a booklet entitled Manshū Jihen ni taisuru Ōbei Shinbun no Ronchō ('Press Opinions in Europe and the U.S. Concerning The Manchuria Incident'). A similar publication had been circulated by the same Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry at the time of the Tsinan incident in 1928, but this time its coverage was more extensive and its publication more frequent with one in almost every other day.[112]

Table XXI (see Appendix p.318) is the analysis of this booklet, nos. 91-100 (ten volumes) which were published between 23 February and 4 March 1932 when the Shanghai incident and the expected declaration of 'independence' by Manchukuo were much in controversy. The table lists only the number of occasions on which the newspapers in Britain, France and the U.S. were quoted in these volumes and they counted 25, 17 and 61 times respectively, thus making their total 103. In contrast, the quotations by the Tokyo Asahi, related or unrelated to this booklet, in the period between 20 February and 10 March numbered only seven; The Times and The New York Times twice each and the New York Herald Tribune, the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Times once each. The Sunday Times quotation was headlined, ' "JAPANESE THREAT" ARGUMENT BY A BRITISH NEWSPAPER' while the Daily Telegraph was quoted to show that it was cautioning its readers of the danger of the British involvement in the furore over the letter sent by Secretary of State, H.L. Stimson, to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman on 23 February which

reconfirmed the U.S. disapproval of the Japanese actions in China. The New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune were quoted on 26 February as supporting the Stimson letter while The New York Times was once again quoted three days later, but this time under the headline of 'DETERIORATING U.S. FEELINGS TOWARDS JAPAN: U.S. NEWSPAPER STILL LACKS UNDERSTANDING'. The Times was quoted to indicate that it had published a rather cautious but factual analysis of the Japanese expedition to Shanghai on 27 February while the Tokyo Asahi's London correspondent reported the publication of a 'pro-Japanese' letter signed by six British nationals in the 'Letters to the Editor' column of The Times. The Tokyo Asahi put a heading to this telegram, 'PRO-JAPANESE SENTIMENT RISES HIGH: JOINT LETTER BY INFLUENTIAL BRITISH SUBJECTS'.[113]

The Tokyo Nichinichi was even more one-sided in its quotations which in fact numbered only two during these three weeks. These quotations were not even those from the actual publications. The Tokyo Nichinichi London correspondent, who had been sent to monitor the League, despatched the personal views expressed by his fellow correspondents from the Manchester Guardian and the Morning Post at Geneva which appeared subsequently in Japan under the heading, 'EXHAUSTED ARGUMENT OVER MANCHURIA: NEW STATE RECOGNISED BY THE MORE SENSIBLE: INSIGHT INTO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MIND'. The actual text read:

> The Manchester Guardian which has been the central figure in the anti-Japanese opinion... has come to recognise the inevitability of accepting ..., The Morning Post of the British Conservative Party is congratulating on the establishment of the great Manchukuo as a realisation of Manchuria for the Manchus....[114]

The provincial Fukuoka Nichinichi, which had been highly critical of the major newspapers in their 'unbalanced' reporting, lived up to its pride at least in this period. Its quotations counted nine, two more than the Tokyo Asahi; The Times twice and the Daily Telegraph, the News Chronicle, the Oberver, the Morning Post, the Daily Express, the Washington Post and the St. Louis Star once each. It was especially noteworthy since the Fukuoka Nichinichi was entirely dependent on only Rengō and Dentsū for its news supply and was not even on the circulation list of the Information Bureau booklet. The American newspapers and the News Chronicle as well as The Times were quoted more or less as 'anti-Japanese' while the others were printed for their somewhat 'sympathetic' attitude towards Japan, thus presenting a more 'balanced' view to the reader.[115]

The presentation of an 'unbalanced' veiw of press opinions overseas was by no means the only way in which the major Japanese newspapers 'cooperated' with the Foreign Ministry and the military authorities behind it during the Manchuria crisis. On a more 'positive' side, they, especially the Tokyo Nichinichi and its sister newspaper, the Osaka Mainichi, willingly collaborated with the state authorities in their attempt to win over the foreign press.

Attempts to influence foreign correspondents based in Japan and China in return for money began immediately after the Mukden incident. At first, it was the military authorities who took initiatives in this direction, thus causing much embarrassment to the uninformed Foreign Ministry officials who were still anxious to check uncontrolled military actions. As such, these attempts were without much success.[116]

As the power balance shifted in favour of the military authorities even in the field of diplomacy, they embarked on a 'buying-off' policy using diplomats as their agents. Once again, however, it was discovered that such attempts were unlikely to succeed if the correspondents concerned were fully employed by the major foreign newspapers and news agencies. With more success, however, those journalists who had been sympathetic towards Japan since before the Mukden incident were encouraged to write either in their own journals or to the newspapers and other communication organs in their native countries. Perhaps the most prominent among them was the editor of the Far Eastern Review, published in Shanghai, who was later to accompany the unofficial Manchukuo delegation to the League of Nations as an adviser. The Japanese press almost invariably presented the opinion of this American with such headings as 'CHINA, REFLECT UPON YOUR OWN DISGRACEFUL STATE OF AFFAIRS! JAPAN TAKES THE RIGHT PATH: GRATIFYING ARGUMENT BY PRESIDENT OF THE FAR EASTERN REVIEW, MR. REA', followed by somewhat inflated comments like, 'He is one of the best-known China hands in the U.S.A. and his opinion has the influence to guide the American intellectuals! '.[117]

The inauguration of Uchida as the Foreign Minister on 6 July 1932 marked another turning point. Instead of confining its 'buying-off' attempts to the correspondents and other individuals working in the Far East, the Foreign Ministry set as its target the more influential individuals working in their own countries and, if possible, the newspapers as well. It was clear to the Foreign Ministry officials, however, that in Britain and the U.S., neither the major newspapers themselves nor the influential columnists could possibly be 'bought

off'.[118] Moreover, the effectiveness of such attempts was doubted by some of the officials themselves as chargé d'affaires at Washington, Saitō Hiroshi, wrote back to Uchida on 27 September:

> The so-called propaganda in a narrow sense through newspapers, books and lectures etc. is effective only when there is a precise target of positive attack.... The propaganda aimed at a defensive target such as to make other countries understand the fair attitudes of a country has difficulty in achieving its goal quickly. It is easy for one to project another as crooked but hard to present oneself as fair and just.[119]

In spite of the failure by the Foreign Ministry to win over the American and the British public, the Japanese newspapers remained anxious to emphasise that there were still some critics of 'conscience' in the U.S. and Britain who presented their 'just argument' to their fellow countrymen. True, there were some, especially in the U.S., who were 'bought off' by the Foreign Ministry and who were presented by the Japanese newspapers as a 'first-class political correspondent', 'one of the best known experts on the Far East' or a 'well-known expert on China in London'. They were in fact not so influential as the newspapers reported and the more alert reader would have noticed that most of these quotations had originated from 'our own staff correspondents' of the two giant newspaper concerns. Once again, it was the Tokyo Asahi that published most despatches of this kind.[120]

In France, the situation was somewhat different. Although some individuals were 'bought off', the Foreign Ministry also could and did succeed in doing the same to some of the newspapers. At least five newspapers were 'bought off' for three months from October to December 1932. Three others including le Soir were also won over by

the Japanese while there was also a tentative approach with the more influential newspaper, le Temps, following the publication of the Lytton Report.[121] In addition, there was a 'special reward' to the chief editor of le Matin who had been writing for the Tokyo Nichinichi and its sister newspaper, the Osaka Mainichi, as a special correspondent. Not surprisingly, the 'reward' was paid through the Osaka Mainichi which in fact quoted more French newspapers, especially le Matin, than the Tokyo Asahi in the period between October and December 1932 (See Table XX, Appendix p.316).[122]

While the Foreign Ministry officials were busily engaged in the 'buying-off' of some French newspapers with the cooperation of the Osaka Mainichi, the credibility of the Japanese news agency, Rengō declined rapidly among its foreign contractors. Rengō had been designated since the Mukden incident as the sole organ through which the Foreign Ministry would make public its dealings with the League of Nations.[123] Disputes between the Japanese news agencies and their foreign contractors such as Reuters, Havas and AP over the handling of reports from each other had not been uncommon, often with diplomatic consequences. An AP report of an interview with Secretary of State H.L. Stimson, on the possible Japanese advance to Chinchow in November 1931 had been misreported by Rengō - and therefore the Japanese newspapers - thus even inviting the wrath of the hitherto restrained Foreign Minister Shidehara towards the U.S. at the time.[124] This time, however, Rengō was criticised by its foreign contractors for sending too many propaganda reports. No longer did Reuters, AP and Havas automatically distribute the Rengō reports from Japan to their respective clients, and Havas even went on to file official complaints with

the Japanese Ambassador in Paris to this effect.[125] In this context, it is worth noting the following observation on state interference with overseas communication by former Foreign Minister Ishii Kikujirō in his memoir published in 1930:

> Instead of attempting direct propaganda overseas, national opinion within the country should be put into order. We should not forget that more often than not, it is easier to achieve our goal if we left it to the private news agencies.[126]

5. Withdrawal from the League of Nations

On 21 November 1932, the League of Nations Council opened at Geneva to renew discussion on the Sino-Japanese conflict, which had entered a new phase with Japan's recognition of Manchukuo and the publication of the Lytton Report. A deadlock between the two Asian neighbours developed in spite of the relatively flexible 'general principles' adopted by the specially appointed Committee of Nineteen which recognised that neither the restoration of the status quo ante nor the maintenance of Manchukuo was satisfactory and that a new solution should be found as the Lytton Report had suggested.[127]

While the League session was in Christmas recess, the Japanese army thrust into Jehol after the occupation of Shanhaikuan, an important port north-east of Peking, on 3 January, 1933. On 14 February, the Committee of Nineteen decided to call for the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway zone, and approved Chinese sovereignty of Manchuria rather than Manchurian independence. The Japanese government retaliated by approving of the advance to Jehol officially three days later and on 20 February, the cabinet meeting decided to withdraw from

the League should the General Assembly pass the resolution recommended by the Committee of Nineteen. This the Assembly did on 24 February and the Japanese delegation walked out of the Assembly Hall followed by an official notification of Japan's withdrawal from the League on 27 March 1933.

Any remaining resistance among the newspapers against the military authorities disappeared when in November 1932 the Army published its 'requests' in the internal trade circular, 'Newspapers and Newspaper Correspondents', just before the departure of the Japanese delegation headed by Matsuoka Yōsuke for Geneva. These 'requests' urged the newspapers and their special correspondents who were to accompany Matsuoka to stand behind the Japanese delegation to the end even if that meant Japan's withdrawal from the League. From now on, even the slightest hint of criticism of the 'crisis' argument propagated by the Army to keep its control over 'national opinion' was to result in the summoning of the editor of the newspaper concerned to the Army Staff.[128]

Such a threat may not have been necessary for some of the newspapers. Eight days before the publication of the Lytton Report, the East Asia Research Centre within the Tokyo Nichinichi and the Osaka Mainichi had already passed a resolution which called for the rejection of the 'intervention' by the League 'at any cost'.[129] These two sister newspapers and their main rivals, the Asahi of Tokyo and Osaka had also earned a bad reputation among some critics for their 'unfair' and 'unbalanced' reporting from overseas. A Japanese national who worked at the League, for example, had written nine months earlier in the provincial Fukuoka Nichinichi under the pseudonym, 'An old man of Lake Geneva':

> The [Japanese] correspondents received a series of telegrams full of instructions from their head offices. They said that the tone of their despatches had not been in tune with the hardened public opinion in the home country. What were wanted were those which denigrated the authority of the League of Nations. The correspondents abstained from sending any reports on the illogical attitudes of the Japanese government or any criticism heard among the people here of the Japanese representatives. In short, the accurate reporting of facts has seldom been welcomed by the Japanese newspapers.[~~130~~ 130]

The arrival of the Matsuoka mission marked another turning point. The correspondents who had been stationed in Europe since before the Mukden incident had at least come to pay a certain amount of respect to the League of Nations. Most of the large number of Japanese correspondents who specially accompanied Matsuoka had never been outside the home country for a long time. Moreover, having been misinformed by the 'distorted' reports from Europe and the U.S. since the Mukden incident, they had no such awe of the League or any public opinion overseas. Their main task as instructed by the Army was not so much to report the actual situation as to despatch their personal observations of Matsuoka himself for more ~~of~~ or less purely 'domestic consumption'. As a result, their usually very sketchy telegrams described little more than 'Japanese victory' whenever Matsuoka spoke. Trying to correct such a tendency among the correspondents was totally useless as their employers in Japan would have shelved any telegrams which implied otherwise.[131]

Not all the reports from Geneva were, however, unreliable despite the 'discreditable' attitude of the Japanese newspapers. The more alert reader would have noticed that, in the shadow of the sensational headlines attached to the despatches from the 'special correspondents', there were more factual and informative and usually much

longer despatches from Rengō and Dentsū. The Rengō telegrams had in fact originated from Reuters, Havas and AP and the Dentsū reports from UP. The fact that they had been sent into Japan in their original languages may have helped them escape too close a scrutiny from the Communications Ministry, which was responsible for overseas communication control. At the same time, the cost of these longish telegrams was perhaps another reason for the considerable degree of dependence of the Japanese newspapers on the two news agencies even after they had sent their own special correspondents to Geneva with the Matsuoka mission.

Table XXII (See Appendix p.320) is the analysis of the published telegrams concerning the debate at the League of Nations at various stages of the Manchuria crisis. The despatches originated at Geneva except for the period between 16 November and 12 December 1931 when the League Council conducted the debate in Paris. The figures in the brackets indicate that these telegrams came from the staff correspondents of the two Japanese news agencies who were specially sent to Geneva with Matsuoka. They were in fact published with remarks such as 'Dentsū (or Rengō) special correspondent' instead of the usual 'Dentsū (or Rengō)'. As the table indicates, the telegrams which had come from Reuters, Havas, AP and UP and which were published as 'Dentsū (or Rengō)' telegrams, if combined, mostly outnumbered and were almost invariably more substantial in content than those from the 'special correspondents'.

What made it difficult for the reader to judge the actual situation at the League was the frequently misleading emphasis of the headlines attached to these telegrams from the international news

agencies. Even when the despatch reported the sympathy which the Chinese representative had won, the headline read like 'CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THROWS HIMSELF ON THE MERCY OF THE LEAGUE' and 'VICTORY FOR MATSUOKA IN TALKIE AS WELL: POOR PERFORMANCE BY MR. KU'.[132] At the same time, much criticism directed at Japan, especially by the representatives of the smaller nations, was reported by the same foreign news agencies through Rengō and Dentsū, but the text tended to be distorted by such emotive wordings as 'venomous tongue' and 'malicious intention',[133] thus twisting the otherwise factual reporting of the telegram.

The reader was perhaps puzzled when some newspapers such as the Tokyo Asahi and Jijishinpō suddenly started to argue against the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations. He had been told by these and other newspapers that Japan was fighting against the evil world and that the League was the cause of all the difficulties to which Japan had been subjected since the Mukden incident. The sudden change in the attitude of the Tokyo Asahi and Jijishinpō towards the end of January 1933 was carried out in defiance of the 'requests' from the Army two months earlier. By then, however, the leader of one or two newspapers could, as Ogata Taketora of the Tokyo Asahi admitted after the Second World War, 'no longer change the national situation'.[134] The reader could certainly not be blamed if he found the changed approach of these newspapers unconvincing.

If the newspapers did not sound very convincing in their opposition to Japan's withdrawal, nor did most of the journals. True, sōgōzasshi and Kokusaichishiki criticised the 'discreditable' attitudes

of the newspapers. On the other hand, both Chūōkōron and Kaizō had already made a significant change in their attitude immediately after the publication of the Lytton Report, when they began to advocate the creation of a new principle ~~to~~ in the world. It was futile, they argued, for the Foreign Minister to continue his attempt to justify Japan's actions on the basis of the existing principles. Instead, a new principle, which could be termed an 'East Asian Monroe Doctrine' and which would require the 'total expulsion of any external interventions', should be introduced if the Sino-Japanese conflict was to be settled in a satisfactory way. Japan had already paved the first steps to this end when she gave an official recognition to Manchukuo. The reexamination of this new principle was essential before a further step was taken if too heavy a burden on the future generation of the country was to be avoided. Nevertheless, the adoption of this principle, the journals contended, would be ~~the~~ an 'attitude worthy of the magnanimity of a great nation'.[135] In this, they drew closer to the view long held by the Gaikōjihō editor, Hanzawa Gyokujo.[136]

People like Yamakawa Tadao, the most influential director of the League of Nations Association in Japan,[137] also sounded contradictory in opposing the withdrawal while still maintaining that world public opinion, which had been unanimously against Japan, was wrong and that the League was simply suffused with 'lack of understanding' of the Far Eastern situation.[138] The following comment by Tōyōkeizai-shinpō was one of the few examples which sounded coherent:

> The disadvantage resulting from her withdrawal will be immeasurable in the future when international friendship and cooperation develops further. Many of the intellectuals are, therefore, opposed to the withdrawal. If there is any way in which it can be avoided, however high the price for it, they would

> ardently like the government to do its best. We believe that this is the hope of the majority of our people with common sense and therefore public opinion.[139]

Whatever the 'true' public opinion may have been, the Japanese delgation walked out of the Assembly Hall in a 'manly' manner on 24 February, thus finalising Japan's withdrawal.

6. Aftermath

After all the hysteria, which had lasted more than eighteen months, there was some feeling of deprivation in the country. The 'ultimate' goal having just been achieved, the entire nation seemed totally lost for the moment. Then the increasing anxiety about Japan's isolation crept into their mind and the press was left with a difficult task to convince the nation once more that Japan would survive safely without the League of Nations. The reactions shown by the newspapers and the journals varied to achieve this end.

The metropolitan newspapes sounded unrepentant. To the Tokyo Asahi, the withdrawal simply meant that direct diplomacy between Japan and the other Powers would become more important than before and that it provided the country with a chance to promote a new style of diplomacy.[140] The 'new' diplomacy advocated by the Tokyo Asahi, however, sounded like little more than the diplomacy hitherto dictated by the Army, as the following leader of 28 September 1933 suggested:

> Since the Manchuria incident, the Kasumigaseki diplomacy has been revived gradually thanks to the impetus provided by the enforcement of the progressive national policy by the military authorities.... In order to dispel the illusions held by China and to establish a closer relationship between the two countries, Japan's China diplomacy, needless to say, is left with a positive role to play.[141]

Criticism, direct or indirect, of the military authorities was voiced mainly by the smaller newspapers such as the Teito Nichinichi and Yorozu Chōhō in Tokyo and some provincial newspapers such as the Fukuoka Nichinichi and the Shinano Mainichi that showed more courage in speaking out, at least until the February 25 uprising in 1936 when some of the most influential members of the Establishment were murdered by the rebellious group of young officers.[142] The major newspapers seemed content with the publication of foreign newspaper leaders which were critical of the Japanese policy.[143] The number of overseas telegrams, however, gradually decreased.

Kokusaichishiki, which had been published by the League of Nations Association in Japan, felt obliged to change its character as a result of the withdrawal. This change was not just a change in name but also in content, since its attitude had turned against the League and public opinion overseas to a considerable degree. The following declaration of 12 May 1933 by the Association, which changed its name to the International Association of Japan, illustrates this point clearly:

> The present name and aim of Article 1 of the Association have tended to be misunderstood by the general public. It has been thought of as a branch of the League of Nations or reputed to be a body which uncritically supported the League. It has also been considered - very hastily - to have nothing to do with general issues.... These have often caused obstructions to the activities of this association even at a normal time.[144]

As to the other diplomatic journals, Gaikijihō, which had been filled with almost hysterical 'pro-withdrawal' contributions, some calm returned. Some individual critics such as Honda Kumatarō, Rōyama Masamichi and Machida Shirō, who had tried in vain to calm down the

hysteria through this journal just before the withdrawal found that they would at last be able to talk to a more sober audience. Indeed, it was they rather than the more nationalist contributors ~~that~~ who played a major role in the post-withdrawal Gaikōjihō. Machida of the Tokyo Asahi, who had come to support the military action in Manchuria but who had remained opposed to the withdrawal, warned in the April 1, 1933 editiion:

> It is all right to advocate the 'imperial-way-ism' (kōdō shugi). We must not forget, however, that the civilised countries have their own positions.... It would not bring any pleasant reward if Japan, with her xenophobic spirit, advocated the exaltation of the Japanese spirit.[145]

Such fear was stronger among the contributors of Chūōkōron and Kaizō. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi who, according to Ogata Sadako, had been the only critic to challenge the Uchida diplomacy publicly,[146] compared Uchida unfavourably with Komura who was the Foreign Minister at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. Uchida and Prime Minister Saitō attributed the responsibility for Japan's isolation to the 'trend of public opinion' or the 'consensus of the people' whereas Komura and his prime minister, Katsura, had proceeded with the conclusion of the Portsmouth treaty in spite of the enormous pressures from 'public opinion' for the future good of the country. Kiyosawa asked in Chūōkōron:

> We have no objection to parliamentary politics based on the voice of the people. However,is it not also the duty of the members, especially the leader, of the nation to ignore 'public opinion' for the time and sacrifice themselves in favour of the state when it is facing a grave difficulty?[147]

Yokota Kisaburō, perhaps the only legal scholar to claim that

Japan's military action had been a violation of international law, was also invited by Chūōkōron to reexamine the 'East Asian Monroe Doctrine' which had been espoused by its editor eight months earlier. Contrary to the impression given in the leader, Yokota warned, this could not be used as a ready-made principle for Japan to justify her case. The original Monroe Doctrine did not possess any vested interests to protect. It rejected European intervention but was willing to invite arbitration by a third country including one from Europe. It aimed at the status quo among the American states and finally was recognised internationally as in the Nine Power and the Kellogg-Briand Pacts. On the other hand, the Asian version as advocated by the government and its supporters was intended to function in order to protect Japan's vested interests, rejected any kind of intervention including arbitration by a third country, and was designed to encourage and help the independence of the nations in the region. The 'East Asian Monroe Doctrine', therefore, Yokota contended, could only be pursued as a policy for the future.[148]

Perhaps the general feelings among the Chūōkōron contributors at the time were best summarised by Murofushi Takanobu who argued that responsible politicians should not instigate a bellicose spirit, responsible statesmen not think more lightly of the economic blockade than reality required, and responsible soldiers not speak of victory so thoughtlessly. Murofushi wrote in the June 1933 edition:

> We have to speak up bravely to say that Japan's politics have lacked wisdom and that the Foreign Ministry did not have a diplomacy. People might say that we are in a crisis. Indeed because we are in a crisis, we ought to be wise. In crisis, the Foreign Ministry has to have a diplomacy.[149]

Finally, the participation of the reader in the discussion of foreign policy appeared to be expanding when Tōyōkeizaishinpō decided to invite its readers to contribute in its March 11, 1933 edition, thus extending its hand to 'public opinion'.[150] On the other hand, Kaizō abolished its Kaizō Antena column from December 1933 onwards. Perhaps the following letter from a Mr. Matsuda in its June edition was the 'true voice of the people'.

> Many of those who thought the withdrawal was inevitable should admit that they have a social obligation to reconsider what they have sown. If they do not admit the total failure of Japan's diplomacy, the future misfortune will be even greater. Once Baron Shidehara stated that diplomacy should not be something to be praised by the people of the time. This is indeed the word which we should savour.[151]

The course which Japan subsequently followed was in fact not the one encouraged by this writer.

CHAPTER VIII - Conclusion

The main theme of this thesis is the decline of the press as an independent critical force in Japan. The Japanese newspapers, it was suggested in 1930, had long prided themselves on their anti-government attitude, which almost invariably resulted in their expansion.[1] It was alleged in 1938, however, that the same newspapers had sought and ensured their survival and expansion as government 'spokesmen' ever since the Manchuria crisis.[2]

Such a transformation in the role of the press was not an entirely new development. The press had acted as a government 'spokesman' to unite the nation against the enemy country during the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars a few decades earlier. On these occasions, however, the press invariably resumed its former role as a major critics of the government as soon as the immediate crisis seemed to have passed. This does not mean that press criticism always derived from a more rational or logical point of view. Indeed, it was the misinformed and emotional tone of press condemnation of the more 'realistic' nature of the Portsmouth treaty of 1905 that had been largely responsible for the subsequent riot in Tokyo. Even then, however, the press acted as the vox populi rather than an apologist for the government.[3]

This proud tradition of the Japanese press seems to have been maintained and strengthened during the era of 'Taisho Democracy'. The

granting of universal male suffrage in 1925, though somewhat overshadowed by the simultaneous enforcement of the Peace Preservation Law, owed much of its success to the unequivocal press campaign against the government. The press also stimulated public opinion on disarmament as a means of reducing the financial burden borne by the people. Its united effort undoubtedly made it easier for the government to overcome the powerful opposition from the Navy in accepting the Washington naval treaty in 1922. It is also probable that the government was greatly encouraged by the press support for the abolition of four Army divisions in 1924. Thus the press appeared to have become not only a formidable critic of the government but also a valuable ally in the latter's fight against the more 'reactionary' military authorities.

Throughout the period of 'Taisho Democracy', the press had also seemed to take pride in enlightening the public on the real nature of government policy, especially in the field of foreign affairs where the government was at its most secretive. This difficult task was much helped by the improvement of the communication network within and without Japan in the first quarter of this century. The major newspapers encouraged their reporters to form correspondents' clubs at most of the more important government departments. The Asahi and the Mainichi newspaper concerns sent out staff members as their permanent correspondents in the West while most of the major newspapers

also eventually opened offices in virtually every city of any significance in China. The 'commercial newspaper' (shōgyō shinbun) of the Taisho era did perhaps not possess the critical vigour of the 'leader newspaper' (bokutaku shinbun) of the previous Meiji era which was alleged to have thrived on its reputation as the most frequently punished newspaper for its anti-government view.[4] Nor perhaps was the lead article of the 'commercial newspaper' the most important commercial factor any longer as its emphasis shifted from discussion to reporting. Nevertheless, these 'shortcomings' seem to have been amply compensated for not only by its sheer size but also by the critical tone of its 'factual reports'. Indeed, it was the articles written by the correspondents attached to the Foreign Ministry that angered the government over the Twenty-One Demands and the Siberian Expedition. It was also largely the sympathetic tone of 'factual reports' that encouraged the spreading of the Rice Riots in 1918, which brought down the government. Nakane Sakae, a former reporter of the independent news agency, Dentsū, recalled in 1936 of the influence of these 'factual reports' :

> The air at the [Cabinet Correspondents] Club could cause a change of government. It was neither that the lead article attacked the government nor that the editor wrote with the intention to topple it.... The article written in the atmosphere created at the Club would swirl with greater power and charm than any other article in the newspaper, thus opening the way for a political change which would end the political life of a Prime Minister or which would force the government to resign. People often say that it is merely a newspaper cliché, but it was the air of the Club that produced a cliché which was formidable.[5]

In retrospect, however, this claim was a slight overstatement. Even the unequivocal press campaign would not have changed the government had it been supported only by the people. More than one government fell in the middle of nation-wide protests during the era of 'Taisho Democracy'. On these occasions, however, the government was not formed by the political party which held a majority in the Lower House of the Imperial Diet. The majority party therefore joined forces with the press and the people against the 'non-party' cabinet. Conversely, similar attempts failed if the majority party did not side with the press and the people.[6] By the late 1920s, the 'party cabinet' system appeared firmly established and the majority party was itself part of the government which was under constant fire from the press. In addition, the main Opposition party seldom joined forces with the press to fight against the government. Indeed, more often than not, it was the Opposition that was subjected to harsher criticism from the press because of its 'opportunistic' attitude. Hamaguchi and his Minseitō party were, for example, condemned by the press when they joined the Privy Council in delaying the ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1929. Their attack on the settlement of the Tsinan incident also pushed the press closer to the Tanaka cabinet, which had labelled the press as a 'traitor' who spoke for China rather than its own country. Thus, the government seemed to have

even fewer causes of concern for its survival in the late 1920s and early 1930s than at the height of 'Taisho Democracy'.

The press could and perhaps did, however, influence government policy so long as it represented the majority opinion of the people. If Prime Minister Hamaguchi could be believed, not only had the press support been a significant factor for his election victory in 1929 but it was also an essential precondition for the enforcement of his policies.[7] It was suggested in 1938 that the 'consensus of the mass of the people' had never existed in Japan because there were neither 'citizens' nor 'citoyens' and that 'public opinion' in Japan simply meant the opinion expressed by the press.[8] It is also alleged that the Japanese newspapers throughout the 1920s supported the principle of international cooperation as expressed in 'Shidehara Diplomacy' more because of their commercial need to represent the 'opportunistic' internationalism prevalent among the people than because of the needs of the state.[9] If the press was 'opportunistic' in conforming with the public sentiment, however, this 'opportunism' was also its strength. What would have happened had the newspapers not switched support from the Navy to the government in the post-London naval conference dispute ? The public sentiment was overwhelmingly in favour of the ratification of the London treaty which promised tax reduction, if temporary.[10] The continued support for the Navy by the major newspapers would most certainly have cost them a sizeable readership. A major riot might have erupted

as a result of the delay or even failure of the government to ratify the treaty which could have forced the government to resign, as the Rice Riot had done twelve years earlier. Hamaguchi's Minseitō party would probably not have won the subsequent election. It can of course be argued that the press's willingness to 'represent' the dissatisfaction of the people works as a safety valve in their struggle against the government.[11] There is little doubt, however, that without the encouragement from the press, the Rice Riot would not have spread so widely and quickly as to cause the change of the government. Considering that the whole-hearted support for the Riot by the Asahi and the Mainichi newspaper concerns gave them a much needed impetus for their commercial domination over their somewhat hesitant rivals in Tokyo,[12] the newspapers needed to conform to 'public opinion' if they were to survive and expand. The 'party cabinet' in the late 1920s and early 1930s needed to reflect the 'public opinion' expressed in the press in order to stay in power when faced with an issue of national importance. Thus the switch of support by the major newspapers to the government over the London naval treaty was inevitable even if it was the result of their 'opportunism'.

It is possible that the Japanese press was genuinely idealistic about disarmament and world peace in the 1920s. The U.S. proposals for

the Geneva naval conference in 1927 and the Paris peace conference a year later which was to produce the Kellogg-Briand Pact were greeted, at least initially, by a certain amount of cynicism from the press. This was largely because the press believed that these conferences would have been unnecessary had the U.S. joined the League of Nations whose Covenant epitomised - at least in the eye of the Japanese press - ideals for world peace and international cooperation. The somewhat lukewarm press campaign for the Kellogg-Briand Pact may have derived partly from the failure on the part of the critics to comprehend its real significance. On the other hand, it was also the unconditional acceptance of such idealism by the critics that enabled the government to escape press criticism for its failure to give more serious consideration to the question of exceptional cases to which the Pact would not apply.

It was also partly this untested idealism of the press that weakened its critical tone over the China issue. Foreign Minister Shidehara's 'mutual economic prosperity' between the two Asian neighbours and his 'non-intervention' in the Chinese civil war accorded with the spirit of the League Covenant. Almost any government action which appeared to contradict these principles was, therefore, strongly condemned throughout the 1920s. Tanaka's 'positive' policy as reflected in the

Shantung expeditions in 1927 and 1928 was subjected to constant press criticism for the same reason, at least partly, It can of course be argued that the press opposed Tanaka because his policy brought Japan substantial financial damage. Nevertheless, it was the press's unquestioning acceptance of the idealism of the League Covenant that led to its failure to foresee the incompatibility between the high principles of 'mutual coprosperity' and 'non-intervention' on the one hand and the defence of vested Japanese interests in China on the other. When this ambiguity was challenged by Tanaka's Shantung expeditions, therefore, the 'protection of the life and property of the Japanese residents' which provided the justification of these seemingly interventionary actions was never questioned by the press. This ambiguity was also responsible, at least at the initial stage of the Manchuria crisis, for the failure of the press to question the 'self defense' for which the Kwantung Army claimed to have taken action against the Chinese army at Mukden. It is not surprising if the press's subsequent projection to the people of the League of Nations as a villain was partly the result of its instinctive reaction to prevent this ambiguity from being exposed to the public. The League's attitude throughout the Manchuria crisis, after all, appeared to clarify this ambiguity and to place 'non-intervention' before the defence of vested Japanese interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.

The strength of the press in its fight against the government depended not only on whether it represented the public sentiment but also on whether the press was united. The unity within the press during the era of 'Taisho Democracy' had been maintained largely through the cartel agreement among the five major newspapers in Tokyo. The commercial rivalry among them was growing but still controllable. The correspondents' clubs showed an increasing sign of independence but still generally acted on the guidelines drawn by the editors. By the late 1920s, however, the old cartel agreement in Tokyo had already been broken up by the Asahi and the Mainichi concerns. Some influential journals, notably Chūōkōron and Kaizō, were beginning to challenge the predominance of the newspapers not only in discussion but also in reporting on almost every major issue. The growing reputation of the two news agencies, Rengō and Dentsū, among the smaller newspapers was another source of concern for the major newspapers. No less daunting to the newspapers as a whole was the establishment of the semi-governmental Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) in 1928.[13] In addition, the power struggle between the reporters and the editors of the newspapers intensified as the shift of emphasis from the lead article to reports progressed further. Even so, the more overt forms of state interference in the 'freedom of the press' were met by united action from the various press organisations. The reform proposals for

the tightening of the existing press control laws were thus killed in 1926 and 1927. Tanaka's insistent calls for a 'unified national opinion' over his 'positive diplomacy' failed largely because of his contempt for 'public opinion' as expressed in the press. Once the outwardly less high-handed and more liberal Hamaguchi cabinet was in power, however, the situation was bound to change.

The greater degree of sympathy between the editors of the major newspapers and the Hamaguchi Minseito cabinet and the ever intensifying commercial rivalry were the main causes of the subsequent disunity within the press, a disunity which proved to be irreparable. The owner or the advertiser of a major Japanese newspaper who contributed nearly half of its entire income is alleged to have seldom interfered with the editorial policy during the era of 'Taisho Democracy'.[14] The intensification of commercial competition among the newspapers in the late 1920s, however, led to the stage whereby the sales departments dictated their content. Sensationalisation of the 'factual reports' was commonly employed for the expansion of their readership and any move by the editorial departments to reverse this tendency was bound to fail as the Tokyo Asahi discovered well before the Manchuria crisis. The somewhat aloof attitude of Foreign Minister Shidehara under the Hamaguchi cabinet towards the press and his no less secretive handling of the China

issue than Tanaka's were utilised to the full by the Japanese military authorities in China to stir anti-Shidehara sentiment among the public. The head offices , in particular the sales departments, of the newspapers and news agencies also encouraged their correspondents in China to send despatches with anti-Shidehara as well as anti-China tones. The disparity thus appeared more clearly than ever before between the 'factual' reports and the lead articles which generally remained sympathetic towards the government, if not Shidehara himself, almost right up to the outbreak of the Manchuria crisis. As the failure of the editors in the spring of 1931 to reorganise the correspondents' clubs attached to the government departments in Japan suggested, however, the editors had lost control of their subordinates not only in China but also in their own country long before the Manchuria crisis.

Press opinions in Japan were as diverse as those in many Western countries, at least until the outbreak of the Manchuria crisis in the autumn of 1931. The 'commercialisation' of newspapers in the first few decades of this century led, it is alleged, to a virtual uniformity in their editorial policies.[15] There were, however, noticeable differences even between the two most 'commercialised' newspaper concerns, the Asahi and the Mainichi. The Asahi, for example, kept silence on the ratio issue before and during the Londona naval conference despite the insistent persuasion by the Navy to gain press support for its 'minimum'

70 per cent ratio as against the U.S. in capital warships. The Mainichi, on the other hand, enthusiastically supported the Navy in spite of its proclaimed commitment to disarmament and world peace. It was also the Mainichi towards the end of August 1931 that reversed its former opposition to the political interference by the military authorities in contrast to the Asahi's steadfast commitment to this end, at least until the Chinchow bombing by the Kwantung Army on 8 October 1931. It was again the Asahi in early 1933 that defied, if temporarily, the guidelines drawn by the military authorities and opposed Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations while the Mainichi passionately advocated it. This does not mean that the Asahi was always more liberal or progressive than its rival. Indeed, it is alleged that the relative lack of factional conflicts within the Asahi often led to a more 'conservative' or 'bureaucratic' attitude.[16] If the Mainichi showed, as has been suggested, a tendency to use more emotive words on the China issue than the Asahi in the latter half of the 1920s,[17] then it is possible that the Mainichi sounded more sympathetic towards China and more critical of Tanaka's 'positive diplomacy' than its rival. In the post-London naval conference controversy, the Mainichi also sounded often more critical of the Navy which it had so enthusiastically supported than the Asahi. Nevertheless, it was the Asahi rather than the Mainichi that was the main target of attack from

the state authorities throughout the 1920s and early 1930s.[18] The following remark by Mitarai Tatsuo perhaps sums up the reason for this phenomenon most aptly :

> The Asahi adhered to the principle and ideology held by [its founder] Murayama. The Mainichi possessed no consistent ideology. To put it kindly, it moved with the current of the time. To put it unkindly, it had no character and was nothing more than opportunism.... The Mainichi appeared to oppose to at one moment and to sympathise with at another [the government of the time], thus changing its side skilfully and quickly. For this reason, the Mainichi was neither hated nor thought much of.[19]

If the Mainichi sounded more 'opportunistic' than the Asahi, the major newspapers as a whole were certainly more 'opportunistic' than some of the smaller newspapers. A provincial newspaper, the Fukuoka Nichinichi in Kyushu, was more sceptical of the popular 'Shidehara Diplomacy' than its metropolitan rivals. Though as a 'Seiyukai newspaper', it was perhaps natural for the Fukuoka Nichinichi to remain faithful to the Tanaka Seiyukai cabinet, its priority was always the defence of vested Japanese interests first and 'non-intervention' second, thus showing much less inconsistency in its support of the 'protection of the life and property of the Japanese residents' as explained by Foreign Minister Tanaka for the Shantung expeditions than the Asahi or the Mainichi. Nor did this provincial newspaper support the Navy's 'minimum' demands before or during the

the London naval conference, claiming that the 70 per cent ratio as against the U.S. in capital warships was desirable but not essential. It was also the Fukuoka Nichinichi that openly condemned the Japanese advance to Chinchow, which followed the Sino-Japanese clash at Mukden in the autumn of 1931, as an act which would invite international outcry against Japan. Moreover, it was the Fukuoka Nichinichi's criticism of the military authorities at the time of the abortive coup by the rebellious officers in February 1936 that has generally been regarded as the most courageous action of the pre-War Japanese press.[20] It should not be forgotten however, that pressures on the provincial newspapers were not necessarily less than those on the metropolitan newspapers.[21]

Different opinions were also heard through journals other than newspapers. Among the major journals, Gaikōjihō, the diplomatic journal. was the most concerned about 'national prestige' and the economic journal, Tōyōkeizaishinpō, the least. Tōyōkeizaishinpō presented total disarmament as the ultimate goal and advocated the abandonment of Japan's 'special status' in Manchuria and Mongolia until September 1931. It was also the only journal of any significance that welcomed the U.S. participation as an observer at the League of Nations following the outbreak of the Manchuria crisis. In contrast, Gaikōjihō supported virtually any policy, either by Shidehara or by Tanaka, which would promote Japan's 'prestige'. Naval disarmament was thus desirable only if Japan's standing as 'one of the three Great Powers' was

guaranteed through, in the case of the London naval conference, her acquisition of a 70 per cent ratio as against the U.S. in capital warships. Overseas capital was welcomed to exploit natural resources in Manchuria but only if Japan's 'special status' was kept intact. Once these principles appeared to be threatened by external forces, the 'weak-kneed' attitude of not only Shidehara or Tanaka but also the military authorities were condemned. By the spring of 1931, Gaikōjihō had in fact become so far ahead of most other newspapers and journals in the 'patriotic race' that an anonymous reader wrote to the editor in May 1931 :

> We urge you to work at and direct us in our attempt to make the people think more seriously and help them cultivate the spirit of independence and self-respect, thus wiping out the slave spirit of worshipping foreign countries. I add that the leading spirit of your company is the only one in Japan that holds trust among the young loyalists. I congratulate you for this.[22]

The two most reputable 'omnibus journals', Chūōkōron and Kaizō, joined Gaikōjihō in their claim for 'non-alignment' with their 'room-letting' structure, thus introducing the opinions of every political shade.[23] Kokusaichishiki, 'aligned' with the League of Nations Association in Japan, also published differing views of the members or sympathisers of the Association. Socialist or Marxist critics such as Yamakawa Hitoshi and Hasegawa Nyozekan were prominent in Kaizō and their opinions before the Manchuria crisis were not very far from Tōyōkeizaishinpō's. They continued to present

some of the harshest criticism even after the Mukden incident in September 1931 but with a considerable amount of traceable blue-pencilling carried out by Kaizō itself, thus losing much of their critical vigour. On the other hand, some liberal critics such as Kiyosawa Kiyoshi and Shinobu Junpei at times sounded less 'liberal' than not only the socialist or Marxist critics but also the major newspapers before the Manchuria crisis largely because these liberal critics placed the defence of vested Japanese interests in China before the high principle of 'non-intervention'. This does not mean that they supported the Shantung expeditions wholeheartedly. Nor were they so concerned about 'national prestige' as the more nationalistic critics were. Indeed, Kiyosawa was one of the most constant and outspoken critics of the Navy at the time of the London naval conference. Shinobu was also one of the very few who actually urged the government to give more serious consideration to the question of exceptional cases under the Kellogg-Briand Pact because of their grave implications on Japan's vested interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. Their friend, Tagawa Daikichiro, a director of the League of Nations Association in Japan, also continued to express dissatisfaction not only with the government and the newspapers but also with Kokusaichishiki, the Association's journal itself, for their misinterpretation of the spirit of the League of Nations during the Manchuria crisis. Thus, press opinions in

Japan were not uniform, at least until the tightening of press control which followed the outbreak of the Manchuria crisis came to limit the 'freedom of the press' to a much greater degree than ever before.

The change, which the Japanese press underwent in the late 1920s and early 1930s, proved, however, fundamental and irreversible. The abortive coup in February 1936 led to a further tightening of press control. Some traditionally liberal journals such as Chūōkōron and Kaizō still continued to show their resistance through various 'anonymous critical essays' (tokumei hihyō) of government policy, if in a more moderate tone.[24] By then, however, the major newspapers and news agencies had come to accept virtually without resistance or criticism the guidelines drawn up in the various Army pamphlets which dictated Japanese foreign policy since Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations.[25] Nevertheless, the major newspapers claimed to represent 'public opinion' as the company history of the Tokyo Nichinichi wrote in 1941 :

> [After the Mukden incident in September 1931] the political parties were, in effect, no longer a propelling force in politics. This shook the conventional view held in some quarters that so long as they enjoyed the patronage of the political parties, they could ignore the entire press. As a result, society in general began to acknowledge again that the right path for public opinion lay with the press organisations.[26]

Whether this assertion was right is an open question. Any possibility of a reversal in the role of the press from a 'spokesman' of the government to one of its critics was, however, ended when the undeclared Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937. Following the summoning of the presidents of the four major 'omnibus journals' including Chūōkōron and Kaizō, even the latter, which had been one of the staunchest opponents of the military 'adventurism' in Manchuria, became an ardent advocate of Japan's aggressive China policy.[27] Occasional signs of minor resistance against further tightening of press control could still be heard mainly in the smaller newspapers in Tokyo and the provinces.[28] The enforcement of the 'one paper per prefecture' (ikken isshi) system in 1942 was, however, the end of such resistance.

Notes for Preface

1. For details on these points, see for example Murayama Ruheiden, Asahishinbunsha, Tokyo, 1953, pp.240-241 and Tonichi Nanajunenshi, Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbunsha, Tokyo 1941, pp.381-389 etc.
2. The Tokyo Nichinichi was part of the Mainichi newspaper concern between 1911 and 1945, and in post-War Japan it has been renamed the Tokyo Mainichi.
3. On this point, see Ogawa Setsu, Shinbun Seiji Gaikō Kiji no Kisochishiki, Kuritashoten, Tokyo, 1932, p.20.
4. For details on this point, see Tamura Kazuo, "Newspaper Review", Chūōkōron, December 1939, p.77.
5. For details, see Shibukawa Genji, "General Review of Newspapers", Chūōkōron, January 1934, pp.33-64.

NOTES

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1. Shimizu Ikutaro, Jaanarizumu, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1949, pp.88-89. See also Kido Mataichi, "Change In The Nature of The Newspaper", Shisō, February 1955, pp.7-13. In the following footnotes, the place of publication will be Tokyo unless oterhwise stated.

2. For these details, see Ono Hideo, Shinbun no Rekishi, Dōbunkan, 1955, pp.44-45.

3. Ibid., pp.101-102. The Asahi and the Mainichi enjoyed the full support of the major distributors in the city and although Osaka Jijishinpō remained a morning newspaper, it never became a major threat to them.

4. Shimizu Ikutarō, op.cit., p.44.

5. Ono Hideo, op.cit., p.60.

6. Ito Masanori, Shinbun Seikatsu Nijūnen, Chūōkōronsha, 1933, pp.380-381. Tokyo had, according to Itō, 16 newspapers and as many officially registered news agencies at the time.

7. Mitarai Tatsuo in Okamoto Kōzō (ed.), Nihon Shinbun Hyakunenshi, Nihon Shinbun Kenkyū Renmei, 1961, p.389.

8. Nakane Sakae, Shinbun Sanjūnen, Sogabo, 1936, p.35.

9. Dentsū Tsūshinshi, Denpōtsūshinsha, 1975, p.329. The other four shareholders of Rengō were Hōchi Shinbun, Kokumin Shinbun, Jijishinpō and Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpō.

10. Ono Hideo, Nihon Shinbunshi, Ryōshofukyūkai, 1948, p.258.

11. Ibid., pp.253-258. The Osaka Asahi was in fact the first to agree to the establishment of Dōmei, which was the result of the forced merger of Rengō and Dentsū. Until then, the Mainichi and the Asahi groups kept at least one staff correspondent each in New York, London, Paris, Washington, Berlin and Moscow, though few of them commanded any respect from the local press in spite of their 'star' status within their companies. For these, see Shimaya Ryosuke, Shinjidai no Shinbun, Etsuzandō, 1926, pp.143-145 and Murayama Ryūhei Den, Asahi Shinbunsha, 1953, p.663.

12. Ono Hideo, 1955, pp.101-102

13. For the advertised figures, see the Tokyo Nichinichi (henceforth TN in the footnote), 1 January 1924, p.1 and the Tokyo Asahi (henceforth TA), 2 January 1924, p.1. According to

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(13.) Shinbun Zasshisha Tokuhi Chōsa published by the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry in 1927, TN and TA had c.450,000 and 400,000 circulations respectively while their sister newspapers in Osaka were credited with 1,166,432 and 1,260,596 in this order. This Police Bureau report was reprinted on 15 October 1979 by the courtesy of Hajima Tomoyuki who owns the original, and will be referred to as Hajima. Jijishinpō, Hōchi Shinbun and Kokumin Shinbun were also credited with c.200,000, 250,000 and 150,000 respectively in Hajima.

14. Itō Masanori, 1933, pp.21-23.

15. Ibid., p.22.

16. Okamoto Kōzō, op.cit., p.389.

17. Hajima lists the Fukuoka Nichinichi (hereinafter FN in footnotes) with a circulation of 131,000 and the Kyūshū Nippō with only 4,500. The 'Seiyukai newspapers' tended to enjoy bigger circulations than the 'Minseito newspapers'. In Nagoya, the Shin Aichi ('Seiyūkai') had, according to Hajima, 170,000 circulation while Nagoya Shinbun ('Minseitō') was credited with 90,000. Such a phenomenon mighthave been due to the fact that a large number of the Minseitō supporters read the 'provincial editions' of the metropolitan newspapers which tended to support Minseitō as will be discussed. The Kyūshū Asahi which was published in the same prefecture as FN and the Kyūshū Nippō was credited with 233,722 circulation and the Seibu Mainichi with 22,282 in Hajima.

18. This point will be discussed in Chapters VI and VII.

19. For the detail, see K.T.Y., "New Development In Press Control: Dentsū's Refusal To Participate In Dōmei", Sekaikōron, March 1936, p.60.

20. Dentsū Shashi, Nihon Denpō Tsūshinsha, 1938, pp.902-903. The materials of the 'flash news' programmes were supplied at first by Rengō and Dentsū, but the broadcasting corporation started collecting news through its own correspondents as well after the outbreak of the Manchuria crisis. This point will be discussed in Chapter VII.

21. Chikamori Haruyoshi, Jinbutsu Nihon Shinbunshi, Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, 1970, p.241.

22. Itō Masanori, 1933, pp.21-23.

23. Matsuura Sōzō (ed.), Zasshi Kaizō no Yonjūnen, Kōwado, 1977, p.33.

24. Hajima credited 300,000 to Kingu, 20,000 to Chūōkōron and 100,000 to Kaizō. The difference between the two sōgōzasshi

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(24.) seems much bigger than generally believed. See Matsuura, Bungeishunjū Sanjūgenen Shikō, Bungeishunjūsha, 1959, p.70. Chūōkōron's 500th edition hoped that the reader would 'see us in the long run as a beneficial friend who strictly maintains the role of being a high class journal ... without being boring'. See Chūōkōron, October 1929, p.1.

25. Matsuura Sōzō claims that the 'neutrality' of the newspapers was Right-inclined. See Matsuura, Tennō to Masukomi, Aoki-shoten, 1975, p.63.

26. This incident was called Hakkō Kanten Jiken (literally, 'the white-light-penetrates-the-sky incident') and the Osaka Asahi leader criticised the government's rice-pricing policy saying that the white light seen in the sky at the time was the omen for God's punishment to fall on the country run by corrupt politicians. Other newspapers criticised the government as well, but did not invite the same reaction.

27. Okamoto Kōzō, op.cit., p.344.

28. Tōyōkeizaishinpō Genron Rokojūnen, Tōyōkeizaishinpōsha, 1955, p.474. Tōyōkeizaishinpō was the first weekly journal to succeed in Japan, thus breaking the long-held belief that a weekly journal was bound to fail. It had been published three times a month until it became a weekly in 1919.

29. Asahishinbun Shuppankyokushi, Asahishinbunsha, 1961, p.47.

30. Hajima credited Shūkan Asahi with the circulation of 173,750 and Sandē Mainichi with 249,154.

31. This was largely because its most famous contributor, Fukuda Tokuzo, started to contribute more for Kaizō, thus losing its former vigour. See Kimura Tsuyoshi, 'Kaizō's Twentieth Anniversary: Memoir of a Bystander', Kaizō, April 1938, pp.111-112.

32. Nipponhyōron was the successor of the economic journal, Keizaiōrai ('Economic Thoroughfare'). Bungeishunjū had 258,000 circulation in 1932. See Matsuura Sōzō, op.cit., 1959, p.70.

33. Odagiri Hideo, Shōwa Shoseki Zasshi Shinbun Hakkin Nenpyō, Meijibunken, 1965, lists, on average, more than 20 cases of these sale bans every month after September 1931. This book consists of two volumes.

34. According to Ōmori Yoshitaro, there was a sudden flourishing of smaller 'scholarly' journals in the late 20s and early 30s. This was, in his opinion, nothing more than an indication of the decline in the quality of scholars, especially the 'bourgeois' professors, whose opinions were no longer welcome to the more progressive and influential sōgōzasshi. See Ōmori Yoshitarō, "Reality Of The Scholarly Journals", Chūōkōron, June 1931, pp.141 and 152.

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35. Ikeshima Shinpei, Zasshi Kisha, Chūōkōronsha, 1960, p.13. Ikeshima points out that once written, the contribution was published intact whether the editor agreed with its content entirely or not and that the 'room-letting editing' is a great contrast to the post-War method of getting the news from outside on which the staff themselves write. See also Mimasaka Tarō's comment in "The Dark History of the Press in Shōwa", Sōgō Jaanarizumu Kenkyū, November 1966, p.24.

36. "Invitation To The Contributor For The Kaizō Antenna Column", Kaizō, November 1932, p.189 and Chūōkōron, October 1929, p.1.

37. "Declaration Concerning The Principle of Chūōkōron", Chūōkōron, January 1929. In journals such as Chūōkōron, Kaizō and Gaikōjihō, the page number for the 'leader' was usually omitted. In this thesis, the essay title without the page number in the footnote from now on will, unless otherwise stated, indicate that it is the 'leader' which was normally printed right at the beginning of each edition.

38. Gaikōjihō, No.1, 11 February 1898. Gaikōjihō was at first published three times a month, but later became a twice-monthly journal. In the footnote, the volume number of this journal and its date of publication will be stated in order to avoid confusion.

39. According to Baba Akira, Gaikōjihō enjoyed the backing of the Foreign Ministry and the military authorities at a later stage and became a 'semi-official' journal for these two state institutions. This claim is mentioned in footnote 2, Okamoto Shunpei, "Sino-American Relations In The Eyes Of The Japanese Intellectuals", in Hosoya Chihiro (ed.), Washington Taisei to Nichibei Kankei, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1978, p.278. Okamoto does not state, however, whether Baba had suggested at what stage such backing was made.

40. The League of Nations Association in Tokyo came into existence under the chairmanship of the well-known businessman, Shibusawa Eiichi, in 1920. No representative of the 'proletariat' had been invited, however. See Matsushita Yoshio, Hansen Undōshi, Gengensha, 1954, p.174. The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan also published Kokusaihyōron (the International Review), but its contributors were more or less the same as those of its two rivals. Kokusaihyōron and Kokusaichishiki eventually merged in the post-Manchuria crisis era.

41. Kokusaichishiki had repeatedly to urge its readers to introduce new readers in the 20s and even offered a price reduction of 20% in 1927, to little avail. Its readership, if confined to the

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(41.) members of the association, was more or less fixed at just over 6,000 in the latter half of the decade. See, for example, "News Of The Association", Kokusaichishiki, May 1927, inside the back cover. Its membership clearly increased after the Mukden incident to 11,771 in 1932. See Ogata Sadako, "Diplomacy And Public Opinion", Nihon Gaikōshi Kenkyū, No.1, 1969, p.41. Gaikōjihō never indicated the size of its readership, but like many other journals a 'great increase' was reported after the Mukden incident and it urged its readers to subscribe yearly 'because of a possible shortage'. See Gaikōjihō, No.648, 1 December 1931, inside the front cover.

42. This point will be discussed later.

43. Inoue Kiyoshi and Watanabe Tōru (eds.), Taishōki no Kyūshinteki Jiyūshugi, Tōyōkeizaishinpōsha, 1972, pp.1, 9 and 354.

44. Tōyōkeizaishinpō Genron Rokujūnen, p.5.

45. Its circulation was not disclosed after 1907 when it was claimed to be 5,000, but in the spring of 1931, a weekly increase of 50 was reported, thus making it respectable for an economic journal. See Watanabe Tōru and Inoue Kiyoshi, op.cit., p.30.

46. What had been a private ownership became a limited liability in 1921, but most of the total of 1,400 shares at the time were registered in the name of the chief editor as the co-property of the staff and the rest were personally owned by senior members of the staff, past and present. Any employee lost his share of co-ownership upon leaving the company and this arrangement lasted until the end of the Second World War. See Tōyōkeizaishinpō Genron Rokujūnen, p.474.

47. Only a handful of external contributors were invited to contribute on political and diplomatic subjects throughout the period. Tagawa Daikichiro, a director of the League of Nations Association and a friend of the chief editor of the journal, Ishibashi Tanzan, was the most regular. Tagawa's opinions were expressed more often through Kokusaichishiki, however.

48. Murayama Ryūhei Den, Asahishinbunsha, 1953, p.240. In perhaps the first monitoring of its kind, Shinbunkenkyūjo (the Newspaper Research Centre) of Tokyo Imperial University reported in 1933 that the 21,190 newly recruited soldiers who had answered its questionnaires placed the leader in fourth place behind society, politics and sport in the case of TA and TN. The questionnaires had asked them what column of these newspapers they thought 'superior'. None of the other four major newspapers scored any points in their leader column. See Itō Masanori Shinbun Gojūnenshi, Masushobō, 1943, pp.371-372.

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49. In the '20s, the leader normally consisted of one column out of thirteen in a page and discussed only one or two subjects within this limit. Not every day did theleader appear, nor was it very argumentative. On the other hand, the 'short reciew' was reported to be very popular among the readers.

50. Hugh Byas, as quoted in M. D. Kennedy, The Changing Fabric of Japan, Constable, London, 1930, p.183. The phenomenal commercial success was best reflected in the circulation of the Tokyo Nichinichi whose figure of 64,847 in 1911 increased to an advertised circulation of over a million on 1 January 1924. See Tōnichi Nanajūnenshi, Tokyo Nichinichishinbunsha, 1941, pp.354-365.

51. For these attempts, see Mainichishinbun Hyakunenshi, Mainichishinbunsha, 1972, p.178; Itō Masanori op.cit., 1943, pp.344-346; and Kawai Isamu, Shōsetsu Asahijin, Yagishoten, 1968, pp.50-52. The first headline was used by the Tokyo Nichinichi on 4 January 1871 and it was the Osaka Mainichi that introduced equal spacing for the headline and the text in late Taisho, thus making the headline for the shooting of Premier Hamaguchi in 1930 much bigger than that for the shooting of Prime Minister Hara in 1921. See Sato Junzō, "Newspaper Headlines", Chūōkōron, July 1931, pp.66-70 and Mainichishinbun Hyakunenshi, p.178.

52. Ono Hideo, Nihon Shinbunshi, Ryōshofukyūkai, 1948, p.179. Fukuchi was one of the best-known columnists at the time of the Democratic Rights Movement in the 1880s. For the popularity of the 'short review', see Itō Masanori, , 1933, pp.65 and 186 and Tōnichi Nanajūnenshi, pp.386-388.

53. For example, at the time of the sixth general election in 1899 and over the Portsmouth conference in 1905, the major newspapers published a number of letters from readers every day.

54. KageyamaSaburō, Dokusha no Genron, Gendai Jaanarizumu Shuppankai, 1976, pp.142 and 201.

55. Ichikawa, "Collection of Tessō", Tessō, TA, 18 February 1923. A reader named Koshū even suggested the establishment of a 'fan club'. See, "Tessokai?", Tessō, TA, 17 August 1921.

56. The maximum length of the entire column was limited to 60 lines with 15 characters in each line, i.e. approximately one third of a column in a newspaper which consisted of 8 pages with 13 columns in each page. Only one or two very short letters were, therefore, published on any, but not every, day.

57. "To The Contributors", Tessō, TA, 18 October 1924, p.3. See also TA 3 April 1927 and 3 November 1931, p.3.

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58. Tesso, TA, 3 September 1931, p.3.

59. Tesso, TA, 3 November 1931 and 2 February 1933. Jijishinpō is reported to have found the same trend and had to 'fill up' the column with letters written by the staff not infrequently. See, Itō Masanori, 1933, p.66.

60. 'Quite a few' letters received by Tessō in July 1931 had discussed the Sino-Korean clash in Manchuria, and the Sino-Japanese clash two montsh later and its repercussions at the League of Nations attracted 66 and 'over 60' responses in September and October that year respectively. See Tessō, TA, 4 August, 2 October and 3 November 1931, p.3. Tesso, however, very seldom disclosed the content of the letters received. Tsunobue and the equivalent column in FN never published any figures and, therefore, their statistics in Chart I can show only those which were actually published.

61. Ogawa Setsu, Shinbun Seiji Gaikō Kiji no Kiso Chishiki, Kuritashoten, 1932, pp.13-14.

62. Shimanaka Yūsaku who became the editor of Chūōkōron in March 1927 was responsible for this. Chūōkōron's May 1926 edition contained 17 contributions in the total of 409 pages while its May 1927 edition carried 36 essays in the reduced total of 368 pages. See Chūōkōronsha Nanajūnenshi, Chūōkōronsha, 1955, pp.185-186.

63. Jiron took over the role of the leader after the abolition of the latter in the summer of 1931.

64. This will be discussed in a separate chapter.

65. The Japan Year Book, the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, p.223 (1930 edition) and p.231 (1931 edition).

66. Captain M. D. Kennedy, a British resident in Japan at the time, observed: In adopting this liberal attitude, the Japanese press is almost universally up in arms against the Government of the day, and it is a striking fact that the more a paper attacks the Government, the greater does its circulation tend to increase. See M. D. Kennedy, op.cit., p.188. For a similar observation, see Uehara Etsujirō, "Our People And China Diplomacy", Kaizō, February 1929, pp.81-83.

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1. See for example, TA and TN, 1 January 1927, pp.2-3.

2. "Showa Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.531, 15 January 1927.

3. TA, 10 June 1927.

4. For the detailed account of Shidehara's attitude on these occasions, see G. P. McCormack, Chang Tso-lin, The Mukden Military Clique and Japan, 1920-1928: The Development And Inter-Relationship In North East China, Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1974, pp.134-139.

5. TA, 28 September, 14 and 15 October 1924, 10 December 1925 etc.

6. TA, 16 December 1925. See also TA, 19 December 1925.

7. The fact that Shidehara himself was opposed to the expedition is irrelevant as the press was not informed - at least officially - of the proceedings of the cabinet meeting. For this, see Bamba Nobuya, Manshūjihen eno Michi, Chūōkōronsha, 1975, 3rd edition, p.160. This book is a revised versionof Bamba's Japanese Diplomacy in A Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy, 1924-1929, Minerva Press, Kyoto, 1972. They are not, however, identical.

8. As quoted in Japanese in Bamba Nobuya, 1975, pp.131-132.

9. TA, 13 February 1926. For the criticism of the great 'fuss' on the 'special interests' at the time, see Hanzawa Gyokujō, "Special Status In Manchuria And Mongolia", Tessō, TA, 19 February 1926, p.3. This is one of the rare occasions on which the Gaikōjihō editor sent a letter to the newspapers as a reader.

10. Following a shooting incident between the Chinese textile workers and the British authorities on 30 May 1925, a series of long strikes were organised by the Chinese. Despite the Japanese refusal for a joint expedition, Britain sent troops to Shanghai, thus leaving herself the main target of the Chinese. On 25 June, the Chinese government disclosed the thirteen demands concerning the revision of the unequal treaties including the increase of the uniform import duty from 5% to 12.5%.

11. The essence of this decision was: Japan would accept the maximum duty of 7.5%; China in turn should use half of the subsequent surplus income for the repayment of her debt to Japan which amounted to 200 million yuans as opposed to 40 million yuans each to Britain and the U.S.; Japan would be opposed to any 'intermediate' duty, i.e. between 7.5% and 12.5%, but would consider 8% or 9% as the maximum; finally the recovery of tariff autonomy by China should be gradually achieved.

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(11.) Britain and the U.S. had earlier shown their willingness to accept the maximum 8% or 9% duty respectively. Both of them, however, had indicated that they would reject China's tariff autonomy and the Japanese government based their decision on this principle.

12. TA, 9 October 1925. See also TA, 26 August and 15 October 1925.

13. TA, 28 October 1925.

14. TA, 6 July 1926. Before the Japanese declaration on the opening day of the conference, the U.S. and Britain had announced their unwillingness to accept Chinese tariff autonomy.

15. "Showa Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.531, 15 January 1927.

16. Bamba, 1972, p.192. See also "This Year's Task", Gaikōjihō, No. 530, 1 January 1927.

17. Okamoto Shunpei, "Sino-American Relations In The Eyes Of The Japanese Intelligentsia: Ishibashi Tanzan And Hanzawa Gyokujō", in Hosoya Chihiro (ed.), Washington Taisei to Nichibei Kankei, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1978, pp.259-278.

18. Bamba, 1975, p.183. Bamba contends:

> However, the dissatisfaction felt by public opinion towards the Shidehara diplomacy increased. Even the Asahi ... was attacking it in its leader for being 'imbued with liberalism'. Considering his handling of individual events, it was not so much the 'cooperation diplomacy directed at the U.S. and Britain' as the 'independent diplomacy' that was based on its own diplomatic principle designed to further the interests - especially economic - of Japan. Public opinion, however, did not accept it this way.

19. According to Bamba, Japan's export to China was Y287 million in 1921 and 468 million in 1925. See Bamba, 1975, p.182.

20. Britain proposed the immediate acceptance of additional duties of 2.5% and 5% stated in the Washington treaty, recognition of the enforcement of tariff autonomy etc. See TA, 19 December 1926, p.2.

21. TA, 28 December 1926, leader and p.2.

22. The actual text read:

> No foreign country would ever succeed in its attempt to impose on China the political or social system that has been created by its self-centred desire.

See TA, 19 January 1927, p.2.

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23. Japan's reasoning for the 'unofficial' negotiations was that it was doubtful whether any agreement reached between the two governments, i.e. the Japanese and the Peking, would carry any binding power over the Kuomintang government. See TN, 22 January 1927, p.2.

24. TA, 1 February 1927. See also TN 27 January 1927.

25. Chūōkōron set up a special section entitled 'Criticism On The Diplomacy Led By Foreign Minister Shidehara' in its March 1927 edition whose contributors consisted of one member each from the three major political parties, one legal scholar and a journalist. Of these, only Nagai Ryūtarō, the Kenseikai member and the Foreign Ministry councillor, expressed his whole-hearted support of the 'Shidehara Diplomacy'. For the criticism by the other four of the Foreign Minister, see Notes 28, 29 and 30 below.

26. Since the ratification of the treaty concerning the basic principles in the Russo-Japanese relationship on 25 February (singed on 20 January) 1925, the two countries had succeeded in imporoving their relationship to a considerable extent.

27. "Foreign Minister Shidehara's Speech", Kokusaichishiki, March 1927, p.8.

28. Nakamura Yoshihisa, "A Great Diplomat Required By Current Japan: Is Shidehara One?", Chūōkōron, March 1927, pp.99-104.

29. Kamio Shigeru, "Testing Time For The Shidehara Diplomacy", ibid., pp.113-118.

30. Uehara Etsujirō, "Present Regrettable Chinese Situation And The Shidehara Diplomacy", ibid., pp.109-110 and Shinobu Junpei, "Weakness In Foreign Minister Shidehara's China Policy", ibid., pp.95-98.

31. "Declaration To The Representative Of The Southern Chinese Government On Behalf Of The Proletarian Parties", Chūōkōron, April 1927. See also "Spiritual Linkage Between The Chinese And The Japanese Peoples", Chūōkōron May 1927. The first official representative of the Kuomintang government, Dai Tian-cuo, arrived in March 1927. For the opinions of Kaizō and Gaikōjihō, see "Grave Turning Point of Japan", Kaizō, March 1927 and "Political Struggle And Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.532, 1 February 1927.

32. Bamba, 1975, pp.177-182.

33. TA, 3 April 1927, p.2.

34. See for instance, TA, 30 March 1927, p.2.

35. Bamba, 1975, pp.183-184.

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36. The significance of the difference in tenor between the leader and telegrams from China will be discussed in a separate chapter.

37. TA, 2 April 1927. See also TN, 27 March 1927.

38. See TA and TN, 5 April 1927.

39. TN, 7 April 1927.

40. Yoneda Minoru, "Looking At The Changing Aspects Of China", Chūōkōron, May 1927, pp.81-82. Chūōkōron's special section in this edition entitled "Japanese Vested Interests Threatened By Turbulent China" included three other essays which were more or less in line with Yoneda's argument. See ibid., pp.58-82.

41. FN, 14 April 1927. See also FN 3 and 10 April 1927.

42. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, "Criticism Of The Tanaka Diplomacy In The Light Of The History Of Civilisation", Chūōkōron, July 1927, p.82.

43. The ratio agreed at Washington was 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 in capital ships with Britain, the U.S., Japan, France and Italy in this order.

44. See for example, TA and TN, 12, 13, 14 and 15 February 1927, pp.2 and 3.

45. France suggested that the U.S. should join the League of Nations-sponsored disarmament undertakings which will be referred to later.

46. See for example, TA 22 February 1927 and FN, 21 February 1927.

47. TN, 13 February 1927. See also "Proposal For A Second Disarmament Conference", Kokusaichishiki, March 1927.

48. See Takahashi Kamekichi, "Economic Interpretation Of The Disarmament Proposal And Japan's Position", Kaizō, March 1927, pp.110-119.

49. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, "Coming Of The Age Of Disarmament", Chūōkōron, March 1927, pp.84-90. Two days after Kiyosawa had begun to write this essay, the U.S. invitation was sent out and this fact is stated clearly in it. He urged the government to demand that the U.S. abolish the defensive armaments in Hawaii, the Philippines and Guam, and the British similarly in Singapore.

50. Yamakawa Hitoshi, "Farcical Naval Disarmament Conference", Chūōkōron, April 1927, p.94.

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51. Nagaoka Gaishi, "Auxiliary Warship Issue Seen Through Aircraft", Chūōkōron, April 1927, p.105. Six other essays were featured in the special section entitled 'Eight Differing Views on Disarmament' in this edition.

52. "Our Country Should Proceed With The Principle Of Total Disarmament", Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No. 1237, 26 February 1927, p.9.

53. "In Support Of A Second Disarmament", Gaikōjihō, No.534, 1 March 1927. See also "Recent Japanese Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No. 536, 1 April 1927.

54. This issue will be discussed later.

55. Quoted in TA, 25 June 1927, p.2.

56. TA, 11 June 1927. President Harding had proposed the Washington conference.

57. Ishimaru Tōta, "Faced With A Three Nation Disarmament Conference: An Open Letter On Fundamental Policies For Disarmament", Kokusaichishiki, July 1927, p.15.

58. According to TA, 22 June 1927, p.2., Japan's silence over Hawaii and Singapore derived from her fear of losing her ratio claim.

59. TN, 12 July 1927.

60. The economist, Terashima Shigenobu, was more or less the only person who supported a ratio greater than 70% in auxiliary vessels. See Terashima, "Naval Disarmament And Our Sea Transport And Trade", Kokusaichishiki, July 1927, pp.25-33.

61. For these see Yanagisawa Shinnosuke, "Reality Of The Disarmament Conference: Acute Conflict Between Britain And The U.S.", Gaikōjihō, No.543, 15 July 1927, pp.61-66; Sakamoto Shuntoku, "Geneva Conference", ibid., pp.1-11; Mizuno Kōtoku, "Disarmament Conference: Exposed Monkey Show", Chūōkōron, August 1927, pp. 39-42; Hidaka Kinji, "Go Back To The Hague All Nation Conference On Peace", Gaikōjihō, No. 543, 15 July 1927, pp.77-82. Hidaka, a rear admiral, argued that the Powers should return to the pre-First World War concept of 'principle to defeat the enemy' from the current 'principle to kill the enemy'.

62. Ishimaru Tōta, "Arms Limitation Or Expansion?: Three-Nation Disarmament Conference For The Sake Of Self-Interests", Kokusaichishiki, August 1927, p.78.

63. TA, 6 August 1927. See also Mizuno Kōtoku, "Brokendown Naval Disarmament Conference", Chūōkōron, September 1927, pp.40-50.

CHAPTER III

1. Tanaka made these declarations in his reply to an Opposition Diet member, Nagai Ryutaro. See TA, 6 May 1927, p.2. For his inauguration speech and the subsequent press scepticism, see TA, 21 April, p.2. and 8 May, and TN, 11 May, all 1927.

2. See TA and TN, 27 April 1927.

3. "Tanaka Cabinet's Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.539, 15 May 1927. For a similar view, see TA, 17 May 1927.

4. TA, 28 May 1928, p.2. The revolutionary government was divided into two at this stage.

5. For a detailed examination of this phenomenon, see Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, op.cit., Chūōkōron, July 1927, p.78.

6. "Alas, Finally China Expedition!", Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No.1251 4 June 1927, p.11.

7. Yoshino Sakuzō, "China Expedition", Chūōkōron, July 1927, p.120. See also his "Social Review" column, Chūōkōron, August, 1927, p.93.

8. See for example, "Square Look At The Current Situation", Chūōkōron, July 1927; "Manchuria-Mongolia Policy Of The Seiyukai Cabinet", Chūōkōron, September 1927; "Hasty Expedition", Jihyō, Kokusaichishiki, July 1927, p.1. etc.

9. TA, 1 June 1927. See also TN, 28 May 1927 for a similar view.

10. See FN, 29 May 1927.

11. "Handling Of The Expedition Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.541, 15 June 1927.

12. "Appoint A Full-Time Foreign Minister", Gaikōjihō, No.544, 1 August 1927.

13. Yamamoto Kumatarō, "Recent Arguments On China Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.543, 15 July 1927, pp.109-110. See also Ogawa Setsu, "Stick To The Principle Of Being An Onlooker And Keep Silence", Gaikōjihō, No.543, 15 July 1927, p.73. Ogawa was also the sole contrihutor in this period to express this view in Kokusaichishiki. See his, "Shantung Expedition And Anti-Japanese Boycotts", Kokusaichishiki, p.38. See also FN, 10 June 1927.

14. Following the collapse of the Kenseikai cabinet under Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro, the two main Opposition parties, Kenseikai and Seiyuhonto, merged in June 1927 to form a united Opposition party named Minseito under the leadership of Hamaguchi Osachi.

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15. Ōyama Ikuo, "Some Words To The Chinese Proletariat", Chuokoron, October 1927, p.111.

16. See for example, TA, 16 March 1928.

17. The initial number of soldiers to be sent to Shantung in 1928 was 5,500 compared to 2,000 in 1927 while the number of the Japanese residents remained virtually the same at 2,000.

18. TN, 20 April 1928. See also TA, 19 May 1928.

19. "Shantung Expedition Again", Gaikōjihō, No.562, 1 May 1928. See also TA, 20 May 1928 and TN, 19 May 1928.

20. This incident started on 29 April when the police interfered with the reporting of a legally organised political meeting in Tokyo and led to the publication of a joint condemnation of the government by nineteen major metropolitan newspapers and news agencies, with a call for the resignation of the Home Minister and the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police signed by the heads of the Society departments of the seven most influential newspapers. This conflict between the two parties had been on for an entire week when the Tsinan incident took place. See TA and TN, 30 April - 5 May, 1928, pp.2, 3, 6 and 7.

21. This will be discussed in Chapter VI.

22. This was an answer by Tanaka to the Nanking government's demand on 5 May for the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops following the Tsinan incident.

23. TA, 10 May 1928.

24. TN, 9 May 1928.

25. Yoshino Sakuzō, "China Expedition", Chūōkōron, June 1928, p.64.

26. "Importance Of The Tsinan Incident", Gaikōjihō, No.563, 15 May 1928. See also Onishi Sai, "Sclerosis Of China Diplomacy: Second Expedition To Shantung And Understanding Of China", ibid., p.50.

27. TA, 19 May 1928, p.2.

28. They included Mori Kaku (Parliamentary Vice Minister), Debuchi Katsuji (Vice Foreign Minister), Yoshida Shigeru (Consul General at Mukden), Mutō Shingi (Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army), Kodama Hideo (Governor General of the Kwantung Province), Hata Eitarō (Vice Army Minister) and Minami Jirō (Deputy Chief-of Staff).

29. For the detail of this policy, see Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō narabini Shuyō Monjo, 1840-1945, Gaimushō, 1965, Vol.II, pp.101-102.

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(29.) Basically, it declared Japan's 'neutrality' in the Chinese civil war but warned the Chinese that Japan would respond in 'self-defence' against the 'lawless' elements in China. See also, W. F. Morton, Tanaka Giichi And Japan's China Diplomacy, Dawson, Folkestone, Kent, 1980, pp.96-97.

30. "Utilisation Of Diplomacy For Domestic Political Ends", Gaikōjihō, No.547, 15 September 1927. Earlier in "Harvest Of The Eastern Conference" (No.543, 15 July 1927), the editor had, somewhat sardonically, acknowledged the significance of the conference in one sense only; the central government and its representatives in China exchanged their ideas face to face for the first time.

31. See for example, TA, 8 July 1927.

32. Murofushi Takanobu, "Awaken From Your Nightmare", Chūōkōron, October 1927, pp.114-115. For a similar view, see Horie Kiichi, "Japanese Policy Towards Manchuria And Mongolia", Kaizō, November 1927, p.48 and Sasakawa Kiyoshi, "Reconstruction Of Foreign Policy For A New China Required", Chūōkōron, October 1927, pp.125-126. Horie argued that China could 'make up the loss in Manchuria with a revenge in Shanghai".

33. "What Is The Positive China Policy" as quoted in Watanabe Tōru and Inoue Kiyoshi (ed.), op.cit., p.367.

34. Hanzawa Gyokujō, "Three Principles In Current Chinese Affairs: Fate Of Chang Tso-lin; Reopening Of Tariff Conference; Peace Recommendation To China", Gaikōjihō, No.560, 1 April 1928, p.2.

35. Hanzawa Gyokujō, "On The Meeting Of The Japanese Commerce And Industry Which Deal With China', Gaikōjihō, No.563, 15 May 1928, p.10. Hanzawa felt it acceptable if such warning came from either the Japanese residents in China or a non-governmental organisation such as the Sino-Japanese Business Association as it would be a form of the 'national diplomacy'.

36. TA, 19 May 1928. See also TN, 19 May 1928.

37. This point will be discussed later.

38. TA, 26 June 1928. For a similar view, see Yoshino Sakuzō, "Situation In China", Chūōkōron, July 1928, p.83.

39. For a critical view of the causation of these events, see Shidehara Kijūrō, "Outline Of The China Issue", Chūōkōron, March 1929, pp.36-37.

40. "Unification Of National Opinion Over China", Gaikōjihō, No.569 15 August 1928. For similar views, see TA, 15 July, TN,

(40.) 4 August 1928 and Yoshino Sakuzō, "Criticism Of China Policy", Chūōkōron, September 1928, p.87. The intended members of the council in the final proposal published on 3 August were Privy Councillor Itō Miyoji, former Foreign Minister Gotō Shinpei, Hiranuma Kiichirō, the leaders of the two Opposition parties, Tokonami Takejirō and Hamaguchi Osachi, and Home Minister Suzuki Kisaburō. Hamaguchi declared his refusal to participate in the council immediately. See TA, 4 August 1928, p.2.

41. "International Understanding", Kokusaichishiki, September 1928, p.4.

42. See for example, Yasuoka Hideo, "Political Struggle In Japan And China", Gaikōjihō, No.580, 1 February 1929, pp.11-12 and FN, 26 November 1928.

43. This will be discussed in a separate chapter.

44. See for example, TA, 8 August 1928. For the criticism of Minseito's silence on the expedition, see TA, 22 June 1928.

45. FN, 8 August 1928.

46. "Diplomatic Arguments In The Diet", Gaikōjihō, No.580, 1 February 1929.

47. The Powers had agreed at the time that the duty conference would be closed until the emergence of a universally recognised single Chinese government.

48. For Shidehara's attempt, see Chapter II. Tanaka also agreed to the postponement of the negotiations on 20 April and 20 July 1927.

49. Eguchi in Watanabe Tōru and Inoue Kiyoshi (eds.), op.cit., p.361.

50. "China Should Cultivate Her Power First", Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No.1309, 28 July 1928, pp.8-9. For a similar view, see TA and TN, 21 July 1928.

51. Japan, in response to the Nanking declaration, insisted that the old trade treaty would be valid for another ten years according to its Article 26.

52. TA, 21 July 1928. For a similar view, see Kaji Ryūichi, "Abrogation Of The Treaty By The Nationalist Government" and "Takahashi Kamekichi, "Sino-Japanese Economic Relations And Military Policy", Kaizō, September 1928, pp.120-132.

53. Yoshino Sakuzō, "Criticism Of China Policy", Chūōkōron, September 1928, pp.79-80. See also, Komura Shunzaburō, "Mainly On The Sino-Japanese Treaty Issue", ibid., p.38.

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54. See for example, FN, 31 July 1928.

55. Nishiyama Eikyū, "What China Demands From Japan", Kokusaichishiki, November 1928, p.45.

56. Shinobu Junpei, "Significance And Area Of Special Interests", Gaikōjihō, No.570, 1 September 1928. For a similar argument, see "Establishment Of Fundamental China Policy", Kaizō, September 1928 and Ōnishi Sai, "Can Manchuria Be Separated From China?", Gaikōjihō, No.572, 1 October 1928, pp.87-88.

57. See for example, Nakano Seigō, "Reality Of Exposure", Chūōkōron, March 1929, p.102. Earlier Tanaka had declared in the Diet that he had no responsibility for the assassination of Chang Tso-lin because he had not been personally consulted on the transfer of the patrolling area and had claimed that tens of thousands of prime ministers would still not be enough if a prime minister had to take responsibility for such a 'trivial' matter. See also Nakano's "Deterioration Of Sino-Japanese Relations And Japan's Withdrawal From The South Manchurian Railways", Kaizō, February 1929, p.90.

58. "Approve Or Disapprove The Exposure Tactics?", Chūōkōron, March 1929. Tanaka had sent a private proxy to almost every negotiation with China, discrediting the Foreign Ministry officials in the eye of the Chinese. He had also been appointing concession hunters etc. to the higher posts of the South Manchuria Railways and the Kwantung Government General etc. See, "Only Resignation Can Solve", Kaizō, February 1929. For a supporting view of the Tanaka diplomacy, see Yoshida Torao, "Anti-Japanese Movements In China And Japan's Policy Towards Them", Kokusaichishiki, March 1929, p.21.

59. See for example, Hamano Matsutarō, "Present Situation Of The Nationalist Government And The Basis Of Japan's China Policy", Kokusaichishiki, March 1929, pp.65-66 and Sakamoto Yoshitaka, "Return To The Great Cause Of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations", Gaikōjihō, April 1929, pp.36-43.

60. Uehara Etsujirō, "Our People And China Policy", Kaizō, February 1929, p.82. This essay was the only one which supported Tanaka as far as Kaizō was concerned.

61. See for example, Nakano Seigō, "Complete Failure of Tanaka Diplomacy", Kaizō, May 1929, p.105.

62. "Settlement Of Various Issues Concerning China", Gaikōjihō, No.587, 15 May 1929. For a similar view, see TA, 27 March and 18 April 1929; "Improvement In China Diplomacy", Chūōkōron, May 1929; Yoneda Minoru, "Settlement Of The Tsinan Incident And The Future Of The Sino-Japanese Relations", ibid., p.76.

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(62.) The government's original statement of 18 July 1928 demanded an apology from the Nationalist government, punishment of those responsible, compensation for the damages and guarantee for the future. In contrast, the final agreement left the compensation issue to a joint committee. Japan also agreed to withdraw her troops within two months. All the other demands were dropped by Japan.

63. Briand was addressing on the tenth anniversary of the U.S. participation in the Great War.

64. TA, 27 May 1928, p.2.

65. The U.S. plan published on 14 December 1927 included the construction of 71 warships at a cost of over $700 million. See Machida Shirō, "Value Of The Peace Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.556, 1 February 1928, pp.73-74.

66. Among the exceptions presented by the U.S. was aggression against any country in the Western hemisphere which, as President Monroe had declared a century earlier, would not be tolerated by the U.S.

67. "Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.555, 15 January 1928. For similar views, see Hanzawa Gyokujō, "This Year's Diplomatic Issues: Need For A U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.554, 1 January 1928, p.8; Sakamoto Shuntoku, "Peace Treaty: Actually War Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.556, 1 February 1928, p.90; Ninagawa Shin, "Peace Treaty In Name But Not In Deed", Gaikōjihō, No.557, 15 February 1928, pp.19-23; FN, 7 January 1928; TN, 8 January 1928 etc.

68. Machida Shirō, "Value Of The Peace Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.556, 1 February 1928, pp.73-74. See also Inahara Katsuji, "Reality Of The Peace Treaty", ibid., p.14.

69. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, "Progress In The Discussion Of Peace", Kokusaichishiki, March 1929, pp.33-34.

70. TA, 27 June 1928. For a similar view, see TN and FN, 27 June 1928.

71. Shinobu Junpei, "Relations Between The Peace Treaty And The League Of Nations", Gaikōjihō, No.566, 1 July 1928, p.54.

72. Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., p.263.

73. The government made an enquiry to the U.S. on the possibility of amending the phraseology only to be told by the U.S. of its 'groundless' apprehension. See Takeuchi, ibid., pp.263-264.

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74. See for example, FN, 12 October 1928.

75. "Peace Treaty And Constitution", Gaikōjihō, No. 572, 1 October 1928.

76. See for example, "Reservation By The Privy Council", Gaikōjihō, No.585, 15 April 1929; TN, 6 April 1929; FN, 10 May 1929 etc.

77. The government declaration read:

> Our understanding of Article 1 is that the Emperor declares on behalf of the state. Therefore, we declare that it does not contradict the national polity.....

78. As quoted in TA, 25 April 1929.

79. Shinobu Junpei, "Peace Treaty And The Right Of Defence In Manchuria And Mongolia", Gaikōjihō, No.591, 15 July 1929, pp.10-11. For a similar view, see Yamakawa Tadao, "Reservation Issue Of The Peace Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.585, 15 April 1929, p.17.

80. The government also assured the Privy Council that Japan would defend her 'special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia', but without informing the other signatories of the treaty. See TA, 18 and 19 June 1929, p.2.

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1. Matsushita Yoshio, "Prospects Of The Future Of Disarmament", Kokusaichishiki, July 1929, p.86. In June 1929, a Labour government was elected in Britain, which was reported to be in favour of some form of naval disarmament. In response, Okada made some cautionary remarks, that Japan would not take the initiative but would not hesitate to accept an invitation to attend a disarmament conference. For other examples, see Tagawa Daikichiro, "Japan's Position And Attitudes Towards Naval Disarmament", Kokusaichishiki, May 1929, pp.10-22 and "Prelude For A Second Disarmament", Kokusaichishiki, June 1929, pp.5-16.

2. See for example, TA and TN, 26 July 1929.

3. See TA and TN, 11 October 1929.

4. See Table II, Appendix p.301.

5. Ishimaru Tōta, "Mainly On Disarmament: Japan's Positive Attitudes Requested", Gaikōjihō, No.594, 1 September 1929, p.96. For his other contributions, see 'Faced With Disarmament Conference", Kokusaichishiki, July 1929, pp.13-23; "Towards The Next Disarmament Conference", Kokusaichishiki, November 1929, p.27 etc. For a similar view, see Ozaki Gō, "Importance Of The Next Disarmament Conference", Kokusaichishiki, September 1929, pp.29-38.

6. "Conference For Experts Or Politicians?", Kokusaichishiki, August 1929, p.5.

7. See TA, 27 November 1929, p.2.

8. "Naval Disarmament And Japan", Gaikōjihō, No.595, 15 September 1929.

9. TN, 11 October 1929. See also, TN, 11 July and 15 September 1929 and TA, 30 August 1929 etc.

10. TN, 3 January 1930. See also, TN, 20 January 1930, p.2. One of the articles in this page wrote:

> The Navy and the government have a belief that they absolutely cannot concede on the 70 per cent issue. If the ratio is not easily met, it is believed that our plenipotentiary is to make a 'life or death' effort to achieve this. So far as the Empire's stand is concerned, it is assumed that there is only 'either 70 per cent or split'.

Similar articles appeared daily in TN, p.2. throughout the conference.

11. Takamiya Tahei, op.cit., pp.45-47.

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12. Ito Masaneri, "Before And After The London Conference", Chūōkōron, December 1933, p.202.

13. See for example, TA, 30 January, 14 February and 1 March 1930.

14. For the opinions of those who tried to justify the changed attitudes of the major newspapers, see for example, Itō Masanori, "Before And After The London Conference", Chūōkōron, December 1933, p.203.

15. They were the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Four Power Pact, the Nine Power Pact, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the U.S.-Japan Arbitration Pact and the Capital Warships And Naval Equipment Limitation Treaty.

16. Shinobu Junpei, "Political Consideration On The Ratio Issue", Gaikōjihō, No.601, 15 December 1929, p.10. For a similar view, see Yasutomi Shōzō, "London Conference And Crisis For The Government", Kaizō, February 1930, p.86.

17. Okamoto Tsurumatsu, "Disarmament Conference And Japan's Attitudes", Gaikōjihō, No.602, 1 January 1930, p.183. For similar views, see Matsubara Kazuo, "Many Aspects Of The London Conference", Gaikōjihō, No.606, 1 March 1930, pp.5-6 and Yoneda Minoru, "Looking At The Situation At The Disarmament Conference", Gaikōjihō, No.605, 15 February 1930, p.10. The 'clumsy' handling of the conference by the Foreign Ministry came under fire from those who supported the 70 per cent ratio as well. For an example, see Ninagawa Shin, "Naval Disarmament Conference And The General Situation", Gaikōjihō, No.608, 1 April 1930, pp.103-104.

18. Kaizō did not publish any leader on the ratio while the only leader on the issue published in Chūōkōron urged the Japanese proletarian parties to unite in order to get a bigger voice vis-a-vis the government on disarmament. See, "On A Single United Proletarian Party And Recommendation For Disarmament', Chūōkōron, December 1929.

19. Machida Shirō, "General View Of The Disarmament Conference", Kaizō, March 1930, p.164.

20. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, "Popularity Of The Wakatsuki Mission", Chūōkōron, February 1930, p.274.

21. "Financial Importance Of The London Conference", Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No. 1383, 25 January 1930, p.9.

22. For the arguments on this score, see Hanzawa Gyokujō, "Again To The U.S. Ambassador", Gaikōjihō, No.606, 1 March 1930, p.5 and "Note To The U.S. Ambassador", Gaikōjihō, No.605, 15 February 1930, p.1; Sekine Gunpei, "Ideals Of Disarmament And The

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(22.) Anglo-American Negotiation", Gaikōjihō, No.594, 1 September 1929, p.63; Capt. Komaki Kazusuke, "On The 70 Per Cent Ratio In Auxiliary Warships", Gaikōjihō, No.602, 1 January 1930, pp.183-187 etc. For the critical view of the Navy's propaganda, see Okamoto Tsurumatsu, "Contradictory Nature Of The Naval Disarmament Conference", Kokusaichishiki, March 1930, pp.24-25.

23. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, "Recent Scenes At The London Conference", Chūōkōron, March 1930, p.222.

24. For a detailed account of this process, see Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., pp.288-302 etc.

25. Article 11 of the Imperial Constitution provided for the Emperor's supreme command of the Army and the Navy while Article 12 dealt with the imperial prerogative over the organisation and peace standing of the Army and the Navy.

26. They included the construction of three heavy cruisers.

27. "Reexamination Of The London Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.618, 1 September 1930. This leader was referring to the U.S. plenipotentiary's statement at the Senate a few weeks earlier which had tried to assure the country of the 'triumph' of the U.S. at the London conference. See also, "The U.S. Questioned", Gaikōjihō, No.619, 15 May 1930.

28. "Leading Spirit Of Japanese Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.626, 1 January 1931.

29. Honda Kumatarō, "Faced With The Ratification Of The London Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.617, 15 August 1930, p.10. For a similar view, see also Ōyama Ujirō, "Shaky London Treaty", Gaikōjihō, No.618, 1 September 1930, p.20.

30. Ozaki Gō, "Construction Of The Three Heavy Cruisers", Gaikōjihō, No.617, 15 August 1930, p.22.

31. Kamikawa Hikomatsu, "Criticisms Of The London Three Power Treaty From Political Point Of View", Gaikōjihō, No.610, 1 May 1930, p.10.

32. Yasutomi Shōzō, "Naval Treaty And Japan's State Defence", Gaikōjihō, No.611, 15 May 1930, p.23. See also his "Approval Or Disapproval Of The Government's Disarmament Policy", Kaizō, May 1930, p.97.

33. Yasutomi Shōzō, "Military Power In The Treaty And Military Command", Gaikōjihō, No.618, 1 September 1930, p.49.

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34. "Looking Back At The London Conference", Kokusaichishiki, June 1930, p.4. Takeuchi claims that the League of Nations Association in Japan which published Kokusaichishiki had not made any effective measures but to pass a resolution in favour of disarmament until the signing of the treaty. The resolution was not, however, published. See Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., p.304.

35. Ishimaru Tōta, "Fantasy Concerning The London Treaty: Had Japan Blocked The Way To Disarmament?", Kokusaichishiki, October 1930, pp.27-31.

36. Ishimaru, "Taking Up The Naval Replacement Programme", Kokusaichishiki, November 1930, p.69 and "Awaken From The London Disarmament Conference", Kokusaichishiki, June 1930, p.36.

37. Matsushita Yoshio, "Naval Replacement Programme And Feeling Of Security", Kokusaichishiki, December 1930, pp.23-24. See also his "Was The London Conference Successful?", Kokusaichishiki, June 1930, pp.37-45 and "Financial Effects Of The Three Nation Agreement Proposal", Kokusaichishiki, May 1930, p.30.

38. Tagawa Daikichirō, "After The London Conference", Kokusaichishiki, July 1930, p.22. See also his "Emphasis Moves Gradually", Kokusaichishiki, October 1930, pp.16-25. The tax cut which should have resulted from the Washington treaty was never carried out because of the Great Earthquake of 1923.

39. Kato Kanji resigned from the post of the Chief-of-Staff after his unsuccessful attempt to obtain the Emperor's support on the conclusion of the treaty in his meeting with the throne on 10 June. Takarabe resigned from his post after the treaty had been unanimously approved by the Privy Council on 1 October.

40. "Hamaguchi Cabinet Busy At Last", Kaizō, July 1930. See also "Extraordinary Diet And Employment Policy", Kaizō, May 1930. According to the Imperial Constitution, the failure to produce any cabinet Minister obliged the cabinet to resign and this had been the most commonly used tactic by the service forces to pressure the government.

41. The Tokyo Asahi invited Minobe and the Osaka Mainichi asked Sasaki while Kaizō carried the contributions from both. The Tokyo Nichinichi invited Professor Nakano Tomio of Waseda University, one of the best known private universities in Japan. See for example, Minobe, "Relationship Between The Military Authorities And The Government In Our Country", Kaizō, June 1930, p.26 and Sasaki, "Relationship Between The Military Authorities And The Government In The Decision Making Process of Military Strength", Kaizō, July 1930, pp.104-126. See also

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(41.) Minobe, "London Conference And The Scope Of The Power Of Supreme Command", TA, 2, 4 and 5 May 1930 and Sasaki, "Power Of Supreme Command", the Osaka Mainichi, 1-5 May 1930. Chūōkōron voiced its view through Yoshino Sakuzō's "Reality Of The Supreme Command" in its June 1930 edition (see p. 167).

42. "Eradication Of Deadlocks In Politics", Chūōkōron, July 1930.

43. See for example, TN, 15 May 1930.

44. "Mainly On The Supreme Command", Chūōkōron, June 1930. For a similar view, see "Carry Out Definitely Disarmament And Taxation Cut", Kaizō, September 1930.

45. Mizuno Kōtoku, "Final Settlement Of The Domestic Problems Of The Navy", Chūōkōron, September 1930, pp.207-208.

46. Itō Masanori, "Judgment Of A Draw In Disarmament", Chūōkōron, July 1930, p.113.

47. Hanzawa, "On The Ratification Of The London Treaty: The U.S. Should Stick To The Spirit Of Disarmament", Gaikōjihō, No.611, May 1930, p.2. For a similar opinion, see Horikawa Junichiro, "On The Result Of The London Conference", Gaikōjihō, No.610, 1 May 1930, p.74.

48. See for example, TA, 1 May 1930.

49. See Itō Masanori, "Before And After The London Conference", Chūōkōron, December 1933, p.202.

50. Takeuchi, op.cit., p.303. Itō Takashi quotes Kiyosawa Kiyoshi as saying that the 'politicians were far more progressive in their courage and ideology' in deciding to accept the U.S. proposal. See Itō Takashi, Shōwa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyū, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, Tokyo, 1961, pp.39-40.

51. FN, 2 November 1930. See also FN, 29 April, 11 August and 16 September 1930.

52. People like Ozaki Gō of TA, as have been discussed, continued to voice their support for the Navy in not only their newspapers but other journals such as Gaikōjihō.

53. Itō Takashi, op.cit., p.446. On the discrepancy, see also Harada Kumao, Saionjikō to Seikyoku, Iwanamishoten, 4th edition, Tokyo, 1967, Vol.I, oral statement of 26 May 1930, p.66.

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1. The number of leaders on China in the newspapers had decreased drastically in this period. FN, for instance, published 566 leaders in the eighteen months between July 1929 and December 1930 (31.44 per month). Only 25 of them touched on China whereas 80 of them discussed disarmament, making their monthly figures 1.39 and 4.44 respectively. Under the Tanaka cabinet (May 1927 - June 1929), the comparative figures on these subjects were 5.01 and 1.65 respectively. In the fifteen months between August 1929 and December 1930, only one out of the twelve Kokusaichishiki leaders touched the China issue.

2. The 'agrement issue' started with China's rejection of the newly appointed Minister to China, Obata Torikichi, on 17 December 1929. Obata had been regarded by China as a 'persona non grata' since his alleged offence to the Chinese at the time of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915. It was the first time in modern Japanese history for the Foreign Ministry to encounter refusal to such an appointment. The Changsha incident took place on 28 July 1930.

3. See for example, TA and TN, 7 May and 30 October 1930.

4. For the detailed account of the 'railway issue', see for example Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi 1: Manshūjihen Zenya, Asahishinbunsha, 1963, pp.342-352, etc.

5. An imperial ordinance oncerning the organisation of the Home Ministry was issued on 26 February 1886 and the Police Bureau was made responsible for press control.

6. See Shimizu Ikutarō, op.cit., pp.88-89 and Odagiri Hideo, op. cit., Vol.I, pp.6-7. The Newspaper Law and the Newspaper Act are the translations of Shinbunhō and Shinbunjōrei while the Publication Law and the Publication Act refer to Shuppanhō and Shuppanjōrei, and this practice will be followed in this thesis.

7. Russia, France and Germany jointly sent an official note on 23 April 1895 to Japan advising her to return the concession in Liaotung to China. According to Ono Hideo, the Home Ministry exercised the administrative 'prohibition order' 87 times between August and December 1892, 87 times again between January and December 1893, 56 times between January and May 1894 and 222 times between March and December 1895. The majority of the 222 cases in 1895 were applied to articles concerning the Triple Intervention. See Ono, Shinbun no Rekishi, Dōbunkan, 1955, p.56.

8. Ono Hideo states that the Osaka Asahi made a new record for being suspended three times in the post Russo-Japanese war furore in which the press in general strongly criticised the

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(8.) 'weak' attitudes of the Katsura cabinet towards the defeated Russia. TA and three other newspapers were also subjected to the same treatment twice each while the eventual closure on 29 January 1905 of the weekly newspaper, Heiminshinbun, for its anti-war and anti-capitalist views was rather unusually carried out through the more complicated judicial procedure. See Ono, ibid., pp.56-58 and Matsushita Yoshio, op.cit., p.82.

9. Miyake Setsurei, "Fifty Years' History of Newspapers", TA, 3 January 1929, p.3.

10. Article 38 of the Newspaper Law stated that the offence would result in either up to six months' imprisonment of the publisher or the editor, or a fine of up to three hundred yen. According to Article 12, 2,000 yen should be deposited by a Tokyo or Osaka newspaper as its guarantee fund with the local authorities concerned for its publication while the comparable figures for a newspaper published in a city with its population over and under 70,000 were 1,000 yen and 500 yen respectively.

11. TA, 25 December 1924.

12. The Publication Law was the new name given to the amended Publication Act in 1893.

13. For these classifications, see Odagiri Hideo, op.cit., p.18 and Naimushōshi, Chihō Zaimu Kyōkai, 1971, Vol.II, p.758.

14. For the second and the third groups, see Shōwa Shichinen ni okeru Shuppan Kenetsu Gaikyō (hereinafter SSSKG in the footnote), p.142. This leaflet was published in 1933 by the Police Bureau as an internal circular and listed the summary of publication control in the year 1932. Similar leaflets for other years might have existed, but have not been discovered yet. For the classification of these two groups, see also Yamane Shinjirō, "Press Control By The Authorities", Kaizō, April 1927, p.73.

15. SSSKG, p.69.

16. Fuse Tatsuji, "Protest Against The Suppression Of The Press and Class Struggle", Chūōkōron, October 1927, p.90. For a similar opinion, see Fukuda Tokuzo, "On The Seizure Of Publications", Kaizō, October 1927, p.162.

17. The reason for this is that the content analysis comes from SSSKG. See footnote 14 above.

18. These events will be discussed in Chapter VII.

19. In 1922 and 1923, the minor Opposition party, Kakushin Kurabu (the Reform Club) presented reform proposals to the Imperial Diet only to encounter staunch opposition from both the government and the press. The government rejected them as too

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(19.) 'progressive' while the press felt them to be too 'reactionary'. For the content of these proposals, see TA, March 1923.

20. This is a comment made by Fukuoka Ikichi. See Odagiri, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.8-9.

21. For the listing, see for example, Shuppan Keisatsuhō, Vol.6, March 1929, p.110. This booklet was also published by the Police Bureau as a monthly circular on the actual enforcement of press control and its first volume was published as the October 1928 edition under the Tanaka cabinet. It will be referred to in the footnote as SK from now on.

22. SSSKG, pp.27-28. On 28 January 1932, the representatives of the major Tokyo newspapers and news agencies visited the Home Minister at his residence to discuss their anxiety over the increase of the sale bans. They requested the clarification of the 'suspended matters' to avoid unnecessarily damages. The Police Bureau subsequently outlined two categories of criteria, the first one of which was an exact copy of the list in SK, Vol.6, p.110 (see footnote 21 above). The second category consisted of the purpose of publication, its range of readership, its circulation and social influence, the social condition at the time of its publication, its area of distribution and the amount of disquietening sections. Both categories were fully taken into account in the application of the Newspaper Law and this was why, the Police Bureau claimed, different publications received different treatments for the publication of the same article. For this argument by the Police Bureau, see SK, Vol.41, February 1932, p.99.

23. "Explanation On Diplomatic Matters In The Publication Law Proposal", Foreign Ministry Archives (Gaikō Shiryōkan - hereinafter FMA in footnotes) file No. N.2.2.0.6 (this file number is as classified at FMA), and for the title of the file, see the bibliography. Article 18 of the Publication Law was the same in its content as Article 23 of the Newspaper Law, but was applied to books and 'non-political' journals.

24. FMA, N.2.2.0.6, especially the leaflets entitled, "Regulations In The Publication Law Proposal Concerning The Foreign Minister's Right To Prohibit The Publication: Drafted On 27 January 1927", "Clauses In The Proposed Publication Law Relating To The Foreign Ministry" and "Opinions of Each Bureau On The Proposed Publication Law".

25. Ibid.

26. For the criticism of this pehenomenon, see TA, 6 and 15, 1926.

27. Kaizō was banned for the publication of a play called 'Sacrifice' by Fujimori Seikichi in its July 1926 edition. Kaizō and

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(27.) Chūōkōron were to receive three and four sale bans respectively in the period between January 1927 and December 1933. The formal letter of 'protest' to the Home Ministry by the two bodies was dated 23 July 1926.

28. Hashimoto Motome, Nihon Shuppan Hanbaishi, Kōdansha, 1964, p.458.

29. The last of these requests before the outbreak of the Manchuria crisis in September 1931 was made in April 1931. In it, they even proposed to pay for the employment of the extra personnel needed for the revival of the 'internal censorship', only to be rejected. See, ibid., pp.462-463.

30. Ibid., p.460.

31. TA, 30 June 1927.

32. Mitsueda Shigeo, Shōwa Genronshi, Nihonhyōronsha, 1958, p.22.

33. Hashimoto Motome, op.cit., pp.461-462.

34. According to TA, 1 March 1923, the Publication Section (Toshoka) of the Police Bureau had eight subdivisions including the newspapers division and the journals division, but had only one section chief, two supervisors and twenty minor officials who were kept constantly busy. This situation was virtually unchanged even after the outbreak of the Manchuria crisis when the number of sale bans and the 'suspended matters' increased dramatically. See Naimushōshi, Vol.I, pp.804-805.

35. Abe Shinnosuke, "Banning Of Blue-Pencilled Passages", Ekonomisuto, Vol.14, No.27, 21 September 1936, pp.15-16.

36. Noro Eitaro, "Reality Of Japan's So-Called Non-Threatening Disarmament", Chūōkōron, March 1930, p.51. For a similar example, see Yasutomi Shozo, "National Defence Issue Resulting From The Naval Treaty", Kokusaichishiki, July 1930, p.50.

37. Honda Kumatarō, "Failure Of The Shidehara Diplomacy And Mismanagement Of The Tanaka Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.567, 15 July 1928, p.12.

38. Komura Shunzaburō, "Criticism Of The China Policy Of The Seiyukai Government", Kaizō, July 1928, p.80. Compare this with his "Mainly On The Sino-Japanese Treaty", Chūōkōron, September 1928, pp.31-41.

39. Yamakawa Hitoshi, "Unification Of National Opinion On China", Kaizō, October 1928, pp.68-69. For a similar example of blue-pencilled passages, see his "Finale Of The Tanaka Diplomacy", Kaizō, March 1929, pp.70-71. Compare these with his non-pencilled "Characteristics Of The Tanaka Diplomacy", Chūōkōron, September 1928, pp.57-60.

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40. See for example, Nakanishi Inosuke, "Wan Paoshan Incident and Korean Peasants", Chūōkōron, August 1931, p.268.

41. This was probable judging from his attitudes towards the despatches from the Japanese correspondents in China which were published in the major newspapers. This point will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

42. "Foreign Minister Shidehara's Speech", Gaikōjihō, No.628, 1 February 1931. Gaikōjihō never received a sale ban between 1927 and 1933.

43. No deletions were found in the newspapers in 1927.

44. The Japanese correspondents attached to the Kwantung Army knew, according to Chiba Yujirō, who were responsible for the assassination. See his remark in "Insight Into The History Which Left The People In The Cold", Shukan Posuto, 5 November 1971, pp.165-166. Also see Mori Katsumi, Manshūjihen no Rimenshi, Kokushokankokai, 1976, p.32. It is possible that the headquarters of the major newspapers also knew the truth about this affair as the next chapter will suggest.

45. Tokawa's comment in the above Shukan Posuto article, pp.164-165. Some other grave events such as the planning of the occupation of Manchuria by the Army Staff in 1929 and the March and the October Incidents in 1931 in which some of the young officers plotted a military coup were subsequently suspended for the same reason. See also Mitsueda Shigeo, op.cit., p.56.

46. Ogata Taketora, "Earnest Wish Of An Old Soldier: Freedom Of The Press Is Everything", Bungeishunjū, special issue entitled "Newspapers, Radio and Books", December 1952, pp.27-28.

47. Takamiya Tahei, op.cit., pp.52-53.

48. FMA, A.3.5.0.10, Despatch (hereinafter Des. in footnotes) No.103, 29 September 1928 from Head of The Police Training School Yokoyama, to The Foreign Ministry.

49. Odagiri Hideo, op.cit., passim.

50. SK, Vol.6, March 1929, p.110.

51. "Roundtable Talk By The Leader Writers Of The Six Major Newspapers Over Press Freedom And Control", Bungeishunjū, June 1934, p.76. This talk will be quoted several times in this thesis and will be referred to as Zadankai (Roundtable Talk).

52. Mitarai Tatsuo, op.cit., 1952, pp.12-15. The immobilsation of the Osaka Asahi machines was directed at its advocacy of an immediate general election based on universal manhood suffrage which was eventually legalised in 1925. The group responsible

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(52.) for this action was the Fellow Thinkers' Society Towards China (Taishi Dōshikai) whose ostentatious aim was to promote 'hard-line' diplomacy towards China rather than any domestic goal.

53. M.D. Kennedy, The Changing Fabric of Japan, Constable, London, 1930, p.188.

54. Hosokawa Ryūgen, Jitsuroku Asahi Shinbun, Chūōkōronsha, 1958, pp.35-36. Kōno Tsunekichi (ex-Army) of the Tokyo Asahi and Ishimaru Tōta (ex-Navy) of the Tokyo Nichinichi were two of the best-known critics in this category. Kōno was, however, not allowed to write after the Mukden incident in order to avoid 'unnecessary' confrontation with the Army, according to Hosokawa.

55. Mitarai in Okamoto Kōzō (ed.), op.cit., p.341.

56. Ogawa Setsu, op.cit., p.20.

57. Watanabe Tōru and Inoue Kiyoshi (eds.), op.cit., pp.366-367. For the frustration felt by the Army, see Mori Katsumi, op.cit., pp.59-60. Mori quotes the "Observation Of International Situation", a booklet annually published by the Army Staff reporting in its 1930 issue that the Army had not been successful in its attempt to win over the press on the Manchuria issue. The majority of the press, it stated, was against the Army's plan to solve the question even by force, if necessary.

58. Takamiya Tahei, op.cit., pp.45, 54-55. Takamiya was TA correspondent attached to the Army from 1930 onwards. The leaders of the two Asahis were not united until 1934.

59. As quoted in an article entitled "Serious Press Suppression By The Government", TA, 15 December 1930, p.2.

60. These debates were held at Tokyo Imperial University in July. The Authors' Association and the Publishers' Association jointly sent a letter to the Home Minister four months later requesting the 'easing' of the censoring procedure. It is also noteworthy that these two organisations had been working on this since they established the League For The Reform Of Censorship System in 1927 whose members included artists, theatre directors and some of the labour movement leaders. See Hashimoto Motome, op.cit., pp.462-463.

61. See for example, TA, 15 December 1930, p.2. Hosokoshi was alleged to have passed some information to a news agency owner friend on the current condition of Prime Minister Hamaguchi who had been shot at Tokyo station by a fanatic opponent of the London naval treaty in November that year. Hosokoshi was held by the police under the Rumour Control Act.

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62. See footnote 20, Chapter III.

63. Kasumikai was so called because the Foreign Ministry was at Kasumigaseki while Kuroshiokai (the Black Current Club) took its name from the warm current which flowed northward near Japan.

64. Shunjūkai can be translated as the Spring-Autumn Society, but Shunjū was one of the Four Chinese Classics written at the time of Confucius.

65. Kato never withdrew the ordinance itself to avoid a 'loss of face' but promised its 'harmless application', thus in effect nullifying the order to prohibit criticism of his policy. His ultimatum to China to accept the Twenty-One Demands on 4 May leaked and was bitterly criticised by the press. This ordinance became the first and the last to be issued against the press before the enforcement of the National Mobilisation Law in 1938.

66. Nakane Sakae, Shinbun Sanjūnen, Sōgabo, 1936, p.116.

67. See Arase Yutaka, "Formation Process Of Monopoly In Newspapers", Shisō, February 1955, p.39 and Nomura Hideo, "Political Correspondents In The Old Days" in Gojūnin No Shinbunjin, Dentsū, 1955, p.227.

68. One of the two news agencies, Rengō, was established in 1926 and joined immediately while the other agency, Dentsū, was a founder member of the new group. Itō Takashi claims that the 'respectability' of the newspaper editors was enhanced by the establishment of the New Japan Alliance whose members included the editors, the younger members of the House of Peers and some top officials of the Home Ministry. The joining of such noted scholars as Yoshino Sakuzō and Ōyama Ikuo with TA, according to him, also worked to this end. See Itō Takashi, op.cit., p.435.

69. Itō Masanori, 1933, pp.73-74.

70. No newspaper condemned the government in the leader concerning this issue.

71. Kitagawa Kazuo, "Towards The Unity Of Newspaper And News Agency Correspondents: Mainly On The Correspondents' Clubs", Chūōkōron, June 1931, pp.284-285. The Home Ministry did issue an apology to the 21st Day Club, but this was, according to Kitagawa, nothing more than to calm down the anger of the reporters. The executives of the 'bourgeois' newspapers, he contended,

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(71.) had 'shaken hands' with the Minseitō government 'as a token of their total cooperation'.

72. This point will be discussed later.

73. Itō Takashi, op.cit., p.441. By 1934 when the second London naval conference was taken up by the press, the 21st Day Club was 'consulted' by the two service Ministries, the Home and the Foreign Ministries, but its opinion was totally ignored. See Ono Hideo, op.cit., 1955, pp.113-114.

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1. Some FMA files contain the copies of these telegrams.

2. This conference opened on 27 August 1927.

3. FMA, B.10.9.0.11, document No.15. For the press debate on this subject, see for example, TN, 27 and 28 July 1927.

4. For actual examples of these 'censored' telegrams, see TA and TN, 30 May-31 July 1927, p.2.

5. Yoshino Sakuzō, "On The China Expedition", Chūōkōron, August 1927, p.12. Yoshino quoted his friends in the newspapers complaining that they had been warned of heavy punishment if they defied the government order to present the telegrams in this way. See also Yamakawa Hitoshi, "Change Of Government, Parties and Expedition", Kaizō, July 1927, pp.68-76.

6. Uchida Shinya, Fūsetsu Gojūnen, Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1951, 2nd edition, pp.132-133. See also Furuno Inosuke, Shinbun Tsūshin Chōsakai, 1970, p.171. This incident took place during the Sino-Japanese battle in Shanghai towards the end of January 1932 and Iwanaga barely escaped punishment.

7. For the number of telegrams 'received somewhere', see Tables XIII - XV (Appendix, pp. 308 - 310)

8. FMA, A.3.5.1.10, Cable No.52, Des. No.481.

9. FMA, A.3.5.0.10, Des. No.650. Also see Hayashi Kyūjiro, Manshūjihen to Hōten Sōryōji: Hayashi Kyūjirō Ikō, Harashobō, 1978, p.48. In Manchuria where Japan was considered to hold a 'special status', press control imposed upon the Japanese correspondents and the Japanese-owned newspapers tended to be harsher than in other parts of China or in Japan, and the authority directly in charge of it was the Kwantung Government General. For this, see Ishikawa Junkichi (ed.), Kokka Sōdōinhō, Vol.IV, Kokka Sōdōinhō Kankōkai, 1975, pp.3-75.

10. FMA, A.3.5.1.10, Des. No.52, from Hayashi to Tanaka, 19 March 1929. See also Des. No.481, from Tanaka to Hayashi, 17 May 1929.

11. FMA, A.3.5.0.10, Des. No. 65, Tanaka to Hori. The third party unmentioned in this passage was the Communications Ministry and this matter was reported in, for example, FN, 9 January 1929, p.1.

12. Japan's participation in the First World War was largely confined to Shantung where Germany had held some important concessions including the naval base at Tsingtao. The treatment of war correspondents by the military authorities had been

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(12.) regretted by many and, until the Russo-Japanese War, the reporters had been classified in the same category as cattle. The first legal regulations concerning these correspondents came into force during the Russo-Japanese War thanks largely to the participation of their colleagues from overseas, but the situation had changedlittle when the Siberian expedition took place. Among the most notable former correspondents who subsequently became the executive members of the newspapers was Okuno Shintarō of the Osaka Mainichi-TN. For the details of these aspects, see Maruyama Kanji, "On The War Correspondents", Kaizō, December 1937, pp.266-270.

13. Dentsū Shashi, Nihondenpotsushinsha, 1938, p.821.

14. See for example, Army Ministry Archives (hereinafter AMA), Mitsu Dainikki, 1929, Vol.I, Des. No.107 from Ono Toyoshi, the commander of the 17th Division, to Army Minister Ugaki, 7 March 1924. This despatch was entitled "Notes On the Planning And Preparation For Expeditions In Case Of Catastrophe And Disturbance."

15. FMA, A.1.1.0.2-17. The troops came from Kumamoto which was the headquarters of the 6th Division. FN was published in the neighbouring Fukuoka prefecture and strongly supported the expedition, as noted in Chapter III.

16. See for example, TA, TN and FN, 4-15 May 1928, pp.1 and 2.

17. Mainichi Shinbun Hyakunenshi, 1972, p.155.

18. TA, 6 and 7 May 1928, p.2, respectively.

19. The capitalised part was in Gothic as well as much larger types. TN, 4 May 1928, p.2. On the final account released by the government a few days later, less than thirty had been killed.

20. Ōba Keishū had written on thisscore in Nihon oyobi Nihonjin (Seikyosha, 1 May 1920, pp.24-25);

> Those who have observed the situation impartially can easily see how creditable the so-called 'received at the Army Ministry' telegrams are. Our stupid newspapers today which haveno fixed views, however, have been treating such military propaganda telegrams from Siberia as if they were so precious. With a little more shrewd observation, the readers should be able to discover that there are some reporters in Siberia who have become devoted admirers of the military propaganda.

21. FMA, A.1.1.0.2-17, Des. No.700, Minister Yoshizawa to Tanaka, 21 May 1928.

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22. AMA, Riku Shi Mitsu, No.11, "Detailed Reports Of The Actions in the Seventh Year of Shōwa", pp.802-803.

23. FMA, A.1.1.2-5, Des. No.22, from Consul Tamura in Chicago to Tanaka, 10 May 1928. See also AMA, Riku Shi Mitsu, No.II, booklet called "Enforcement Report Concerning Propaganda And Strategy".

24. FMA, A.1.1.0.2-19, Des. No.54.

25. TA evening edition, 10 May 1928, p.1.

26. AMA, Shōwa Sannendo Riku Shi Mitsu Dainikki, pp.710-715 and 779-780.

27. AMA, ibid., pp.741-742.

28. W. Fleisher, Volcanic Isle, Jonathan Cape, London, 1942, p.183.

29. The efficiency of the bureau was however, questioned by various critics even before the Mukden incident in 1931. See Shimaya Ryōsuke, Shin Jidai no Shinbun, Etsuzandō, 1926, p.153.

30. This point will be clarified later in this chapter.

31. See Hōchi Shinbun, 19 January 1929, p.2.

32. FMA, A.3.6.0.3, Des. No.82, from Yata to The Head of the Information Bureau, 22 January 1929. See also Des. No.44 in the same file.

33. FMA, ibid., Des. No.178, from Yata to Shidehara. The company motto of Dentsū was, "Do not despatch a false telegram, but make sure of its accuracy before sending out". See Nakane Sakae, Shinbun Sanjūnen, Sōgabo, 1936, p.229.

34. FMA, A.3.6.0.2-1, Des. No. 294, from Hori to Tanaka, 28 March 1929. Dentsu claimed the death casualty figure of the Japanese at 280 while telegrams from other companies reported it to be between 30 and 100 during the Tsinan incident. See TA, TN and FN, 4 - 15 May 1928, pp.1 and 2.

35. FMA, A.3.6.0.3, Des. No.238, from Hori to Tanaka.

36. FMA, A.3.6.0.2-1, Des. No.955, from Hayashi to Tanaka. This letter was in fact written as a response to the formal request from Tanaka to investigate the activity of the Japanese correspondents in China. Other consulates also sent their accounts to Tanaka.

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37. FMA, ibid., Des. No.294, from Hori to Tanaka. Rengō acted as an 'export only' agency in Peking where the 'import' was dealt by Tōhō Tsūshinsha which had also enjoyed their backing of the Foreign Ministry. The Chinese-owned Chinese language newspapers, according to Hori, did not think much of Tōhō's relatively quiet Chinese language bulletins whereas its English language bulletins were popular among the English-language newspapers which were mostly owned by foreigners. Dentsū's Chinese language bulletins were, Hori added, very popular among the Chinese newspapers which tended to favour sensationalism.

38. "Nonsense Telegrams" in Tsunobue, TN, 3 May 1927, p.3. The writer pointed out that the Japanese newspapers had reported the entry of 3,000 plain-clothed Chinese soldiers to Dairen for an attack on the Japanese. Even an amateur observer could see, the author claimed, that six or seven ships would have been required for such a large scale operation, which should have made it impossible for the soldeirs to land 'secretly' as had been reported.

39. Gotō Chōtarō, "Attitudes Of The Japanese Who Are Unskilful In China Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.571, 15 September 1928, p.123. A rice-cake in a picture means something which one cannot obtain.

40. FMA, A.3.5.0-11, Des.No.1259, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara.

41. FMA, ibid., Des.No.1443, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara.

42. AMA, Mitsu Dainikki, 1929, Vol.I, "Instructions From The Head Of The Military Affairs Section To The Officers And Intelligence Officers Attached To The Legation In China", dated 17 August 1929.

43. FMA, A.3.5.0-11, Des.No.1443, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara.

44. Page one of the major metropolitan newspapers was devoted to commercial advertisement until the mid-'30s. The 'front page' in this case, therefore, implies page two of TN.

45. TN, 19 June 1930, p.2. Tanaka had written a similar report on his 'interview' with Chiang at the time of the Tsinan incident two years earlier and this was a very sympathetic article towards Chiang who faced a difficult situation at the time. See TN, 8 May 1928, p.2. References to the personal aspects had been very common in the Japanese press before the Second World War.

46. FMA, A.3.5.0.10, Des.No.509.

47. TA, 7 July 1930, p.2.

48. FMA, A.3.5.0.10, Des.No.720.

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49. TN, 16 July 1930, p.2.

50. FMA, A.3.5.0.10, Des.No.302.

51. The Centre had several advisers from the outside world including former Prime Minister Kiyoura Keigo and former - and later again - Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya.

52. TN article, "The Tokyo Nichinichi No.20,000: No.IV", 30 April 1932, p.5. See also Tōnichi Nanajūnenshi, p.226. Neither of them states what was exactly decided on the railway question.

53. Ibid.

54. FMA, A.1.1.0.1-13, Des.No.24, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara; Des.Nos. 30 and 40, from Hayashi to Shidehara dated 18 and 22 January respectively; Des.No.614, from Hayashi to Shidehara, 24 December 1930 etc.

55. See for example FN, 16 January 1931, evening edition, p.1.

56. TA, 24 January 1931. This leader was specifically directed at the 'railway negotiations' which was conducted in strict secrecy between Chang Hsueh-liang and the South Manchuria Railways.

57. FMA, A.1.1.0.1-13, Des.No.71. See also Des.No. 102 in the same file, from Hayashi to Shidehara dated 16 February 1931. The latter claimed that the Japanese language newspapers at Mukden which had been more anti-Chinese than the newspapers in Japan did not publish the controversial 'telegrams' because the Rengō head office had never sent the copies of these 'telegrams' to Mukden. Rengō normally collected all the reports from its branch offices first and sent them back to all the offices as well as its clients.

58. FMA, A.3.5.0.13, "Withdrawal Of The Access Allowed To The Correspondents To The Negotiation Bureau Of The Manchuria Railways", from the Police Bureau Chief to the vice Foreign Minister etc. dated 9 February 1931.

59. See for example TA and TN, 3 March 1931, evening edition, p.1.

60. FMA, A.1.1.0.1-13, Des.No.182. For the inability of the consulates to control the correspondents and the subsequent protests from the Chinese governments, see ibid., Des.No.207, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara. See also FMA, A.3.6.0.3, Des.No. 368, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara dated 7 April 1931.

61. See for example, TA, 6 April 1931, p.2.

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62. TA, for example, wrote a leader on this subject condemning the Chinese government. See TA, 15 April 1931.

63. FMA, A.3.6.0.3, Des.No.405. On 20 April, Shigemitsu reported to Shidehara that the English language newspaper, the China Press, had cited over twenty false reports by Rengō since May 1930. See ibid., Des.No.407. It may not have been the main reason for the 'fabrication' of telegrams by Rengō, but the news agency had been pressed hard by the popularity of the 'sensational' Dentsū despatches among the newspapers in Japan which were their clients. Rengō had been engaged in the expansion of the domestic market in a much more aggressive way than before since its acquisition of the 'domestic only' news agency, Teikoku Tsūshinsha, in March 1929. For the detailed account, see Furuno Inosuke, pp.160-166. Hajima, p.16, cites that in 1927, Dentsū had circa 650 clients while Rengō had 350 approximately.

64. For the press accounts of the continuing conflict between the two parties, see TA, 2 May 1931, p.2 and 5 May 1931, evening edition, p.1 etc.

65. For the detailed account of the Japanese attitudes towards the Korean immigrants, see Lytton Report, pp.61-63. For the 'internationalisation' of this issue, see FMA, A.1.1.0.20-3, Vol.VII, Des. No.2951, from the Head of the Police Bureau of the Kwantung Government General to Shidehara, dated 11 July 1931. The overreaction by the Army to this incident and the following Nakamura incident led even the Emperor to summon the Prime Minister for questioning. See Yabe Teiji (ed.), Konoe Ayamaro, Kōbundo, 1952, p.194.

66. FN, 13 July 1931. See also TA and TN, 7 July 1931 for similar opinions. A.M. Young who was the editor of the English language newspaper, the Japan Chronicle, published in Kobe at the time, confirms the 'sensationalisation' of the initial issue, but does not mention its ironical effect. See A.M. Young, Imperial Japan: 1926-1938, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1938, pp.74-75.

67. The Intelligence Office of the Kirin Province was quoted by the Japanese consulates at Kirin and Mukden to have notified its entire police forces that the killing of any Japanese intelligence officer could be carried out as 'self-defence'. See FMA, D.2.6.0.32, Des.No.892, from Consul General at Chientao, Okada, to Shidehara, 29 August 1930.

68. Mori Katsumi, op.cit., p.54. The 'informal advice' was prompted, according to Mori, because of the publication of a telegram on the murder on 25 July by TN which had obtained the information from the South Manchuria Railways. For the initial efforts by

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(68.) the Foreign Ministry to prevent the leak of this news, see FMA, D.2.6.0.32, Des.No.301, from Councillor Yano to Shidehara, 24 July 1931; No.429, from Shidehara to Hayashi, 25 July 1931; No.486, from Hayashi to Shidehara, 31 July 1931 etc.

69. TA, 5 August 1931, p.2. As to the criticism of the Army's retrenchment plan, see TA, 18 June 1931; "Issue Of Civilian Ministers For the Service Ministries", Kaizō, August 1931 etc. Earlier in May, TA serialised a symposium entitled 'Round Table Talk On The Administrative And Financial Readjustment' participated by experts from every sphere except the military authorities. This subsequently led to a physical threat to the chairman of the symposium and TA's chief editor, Ogata, from an army officer who regarded it as a 'trial in absence' largely because of the 'anti-Army' sentiment expressed at the meeting. Ogata in turn made 'the last direct plea by a newspaper editor to the Army Minister' before the Second World War for his reassurance not to resort to such extreme means. See Ogata, "Ardent Wish Of An Old Soldier: Freedom Of Speech Is Everything", Bungeishunjū, extra edition, December 1953, pp.27-28. See also Asahi Shinbun no Kyūjunen, Asahishinbunsha, 1969, pp.359-361. For the actual comments by the participants of the symposium, see TA, 16 May 1931 etc.

70. Harada Kumao, op.cit., oral statement on 7 August 1931, pp.18-19.

71. The last examples which defended the 'Shidehara Diplomacy' were Matsumoto Tadao, "Inquiry Into The Essence Of The Shidehara Diplomacy", Gaikōjihō, No.627, 15 January 1931, p.104; Sotomatsu Mōa, "Forceful Dipkomacy Or Weak Diplomacy?", Kokusaichishiki, March 1931, p.19 etc.

72. See for example, Hashimoto Masukichi, "Consequence Of The Manchuria And Mongolia Issue", Gaikōjihō, No.632, April 1931, p.78 and "Chinese Situation And Our National Policy", Gaikōjihō, No.642, 1 September 1931, p.22; Satō Yōnosuke, "Mistaken Manchuria Policy", Gaikōjihō, No.627, 15 January 1931, pp.36-48 and "Observation For The Settlement Of The Manchuria And Mongolia Issue", Gaikōjihō, No.641, 15 August 1931, pp.87-98 etc.

73. FMA, A.1.1.0.1-13-1, Des.No.135, from the Consul General at Hankow, Sakane, to Shidehara, 17 February 1931. This was important because the relative importance of the chief editor within the editorial department had been steadily declining and that of the heads of the subdivisions increasing in proportion to the growing degree of commercialization of the newspapers. TA had eight sections within the department including China, foreign affairs, economics and politics in 1928. For these see Ogawa Setsu, op.cit., p.23 and Niinobe Shuzo, Asahi no Buchō San: Asahi Shinbun o Okoshita Hitobito, Harashobō, 1972, p.3.

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74. TN, 6 August 1931. See also TA, 5 and 6 August 1931.

75. Sasa Hiroo, "Sino-Japanese Crisis Near", Kaizō, October 1931, p.143. See also "Reflection On The Manchuria And Mongolia Issue", Chūōkōron, October 1931.

76. See for example, TA, TN and FN, 18 August - 5 September 1931, pp.1 and 2.

77. Sasa, Kaizō, October 1931, p.143.

78. Rōyama Masamichi, "Aggravation Of The Manchuria And Mongolia Issue", Chūōkōron, October 1931, p.111.

79. For this minority view, see for example, Nakabayashi Yoshio, "Changing Manchuria And Mongolia Policy", Chūōkōron, August 1931, pp.50-51; Hasegawa Nyozekan, "Deterioration Of The Sino-Japanese Relationship And The Deadlock Of The Capitalist War", Kaizō, October 1931, p.52; "Uneasy Feelings", Kaizō, October 1931 etc. In contrast, the Jiron column editor of Gaikōjihō, Hanzawa Gyokujō, seemed to have assumed the role of a 'crusader' of Japanese diplomacy and began to advocate the employment of actual force to 'rescue the Chinese people'. See Hanzawa, "Uneasy Sino-Japanese Relationship", Gaikōjihō, No.642, 1 September 1931, p.3. Gaikōjihō's 'leader' column called Kantōgen disappeared in July 1931 and the Jiron column became the most important column of the journal.

80. Yabe Teiji (ed.), op.cit., pp.191-193; Kido Kōichi, op.cit., p.89; Ogata Taketora, Bungeishunjū, Dec.1953, pp.27-28 etc. Ogata, Takaishi and Iwanaga Yūkichi of Rengō were invited by some of the top Army officials to discuss the press attitudes towards the Manchuria issue and Ogata expressed his steadfast opposition to any hasty military adventurism at the meeting in contrast to Takaishi's willingness to support the Army's Manchuria policy.

81. TN, 5 September 1931. For a similar view by FN, see FN, 13 September 1931.

82. FMA, D.2.6.0.32, the Army Staff leaflet entitled, "Summary Of The Captain Nakamura Incident", preface.

83. FMA, D.2.6.0.32, Des.No.523, from Kamimura at Nanking to Shidehara, 6 September 1931.

84. FMA, D.2.6.0.32, Des. No.190, from Shidehara to Hayashi.

85. FMA, D.2.6.0.32, Des.No.939, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara, 15 September 1931.

86. Furuno Inosuke, pp.168-170.

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1. The staff of these telecommunication offices were not allowed to send any telegrams except those released through Major Mitani of the Kwantung Army for the first two days and to have ignored this order would have resulted in death. See Mori Katsumi, op.cit., p.85. See also FMA, A.1.1.0.21, Des. No.113, from Consul at Chanchung Tashiro to Shidehara, 22 September 1931. Correspondents in other areas of China on the other hand were refused access to telecommunication by the Chinese government for at least a few weeks after the Mukden incident. See FMA, A.1.1.0.21-4-4, Des.No.1357, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara, 2 December 1931.

2. Quoted in Imai Yukihiko, Tsūshinsha, Chūōkōronsha, 1973, p.129. See also Uchida Shinya, op.cit., pp.132-133.

3. For a detailed account, see Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., pp.349-357.

4. See TA and the Osaka Asahi, 20 September 1931. See also Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., p.362 and Kakegawa Tomiko, "The Press Freedom And Public Opinion In Japan, 1931-1941" in D. Borg and S. Okamoto, op.cit., pp.537-538.

5. W. Fleisher, op.cit., p.203.

6. TA, 6 October 1931.

7. Whether there was any 'improvement' is questionable, but this was how the press saw the situation. See for example, TA, 25 and 26 September 1931.

8. TA, 2 October 1931.

9. TA, 1 October 1931.

10. TA, 13 October 1931.

11. FMA, 1.1.0.21, Des.No.617 from the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army to the Army Vice Chief of Staff, 7 October 1931.

12. Mori Katsumi, op.cit., p.141. The top level Army officers might not have favoured too strict a control of the press. For this, see "Generosity of the Military Authorities On The Press", Chūōkōron, April 1932.

13. Kuwaki Somei, Rikugun Gojūnen Shi, Masushobō, 1943, pp.382-383. See also AMA, Man Mitsu Dainikki: Shōwa Shichinen, Vol.I, Des.No.298 from the Newspaper Unit to the Police Bureau, 16 December 1931.

14. "Summary Of The Work Carried Out By The Censorship Section Sine The Manchuria Incident", the Police Bureau, quoted in Awaya Kentarō (ed.), Dokyumento Shōwashi: Manshū Jihen to 2.26, Heibonsha, 1975, p.99.

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15. SK, Vol.41, February 1932, p.99.

16. Awaya Kentarō, op.cit., p.99.

17. Takamiya Tahei, op.cit., p.369.

18. "Expectations From The Imperial Reservist Association", Chūōkōron, October 1932.

19. Ito Takashi, op.cit., p.441.

20. TN, 30 April 1932, p.5.

21. Takamiya Tahei, op.cit., pp.59-60.

22. For the changing power balance within the governing circles, see Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., pp.349-357. For the actual arguments by the newspapers, see TA, 17 and 27 October 1931 etc.

23. Tagawa Daikichiro, "Manchuria Affair And The League Of Nations", Kokusaichishiki, November 1931, p.81. Ogata Sadako points out that the League of Nations Association in Japan was not totally committed to the cause and spirit of the League and that Tagawa's view was not the majority opinion within the association. See Ogata Sadako, "The Role Of Liberal Nongovernmental Organisations In Japan" in D. Borg and S. Okamoto, op.cit., pp.474-475.

24. The October 1931 editions of these monthly journals officially appeared on 1 October, but their content had clearly been decided before the outbreak of the Mukden incident and therefore they carried no comments on the latest development in Manchuria.

25. "The U.S. Participation At The Council Welcomed", Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No.1472, 24 October1931, pp.16-17. See also "The Business World Summary", Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No.1471, 17 October 1931, p.5.

26. Yokota Kisaburō, "The Manchuria Crisis And The League Of Nations" and "Forced Public Opinion", Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun, 5 October 1931, p.3 and 19 October 1931, p.2 respectively. The first of these two articles, according to Takeuchi Tatsuji, elicited a storm of protests and many threatening letters. Takeuchi also points out that the most vigorous criticism of the development in Manchuria was raised among labour circles. Both cases were, however, ignored almost completely by the commercial newspapers. For Takeuchi's comments, see Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., pp.362-364.

27. "Manchuria Incident And The Japanese Attitude", Kaizō, November 1931. See also "Independence Movements In Manchuria And Mongolia And Japan", Chūōkōron and "Japan Should Accept The Duty To File Countersuit And Join In The Protocol", Kokusaichishiki, both November 1931.

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28. Sasa Hiroo, "Stout Military Authorities And The Shidehara Diplomacy", Kaizo, November 1931, p.132. The '- - -... - - -' indicates that there were many missing characters.

29. Arase Yutaka, "Japanese Militarism And Mass Media", Shisō, September 1957, p.41. Mitsueda Shigeru, a former Chūōkōron employee, also describes the subsequent sales war among the major newspapers as the 'competition to propagate militarism'. See Mitsueda, Genron Shōwashi, Nipponhyōronsha, 1958, p.64. Dentsu, the news agency, clearly felt very proud to receive a letter of gratitude from the Youth Association of Tokyo for its 'outstanding contribution' to the arousing of patriotism among the people. See Dentsū Shashi, pp.855-857.

30. Itō Masanori, 1947, p.350.

31. Ono Hideo, 1948, p.235 and "Brief Radio Review", Kaizō, June 1936, p.192.

32. Itō Yasuo, "International Network Of The News Movies", Kaizō, March 1936, p.23.

33. Nakane Sakae, op.cit., pp.233-235.

34. Nishinihon Shinbunshashi, p.228.

35. See for example, Mitarai Tatsuo's remark in Okamoto Kōzō, op.cit., pp.382-383 and Zadankai, p.86.

36. On the Chinchow event, the telegram read, "The attack on Chinchow is extremely regrettable from the international point of view. We hope that Your Excellency will handle it with exceptionally strong determination". On the May 15 event, see FN, 16-19 May 1932. Compare these with the much milder tone of TA, 16-18 May 1932. Following this event, FN received regular visits from the local army and right wing organisations and one of its reporters was obliged to appear at the army headquarters at Kurume every week for at least three years. See Nishinihon Shinbunshashi, pp.228-229 and 234.

37. Zadankai, p.80.

38. TA, 27 October 1931.

39. See Hanzawa Gyokujo, "Matter Calling For A Prior Settlement In The Manchuria Issue", Gaikōjihō, No.645, 15 October 1931, p.6. and "The League Of Nations And The Manchuria Incident", Gaikōjihō, No.646, 1 November, 1931, p.7.

40. See TA, 19, 21, 24 and 26 November and 2 December 1931 and Hanzawa Gyokujō, "New Discussions On Sino-Japanese Friendship", Gaikōjihō, No.648, 1 December 1931. p.6.

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41. Uchida, "Japan's Withdrawal From The League Of Nations", Gaikōjihō, No.646, 1 November 1931, p.49. See also Horiguchi Kumaichi, "The Recognition Of The Manchurian Government", ibid., p.52. Horiguchi, a former diplomat like Uchida, went on to advocate the recognition of the new 'regime' in Manchuria which was reported to have been established.

42. Even in its September 15, 1931 edition, a letter appeared defending the Foreign Ministry which had been the focus of criticism by Hanzawa for some time. See Gaikōjihō, No.643, 15 September 1931, p.213.

43. See, for example, the letter from a soldier entitled "Conflict Between The Civil And Military Authorities?", Gaikōjihō, No.644, 1 October 1931, p.375; Murata Kumazo's letter, Gaikōjihō, No.645, 15 October 1931, p.212 etc.

44. Nihon Gaiko Gakkai, op.cit., pp.165-167.

45. Matsuura Sōzō, Shōwa Tokkō Danatsushi: Chishikijin ni Taisuru Danatsu, Taiheishuppansha, 1975, Vol.I, p.9. See also Kuroda Hidetoshi, Shōwa Genronshi e no Shōgen, Kōbundo, 1966, p.214.

46. See for example, Masuda Wataru, "All-Out Political Struggle", Chūōkōron, November 1931, pp.132-133. This was the last essay in the journal during the Manchuria crisis which quoted the opinions of the Chinese critics.

47. Nakamura, "Manchuria Incident And The Independence Of Supreme Command", Gaikōjihō, No.651, 15 January 1932, p.15.

48. Takayama, "Kasumigaseki And Miyakezaka", Chūōkōron, December 1931, p.190. The phrase jikan gaikō had never been used by any critics, at least in the major journals examined in this thesis. For another example of self-censorship, see Note 28 of this chapter.

49. See Chūōkōron, November 1931, pp.29-32.

50. For Inomata's actual argument, see ibid., pp.2-37.

51. For example, Arahata Kanson's "Withdraw From The League Or Ignore Its Advice" in Kaizō's March 1932 edition contained at some stages 111, 299 and 300 missing characters, thus making it impossible for the reader even to imagine what the writer was trying to say. Four months later, the same journal published Suzuki Mosaburō's "Manchuria Issue On The Life-and-Death Line" which also containednot a few passages which contained up to one whole line of characters missing. A typical line in this journal contained characters numbering between 65 and 75.

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52. Okamoto Tsurumatsu, "Renmei Gaikō And Tai Renmei Gaikō", Gaikōjihō, No.651, 15 January 1932, p.76. For similar examples, see Okabe Saburo, "Insight Into The Circumstances Of The Manchuria Incident", Gaikōjihō, No.646, 1 November 1931, p.10 and Ogawa Setsu, "How The Fundamental Solution Of The Pending Issues With China Could Be Settled?", ibid., pp.127-128.

53. Machida Shiro, "From Manchuria To Japan: Breathe The Air At Mukden To Understand Manchuria Correctly", TA, 27 January 1932, p.2. This essay was written on 17 January after Machida had travelled in Manchuria for three weeks.

54. See for example, Hanzawa Gyokujō, "Diplomacy Of The Inukai Cabinet", Gaikōjihō, No.650, 1 January 1932, p.2 and "Appointment Of Yoshizawa As Foreign Minister", Gaikōjihō, No.651, 15 January 1932, p.2.

55. See for example, TA, 6 and 9 February 1932.

56. Hanzawa, "Significance Of The Shanghai Incident", Gaikōjihō, No.653, 15 February 1932, p.8.

57. Matsui Hitoshi, "Looking At The Shanghai Incident Straightforwardly", Chūōkōron, March 1932, p.43.

58. Matsubara, "On The Recognition Of The New State In Manchuria And Mongolia", Chūōkōron, May 1932, p.33. For another example, see Yoneda Minoru, "Why Has Chinchow Become An Issue?", Chūōkōron, February 1932, pp.98-113. Compare this with his critical essay, "Manchuria Incident From International Point Of View", Chūōkōron, November 1931, pp.117-122.

59. See for example, TA, 21 November 1931.

60. See Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., pp.373-379.

61. On 23 February, Secretary of State, H.L. Stimson wrote to Senator Borah that the U.S. would not recognise the 'independence' of Manchuria. The major newspapers put on a brave face, at least outwardly, and condemned this letter almost unanimously. See for example TN, 27 February 1932. See also, footnote 113 of this chapter.

62. See Hanzawa, "Japanese Diplomacy After The Recognition Of Manchukuo", Gaikōjihō, 1 October 1932, p.5. Hanzawa had declared five months earlier that Japan had already withdrawn from the League 'spiritually', but never outspokenly challenged the League or the 'world'. See "The League Of Nations And Japan", Gaikōjihō, No.658, 1 May 1932, p.1.

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63. The editorial note column was called Henshū Yoteki (The Spare Ink of The Editorial Department) and was usually inside the back cover as in this case. No page number was provided for this page.

64. See Kamikawa Hikomatsu, "Rejection Of The Withdrawal From The League" and Tachi Sakutarō, "On The Withdrawal From The League", both in Kokusaichishiki, May 1932, pp.11-20 and pp. 2-10 respectively.

65. See for example, Tachi Sakutaro, "Recognition Of Manchukuo", Chūōkōron, September 1932, pp.14-15.

66. Sugimori Kōjirō, "What Should Japan Do?", Kaizō, April 1932, p.36.

67. "Manchuria Incident And World Public Opinion", Kokusaichishiki, December 1931. See also Ogata Sadako in D. Borg and S. Okamoto, op.cit., p.473.

68. "No Other Way Than Through Direct Negotiations", Kokusaichishiki, August 1932.

69. "Establish Our Manchuria Policy Promptly", Kokusaichishiki, July 1932.

70. "Saitō Cabinet And The Manchuria Issue", Kaizō, July 1932.

71. "Time For The Recognition Of Manchukuo", Chūōkōron, September 1932.

72. "Establishment Of A New State In Manchuria And Mongolia And Our National Policy", Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No.1488, 27 February 1932, p.13.

73. TA, 5 May 1932. This leader accused the government of its 'opportunism' in not giving full recognition to Manchukuo.

74. Machida, "Timing Of The Recognition Of Manchukuo", Kokusaichishiki, July 1932, pp.18-19.

75. Yanaibara, "On The New State In Manchuria And Mongolia", Chūōkōron April 1932, pp.18-30.

76. Yoshizawa Kenkichi, "Some Thoughts On The Current Internal And External Political Situations", Chūōkōron, October 1932, pp.92-101.

77. See for example, Sasa Hiroo, "An Aspect Of Japan's Diplomacy", Kaizō, September 1932, pp.94-96.

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78. Sugiyama, "On The Leader At Kasumigaseki", Chūōkōron, September 1932, pp.287-288. At this meeting, Lord Lytton proposed Japan's postponement of the recognition which, he said, would destroy the spirit of the Nine Power Pact etc.

79. Murayama Ryūhei Den, Asahishinbunsha, 1953, p.652. See also, Tokyo Saiban, Asahishinbun Hōtei Kishadan Kenkyūkai, 1962, Vol.I, pp.273-274 and 279, affidavits by Maeda Tamon and Ogata Taketora.

80. Sankakuten, TN, 3 May 1932, p.3.

81. Tesso, TA, 2 September 1932, p.3.

82. Ibid., 468 letters were received by Tessō in August 1932 and 26 letters were published. See Table I (Appendix).

83. Baba, "Exhortations to Journalism", the Yomiuri, 27 July 1932, p.2.

84. See Takeuchi Tatsuji, op.cit., p.389 and TA, 26 August 1932.

85. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Nihon Gaikōshi, Toyokeizaishinposha, 1942, p.478.

86. Harada Kumao, op.cit., pp.376-378. For the actual comments by the newspapers, see TA and TN, 1-3 October 1932, pp.1 and 2.

87. "Lytton Report", Kokusaichishiki, November 1932.

88. For example, see Itakura Takuzo, "Legal Formality Arguments Of The Lytton Report", ibid., p.35; Yamakawa Tadao, "On The Lytton Report", ibid., pp.12-13; Nishizawa Eiichi, "Lytton Report And Japan", ibid., pp.46-51 etc.

89. Suehiro, "Policy Towards The Lytton Report", ibid., pp.31-32. For his opposition to Japan's withdrawal, see for example, "Objection To Japan's Withdrawal From The League", Gaikōjihō, No.660, 1 June 1932, p.10.

90. Tagawa, "Manchuria Incident And The League Of Nations", Kokusaichishiki, May 1932, p.30.

91. Tagawa, "Spirit To Maintain The League Of Nations", Kokusaichishiki, December 1932, p.27.

92. Sugao Ichirō, "Establishment Of National Diplomacy", Kokusaichishiki, September 1931, p.57.

93. See the 'letters to the editor' column in Kokusaichishiki, July 1932, p.104 etc.

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94. Akiyama, "Lytton Report", Kokusaichishiki, December 1932, pp.83-84.

95. Taoka, "Understanding The League Of Nations", Kokusaichishiki, January 1933, p.64.

96. Midōsugi, "Where Is The Japanese Pacifism Going", ibid., p.66.

97. Ueda, "Lytton Report And The Current Situation In Manchuria And Mongolia", Gaikōjihō, No.673, 15 December 1932, p.222. For the criticism of the government from the requested contributors of this journal, see Hashimoto Masukichi, "On The Lack Of Understanding", Gaikōjihō, No.571, 15 November 1932, p.88. Hashimoto's view was in the minority opinion found in Gaikōjihō and the majority of its contributors supported the government's claim.

98. "Invitation To Kaizō Antenna", Kaizō, November 1932, p.189. The maximum length of each letter was more or less the same as that for Tessō of the Tokyo Asahi.

99. A letter entitled, "Guide The Journalism Back To The Right Path", Kaizō, December 1932, p.168.

100. Arai, "Behaviour Of Public Opinion Without A Public Opinion", Kaizō, April 1933, p.274.

101. There had been occasional contributions to this end such as Abe Shingo's "Newspaper Quarter On the Manchuria Incident" (Kaizō, November 1931, pp.36-39), but they were not systematic or comprehensive.

102. Baba, Chūōkōron, September 1932, pp.187-188.

103. Ishihama, Chūōkōron, October 1932, p.203.

104. Yamakawa Hitoshi, Chūōkōron, December 1932, p.229. See also the contributions to the same column by Omori Yoshitaro and Jōshi Shōken, Kaizō, January and February 1933 respectively.

105. FN, 11 October 1932.

106. FN, 5 October 1932.

107. Kakegawa, op.cit., p.540.

108. FN, 20 August 1932.

109. Takagi "Logical Conclusion Of The Manchuria And Mongolia Issue", Gaikōjihō, No.649, 15 December 1931, p.9.

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110. "Major Newspapers And Their Tendency", FN, 20 November 1931, p.1.

111. Shimomura, "Looking At The Domestic Situation Through The Manchuria And Mongolia Issue", Kokusaichishiki, December 1931, p.69.

112. No.100 of this booklet was published on 4 March 1932, making the frequency of its publication one in every 1.69 days in the period between 18 September 1931 and 4 March 1932. 116 groups and individuals received this booklet at the publication of No.62 on 11 February 1932 and they included; 22 newspapers in mostly Tokyo and Osaka; Rōyama Masamichi, Yokota Kisaburō, Takayanagi Kenzō, Kamikawa Hikomatsu and Tachi Sakutarō of Tokyo Imperial University; the League of Nations Association in Japan; Hanzawa Gyokujō, Nagai Ryūtarō, Nakano Seigō etc. See FMA, A.1.1.0.21-4-1-1.

113. See TA, 26, 27 and 29 February and 1 and 6 March 1932, p.2. and 27 February 1932, TA, evening edition, p.1.

114. TN, 5 March 1932, p.3. The head of the Japanese delegation at the League, Sawada, felt obliged to convey to Foreign Minister Yoshizawa on 19 February the criticism among the European newspapers of the Japanese correspondents who, they complained, almost totally disregarded their opinions. See FMA, A.1.1.0.21-4-2.

115. See FN, 24, 25, 27, 28 and 29 February and 1 March 1932, pp.1 and 2.

116. See for example, FMA, A.1.1.0.21-4-2, Des.No.1152, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara, 16 October 1931.

117. TA, 14 October 1931, p.2. For other examples concerning Rea's opinions, see TA, 24 August 1932, p.3 and FN, 17 November 1932, p.2 etc.

118. See for example, FMA, A.1.1.0.21-4-2, Des.No. 362, from Ambassador to Britain Matsudaira to Uchida, 11 October 1932.

119. Ibid., Des. No.507, from Saito to Uchida.

120. In the author's count, TA published at least four times as many quotations of this nature as either TN or FN in the eighteen months between September 1931 and February 1933. The Americans who were 'bought off' included Frederick Moore who was a correspondent for the North Atlantic Newspaper Alliance - a group of 23 small newspapers excluding the 'Hearst newspapers'; Francis Clarke, a sub-editor of the Atlanta Constitution whose opinions were in fact never quoted in TA, TN or FN. In Britain, the Embassy 'assisted' people like J.O.P. Blunt, a Shanghai correspondent of the Times, and O.M. Greene who had

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(120.) been speaking for Japan voluntarily. The Embassy paid for their research materials from then on. See FMA, A.1.1.0.21-4-2, Des.Nos. 111 and 115, from Consul General in New York Horiuchi to Uchida, 21 July and 17 August 1932 respectively; Des. No. 689, from Debuchi to Uchida, 28 December 1932; Des.No.70, from Consul General Wakasugi at San Francisco to Uchida, 17 July 1932; Des.No.222, from Saito to Uchida, 29 June 1932; Des.No.362, from Ambassador Matsudaira to Uchida, 11 October 1932 etc. For the actual quotations of these 'bought-off' people in the Japanese newspapers, see TA, 9 April 1932, evening edition, p.1; 8 October 1932, p.2; 20 OCtober 1932, p.3 etc.

121. For these details, see FMA, A.1.1.0.21-4-2, Des.No.557, from Kuriyama to Uchida, 24 September 1932. In Switzerland and Germany, similar attempts were made, but their 'success' was not confirmed by the Foreign Ministry. See, ibid., Des.No. 618, from Sawada to Uchida, 25 October 1932 and Des.No.115, from Obata to Uchida, 13 October 1932.

122. The editor of le Matin received 10,000 francs from the Foreign Ministry under the guise of 'reward' from TN. See ibid., Des.No.729 from Nagaoka to Uchida, 16 September 1932.

123. Ibid., a memorandum from Iawanaga Yūkichi of Rengō to Uchida dated 21 September 1931.

124. FMA, A.1.1.0.21-32, Des.Nos. 517 and 520, from Debuchi to Shidehara, 28 November 1931. See also, M.Vaughn, Covering the Far East (translated as Nihon ni Semaru Kage: Manshū Jihen - 2.26), Jikyoku Hyōronsha, 1937, pp.113-114 and Harada Kumao, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.148-149, oral statement of 30 November 1931. For the actual reporting by the newspapers, see FN, 29 November 1931, evening edition, p.1. Stimson was reported to have disapproved of the Japanese advance to Chinchow, but Shidehara was accused of 'leaking military secrets' to the U.S. by the Army and its supporters.

125. FMA, A.1.1.0.21-32, Des.Nos.819 and 829, from Nagaoka to Uchida, 23 and 27 October 1932 respectively.

126. Ishii Kikujirō, Gaikō Yoroku, Iwanamishoten, 1930, p.417.

127. For the detailed account of the principles, see Takeuchi, op.cit., pp.402-407.

128. See Ono Hideo, 1948, p.249.

129. Tōnichi Nanajūnenshi, p.244. Takada Motosaburo, the head of TN's make-up section from 1933, contends that although TN had come to be regarded by then as a henchman of the Army, the military authorities were still not entirely satisfied. See Takada, "Age Of Shortage In The Freedom Of Press", Gojūnin no Shinbunjin, Dentsū, 1955, p.310.

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130. FN, 18 February 1932, p.2. His essay was entitled "Great Misunderstanding: The League Of Nations And Japan", and was serialised from 17 February. He also contributed to FN throughout the Manchuria crisis from Geneva and elsewhere in Europe. See for example, FN, 29 July 1932 and 31 March 1933, p.2.

131. Dohashi Yūitsu, "Personal Views On The Withdrawal From The League Of Nations", Gendaishi Shiryō, Vol.41, Misuzushobo, 1973, pp.144-146. The newly arrived Japanese correspondents were also given a chance to make their own speech on the radio service which had been specially established by the Japanese national broadcasting corporation between Geneva and Tokyo. Their speeches for the 'domestic consumption' included, 'To The People Back Home' (Dentsū); 'Requests To The People Back Home And Our Determination' (TN) etc. See FN, 27 November 1932, p.1.

132. TA, 25 and 28 November 1932, p.2, both 'Rengō' telegrams.

133. See for example, TN, 8 December 1932, p.2.

134. Takamiya Tahei, op.cit., p.369. TA and Jijishinpō opposed to the withdrawal, but TN steadfastly advocated it. See TA and TN, 10-24 February 1933 etc.

135. See "Lytton Report", Chūōkōron, November 1932; "Establishment of An East Asian Monroe Doctrine", Chūōkōron, December 1932; "Lytton Report And Manchuria", Kaizō, November 1932.

136. For Hanzawa's views, see his "Japanese Diplomacy After The Recognition Of Manchuria (sic)", Gaikōjihō, No.668, 1 October 1932 etc.

137. Ogata Sadako, 1973, p.475.

138. Yamakawa Tadao, "Persuade The League Of Nations To The Last", Kaizō, March 1933, p.76. See also his "On The Application Of Article 15:4", Gaikōjihō, No.677, 15 February 1933, pp.1-10.

139. Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No.1535, 4 February 1933, p.6. For a similar view, see Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, "Question To Foreign Minister Uchida", Chūōkōron, March 1933, p.196. Kiyosawa's thorough criticism of the Uchida diplomacy received several dozens of sympathetic letters, thus proving the contention made by Tōyōkeizaishinpō to some extent. See Kiyosawa, 1942, p.490.

140. TA, 28 March 1933.

141. TA, 28 September 1933.

142. See for example, Itō Masanori, 1933, pp.474-479; Zadankai, pp.86-87; F.O.B., op.cit., pp.12-13 etc.

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143. Zadankai, p.79 and Kakegawa Tomiko, op.cit., p.540.

144. "Change Of The Articles Of The Association", Kokusaichishiki, June 1933, p.1.

145. Machida Shiro, "Sequence Of The Withdrawal From The League", Gaikojiho, No.684, 1 April 1933, pp.326-327. See also his "The League Of Nations And The Attitude Of The Smaller Nations", Gaikojiho, No.674, 1 January 1933, p.174. See also Honda Kumataro, "Japan's Determination Towards The League: Be Ready For the Vote Of 53:1", Gaikojiho, No.675, pp.107-108 and "Why Japan Needed To Withdraw From The League", Gaikojiho, No.679, 15 March 1933, pp.97-98; Royama Masamichi, "Lytton Report And The Course Of National Opinion", Gaikojiho, No.670, 1 November 1932, p.2 and "Reexamination Of The Broken International Mechanism", Gaikojiho, No.680, 1 April 1933, p.28.

146. Ogata Sadako, 1973, p.476.

147. Kiyosawa, "To Plenipotentiary Matsuoka", Chūōkōron, May 1933, p.167.

148. Yokota, "Criticim Of The Asian Monroe Doctrine", Chūōkōron, July 1933, p.96.

149. Murofushi, "Anti-British, Pro-American Argument", Chūōkōron, June 1933, p.127. For a similar argument by the editor, see "Creation Of A Crisis", Chūōkōron, December 1933.

150. Tōyōkeizaishinpō, No.1540, 11 March 1933, p.14. The column was called Anraku Isu ('Easy Chair') and had existed for some time but only for the editorial staff of the journal.

151. Matsuda, "Japan's Foreign Policy", Kaizō, June 1933, p.196.

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1. M.D.Kennedy, op.cit., p.188.
2. Kamiizumi Hidenobu, "Monthly Newspaper Review", Chūōkōron, November 1938, p.344.
3. Ono Hideo, 1955, pp.60-62.
4. "For The Sake Of Critics", Chūōkōron, August 1938.
5. Nakane Sakae, op.cit., p.116.
6. A symposium entitled "Politics And Newspapers : A Joint Declaration By The Three Newspapers", Shinbun Kenkyū, Vol.37, 1954, p.4.
7. See TA, 15 December 1930, p.2.
8. Tosaka Jun, "Control And 'Restraint' Of Culture", Kaizō, January 1937, p.329.
9. Itō Masanori, 1943, p.343.
10. Itō Takashi, op.cit., pp.439-440.
11. Arase Yutaka, "Formation Process Of The Monopoly In The Newspapers", Shisō, February 1944, p.42.
12. Ibid., p.39.
13. Yoshimoto Yasuo, "Some Questions Concerning The Broadcasting Corporations Owned By The Newspapers", Shinbun Kenkyū, Vol.29, 1953, pp.5-6.
14. Shimaya Ryōsuke, op.cit., pp.74-75 and 106-116.
15. Kido Mataichi, op.cit., pp.8-10.
16. Azuma Kōtaro, "Characters Of Newspapers And Their Personnel", Nipponhyōron, July 1940, pp.259-260.
17. Banno Masataka and Eto Shinkichi (eds.), Chūgoku o meguru Kokusai Kankei, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1968, p.234.
18. Taira Teizō, "North China's Autonomy And Student Movements", Kaizō, February 1968, p.283.
19. Mitarai Tatsuo, 1952, p.91.
20. Mitarai Tatsuo in Okamoto Kōzō, op.cit., pp.382-383.
21. See for example, Nishinihon Shinbunshashi, pp.228-229.
22. M.K.'s letter, Gaikōjihō, No.635, 15 May 1931, p.211.
23. See Chapter I, Note 36.
24. Aono Suekichi, "New Faces Of The Japanese Newspapers", Kaizō, August 1936, p.287.
25. Iwabuchi Tatsuo, "The Army And The Current Situation", Kaizō, August 1936, p.287.
26. Tōnichi Nanajūnenshi, p.244.
27. For the summoning, see P.C.L., "Contemporary Situation And Critics", Nipponhyōron, October 1937, p.306. For Kaizō's policy change, see Yamamoto Sanehiko, "Twentieth Anniversary", Kaizō, March 1938, pp.83-84.
28. Sukiya Bōjin, "Uneasiness Among The Newspapers", Nipponhyōron, June 1939, pp.200-203.

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APPENDIX

Table I. 'Letters To The Editor'

	Number of Letters Received by Tessō		Number of Letters Published (International Issues)		
	Total	From Tokyo	TA	TN	FN
1930					
January			32	21	
February			33	12	
March			28	26	
April			29	16	
May			28	6	
June			32 (1)	27 (1)	
July			32 (1)	27	
August			33 (1)	25	
September			30	21	
October			34 (1)	23	30
November			25	17	38 (1)
December			25	14	52
1931					
January			37	17	35
February			30	23	35
March			32	27	34
April			28 (2)	24	41
May	514		29	21	34
June	310		27	0	41
July	281		29 (1)	0	36 (1)
August	391		28	0	30 (2)
September	521	365	30 (1)	0	26
October	421	286	25 (1)	0	24 (1)
November	410	274	25 (6)	0	10 (4)
December	368	237	23	0	10 (1)
1932					
January	389	260	26 (1)	0	8
February	473	289	21 (1)	0	10 (1)
March	445	260	27	0	14

(Continued)

TABLE I (Cont.)

	Number of Letters Received by Tessō		Number of Letters Published (International Issues)		
	Total	From Tokyo	TA	TN	FN
1932					
April	504	307	26 (1)	0	19
May	592	405	26	36	13 (1)
June	625	331	26	48	20
July	448	293	25	43	11
August	468	315	26	24	20
September	452	281	24	41	16
October	351	264	26	40	18
November	338	209	27	34	19
December	305	198	22	36	16
1933					
January	272	161	26	42	11
February	342	202	24	41	5
March	487	295	29 (2)	33	8

Note 1: Tessō figures for 'Total' and 'From Tokyo' come from the monthly summary published in the column.

Note 2: Number of published letters are counted by the author.

Note 3: Figures in the brackets indicate the number of letters which discussed 'international issues', i.e. any letter which touched on matters related to diplomatic issues.

Note 4: The total number of letters published in Tessō was 395, 367 and 374 in 1927, 1928 and 1929 respectively, making the average monthly figure 32.92, 30.58 and 31.17. For Tsunobue (TN), the corresponding figures were 265, 251, 243 and 22.08, 20.92, 20.25.

TABLE II Disarmament, Kellogg-Briand Pact and Contributors

	Geneva (1927)	Kellogg-Briand	London (1930)	Total
Gaikōjihō				
SAKAMOTO Shuntoku	6	2	3	11
OZAKI Gō	0	0	9	9
OKAMOTO Tsurumatsu	3	2	3	8
INAHARA Katsuji	1	1	5	7
SHINOBU Junpei	0	5	2	7
YANAGISAWA Shinnosuke	4	2	1	7
HONDA Kumatarō	1	1	4	6
ISHIMARU Tōta	4	0	2	6
KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu	0	3	3	6
MATASUBARA Kazuo	1	3	1	5
YASUTOMI Shōzō	0	0	5	5
MATSUNAMI Jinichirō	0	0	4	4
TACHI Sakutarō	0	4	0	4
MACHIDA Shirō	1	2	0	3
NINAGAWA Shin	0	1	2	3
ŌYAMA Ujirō	0	0	3	3
YONEDA Minoru	1	0	2	3
AOKI Setsuichi	0	2	0	2
HIROSE Hikota	0	0	2	2
SEKINE Gunpei	0	0	2	2
TAKAHASHI Seizaburō	0	1	1	2
YAMAKAWA Tadao	0	2	0	2
Others (once each)	6	13	41	60
Total	28	44	95	167
Kokusaichishiki				
TAGAWA Daikichirō	1	1	9	11
ISHIMARU Tōta	2	0	8	10
MATSUSHITA Yoshio	0	0	4	4
MIZUNO Kōtoku	2	0	1	3
SHINOBU Junpei	1	2	0	3
TAKAHASHI Seizaburō	0	0	3	3
YAMAKAWA Tadao	0	2	1	3
KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu	0	2	0	2
KIYOSAWA Kiyoshi	0	1	1	2
OKAMOTO Tsurumatsu	0	1	1	2
RŌYAMA Masamichi	0	2	0	2
TERASHIMA Shigenobu	1	0	1	2
YASUTOMI Shōzō	0	0	2	2
Others (once each)	3	5	8	16
Total	10	16	39	65

(Continued)

TABLE II (Continued)

	Geneva (1927)	Kellogg-Briand	London (1930)	Total
Chūōkōron				
MIZUNO Kōtoku	3	0	1	4
KIHOSAWA Kihoshi	1	0	2	3
YOSHINO Sakuzō	1	0	2	3
ITŌ Masanori	0	0	2	2
Others (once each)	7	2	8	17
Total	12	2	15	29
Kaizo				
TAKAHASHI Kamekichi	2	0	0	2
YASUTOMI Shōzō	0	0	2	2
Others (once each)	0	2	14	16
Total	2	2	16	20

TABLE III Number of Publications Banned From Sale and Distribution

Year	Total	According to Newspaper Law	According to Publication Law
1925	947	175 (18.5%)	772 (81.5%)
1926	1,334	295 (22.1%)	1,039 (77.9%)
1927	1,582	355 (22.4%)	1,227 (77.6%)
1928	1,178	389 (33.0%)	789 (67.0%)
1929	1,589	442 (27.8%)	1,147 (72.2%)
1930	2,461	539 (21.9%)	1,922 (78.1%)
1931	3,451	876 (25.4%)	2,575 (74.6%)
1932	5,803	2,246 (38.7%)	3,557 (61.3%)
1933	4,877	1,733 (35.5%)	3,144 (64.5%)
1934	2,260	1,185 (52.4%)	1,075 (47.6%)
Total	25,482	8,235 (32.3%)	17,247 (67.7%)

Note: Reconstructed from Uchikawa Yoshimi (ed.), Gendaishi Shiryō, Vol.40, Misuzu Shobō, Tokyo, 1973, p.366.

TABLE IV Number of Publications Banned From Sale and Distribution

Year	Total	'Disturbance of Peace and Order'	'Corruption of Public Morals'
1925	947	225 (23.8%)	722 (76.2%)
1926	1,334	412 (30.1%)	922 (69.9%)
1927	1,582	547 (34.6%)	1,035 (65.4%)
1928	1,178	829 (70.4%)	349 (29.6%)
1929	1,589	1,309 (82.4%)	280 (17.6%)
1930	2,465 (sic)	2,171 (88.1%)	294 (11.9%)
1931	3,451	3,075 (89.1%)	376 (10.9%)
1932	5,803	4,945 (85.2%)	858 (14.8%)
1933	4,876 (sic)	4,008 (82.2%)	868 (17.8%)
1934	2,260	1,702 (75.2%)	558 (24.7%)
Total	25,485 (sic)	29,223 (75.4%)	6,262 (24.6%)

Note 1: Reconstructed from ibid., p.367.

Note 2: According to Shōwa Shichinen ni okeru Shuppan Kenetsu Gaikyō published by the Police Bureau, p.30, the number of publications banned for 'disturbing peace and order' was 158 in 1922, followed by a 'temporary decrease' between 1923 and 1925.

TABLE V Number of Publications Banned From Sale and Distribution According to the Newspaper Law

Year	Total	'Disturbance of Peace and Order'	'Corruption of Public Morals'
1925	175	154 (88.0%)	21 (12.0%)
1926	295	251 (85.1%)	44 (14.9%)
1927	355	331 (93.2%)	24 (6.8%)
1928	389	345 (88.7%)	44 (11.3%)
1929	442	374 (84.6%)	68 (15.6%)
1930	543	504 (92.8%)	39 (7.2%)
1931	881	832 (94.4%)	49 (5.6%)
1932	2,246	2,081 (92.7%)	165 (7.3%)
1933	1,732	1,531 (88.4%)	201 (11.6%)
1934	1,185	989 (83.5%)	196 (16.5%)
Total	8,243	7,392 (89.7%)	851 (10.3%)

Note: Reconstructed from Uchikawa Yoshimi (ed.) Gendaishi Shiryō etc., p.373.

TABLE VI Number of Publications Banned From Sale and Distribution According to the Newspaper Law

Month	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
January	5	1	31	17	26	206(5)	124
February	2	1	37	38(4)	31	269	148
March	13	1	34	27	30	245(12)	191(2)
April	24(1)	4	47	51	28	176	145(1)
May	17	6	32	64(2)	32	192(9)	222(2)
June	14	8(5)	36	38	41	100(2)	140
July	0	22	43	37(1)	64	200	
August	0	7	24	38	53	132	
September	0	21	23	36	78(3)	184(8)	
October	0	25	32	45	118(3)	182(4)	
November	2	21(1)	19	120(4)	246(10)	136(2)	
December	6	30	17	46	112	117(1)	
Total	83(1)	147(6)	375(0)	557(11)	859(16)	2,139(43)	

Note 1: Reconstructed from Odagiri Hideo, Shōwa Shoseki Zasshi Shinbun Hakkin Nenpyō, Meijibunken, Tokyo, 1965, Vol.I. Figures quoted by Odagiri are slightly different from those in Uchikawa although the sources used by them are the same, i.e. Shuppan Keisatsuhō and Shuppan Keisatsu Gaikan which were the internal circulars of the Police Bureau.

Note 2: Figures in the brackets show the number of times on which the eight biggest newspapers were banned. They were the Asahi of Tokyo and Osaka, the Tokyo Nichinichi, the Osaka Mainichi, Hōchishinbun, Chūgai Shōgyō Shinpō, Kokuminshinbun, and Jijishinpō.

TABLE VII Sale and Distribution Ban Placed on the Eight Major Metropolitan Newspapers

	Total	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933*
Morning Edition	60(31)	0	6	0	6	12(11)	31(18)	5(2)
Evening Edition	10(2)	0	0	0	5	1(1)	4(1)	0
Extra Edition	12(7)	1	0	0	0	3(3)	8(4)	0
Total	82(40)	1	1	0	11	16(15)	43(23)	5(2)

Note 1: Figures in the brackets indicate the occasions on which the eight newspapers (see Table VI, Note 2) were subjected to this treatment because their content concerned either the diplomatic or military matters which had been banned.

Note 2: * denotes that the figures are only up to June 1933.

TABLE VIII Sale and Distribution Ban Placed on the Tokyo Asahi, the Tokyo Nichinichi and the Fukuoka Nichinichi

	Total	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933*
Tokyo Asahi	8(5)	0	1	0	2	2(2)	3(2)	1(1)
Tokyo Nichinichi	7(5)	0	0	0	0	1(1)	6(4)	0
Fukuoka Nichinichi	9(8)	0	1	0	0	3(3)	4(4)	1(1)

Re. As in Table VII

TABLE IX Number of Suspended Matters Imposed on Newspapers and Journals

	Total	By Order	By Warning	By Informal Advice
1931	11	3	7	1
1932	64	44	19	1

From: Shōwa Shichinen ni okeru Shuppan Kenetsu Gaikyō, pp.69-74

TABLE X Content Analysis of the 64 Matters in Table IX and the Sale Ban Placed on the Publication of These Matters

	Number of Suspended Matters	Number of Banned Cases
Manchuria-Mongolia	27	259
Shanghai Incident	14	437
Military Secrets	7	39
May 15 Revolt	1	224
Others	15	121
Total	64	1,080

Note 1: For the source, as in Table IX.

Note 2: In 1931, 11 matters and 480 cases were reported.

TABLE XI Monthly Statistics of the 1,080 Cases Listed in Table X

Month	Manchuria-Mongolia	Shanghai Incident	Military Secrets	May 15 Revolt
January	10(1)	0	0	0
February	16(14)	187	0	0
March	19(18)	153	0	0
April	51(20)	3	0	0
May	0	20(5)	0	89
June	18(3)	2(1)	0	2
July	14(12)	71(70)	0	0
August	27(27)	0	0	2
September	76(53)	1	0	1
October	24(10)	0	39	0
November	0	0	0	0
December	4(2)	0	0	0
Total	259(160)	437(76)	39	94

Note 1: For the source, as in Tables IX and X.

Note 2: Figures in the brackets indicate the cases classified as 'diplomatic secrets'. The total numbers given for 'Manchuria-Mongolia' and Shanghai Incident' show the combined totals of 'diplomatic secrets' and 'military secrets' as classified in the same source. The 'Military Secrets' at the top of the table means those unrelated to these two issues.

TABLE XII Number of Publications Banned From Sale and Distribution According to the Publication Law

Year	Total	'Disturbance of Peace and Order'	'Corruption of Public Morals'
1925	772	71 (9.1%)	701 (90.9%)
1926	1,039	161 (15.5%)	878 (84.5%)
1927	1,227	216 (17.6%)	1,011 (82.4%)
1928	789	484 (61.3%)	305 (38.7%)
1929	1,179	565 (47.9%)	614 (52.1%)
1930	1,922	1,667 (86.7%)	255 (13.3%)
1931	2,518	2,233 (88.7%)	285 (11.3%)
1932	3,609	2,916 (80.8%)	693 (19.2%)

Reconstructed from Hashimoto Motome, Nihon Shuppan Hanbaishi, Kōdansha, Tokyo, 1964, pp.456-457.

TABLE XIII: Tokyo Asahi and Telegrams from China

Abbreviations: T.A.: Own Correspondents F.M.: Foreign Ministry
A.M.: Army Ministry N.M.: Navy Ministry
E.: Evening Issue M.: Morning Issue

Date \ Supplier		T.A.	Dentsū	Rengō	'somewhere'	F.M.	A.M.& N.M.	Total
1928								
4 May	(E.)	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
	(M.)	8	1	3	1	0	0	13
5 May	(E.)	4	0	1	0	0	0	5
	(M.)	14	1	2	0	0	0	17
6 May	(E.)	2	0	2	0	0	0	4
	(M.)	4	1	4	0	0	0	9
7 May	(M.)	6	0	2	0	0	0	8
8 May	(E.)	2	0	3	0	0	0	5
	(M.)	6	0	6	0	0	0	12
9 May	(E.)	3	0	3	0	0	0	6
	(M.)	9	0	4	0	0	0	13
10 May	(E.)	3	1	0	0	0	0	4
	(M.)	10	0	5	0	1	1	17
Total		71	4	36	1	1	2	115
1931								
19 Sept.	(E.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(M.)	8	7	3	1	0	0	19
20	(E.)	11	2	1	0	1	0	15
	(M.)	12	2	12	0	0	0	26
21	(M.)	17	6	6	0	1	0	30
22	(E.)	12	0	4	0	0	0	16
	(M.)	8	1	4	0	0	0	13
23	(E.)	9	1	6	0	0	0	16
	(M.)	11	3	7	0	0	0	21
24	(E.)	5	1	1	0	0	1	8
	(M.)	11	3	3	0	0	0	17
25	(E.)	5	2	4	0	0	1	12
	(M.)	10	6	0	0	0	0	16
Total		119	34	51	1	2	2	209

Note 1: Where there is only the (M.) sigh, the day was Monday, for there was no evening issue printed on a Sunday. The evening issue was dated one day earlier than the day of sale; the evening issue dated 4 May 1928 was actually printed and sold on 3 May 1928.

(Continued on next page).

TABLE XIV: Tokyo Nichinichi and Telegrams from China

Supplier / Date	T.N.	Dentsū	Rengō	'somewhere'	F.M.	A.M.& N.M.	Total
1928							
4 May (E.)	2	0	0	0	0	1	3
(M.)	9	0	2	1	0	0	12
5 May (E.)	4	0	1	0	0	0	5
(M.)	13	2	0	0	0	0	16
6 May (E.)	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
(M.)	5	0	2	1	0	0	8
7 May (M.)	6	1	1	0	0	0	8
8 May (E.)	3	0	4	1	0	0	8
(M.)	8	4	4	0	0	0	16
9 May (E.)	6	0	1	0	0	0	7
(M.)	9	4	5	0	1	0	19
10 May (E.)	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
(M.)	11	2	3	0	0	1	17
Total	76	13	25	4	1	4	123
1931							
19 Sept. (E.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(M.)	1	6	0	0	0	0	7
20 Sept. (E.)	20	5	6	0	0	0	31
(M.)	9	2	3	0	0	1	15
21 Sept. (M.)	10	3	6	0	0	0	19
22 Sept. (E.)	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
(M.)	8	6	7	0	0	0	21
23 Sept. (E.)	6	2	5	0	0	1	14
(M.)	5	1	3	1	0	0	10
24 Sept. (E.)	2	1	2	1	0	0	6
(M.)	7	3	3	0	0	0	13
25 Sept. (E.)	3	2	0	0	0	0	5
(M.)	2	1	2	0	0	0	5
Total	74	34	37	2	0	2	149

Abbreviations: T.N.: Own Correspondent; forthe others, see Table XIII
(Notes continued from p. 308)

Note 2: The abbreviations (p.308) apply to Tables XIV and XV also.

Note 3: As these two periods were when the two big events, i.e. the Tsinan Incident and the Mukden Incident, took place, these newspapers printed and distributed several extra editions (gōgai). These free extra editions are not taken into account here however.

TABLE XV: Fukuoka Nichinichi and Telegrams from China

Supplier / Date	F.N.	Dentsū	Rengō	'somewhere'	F.M.	A.M.& N.M.	Total
1928							
4 May (E.)	0	3	2	1	0	2	8
(M.)	3	4	1	1	0	3	12
5 May (E.)	0	2	2	0	0	0	4
(M.)	0	4	3	0	0	1	8
6 May (E.)	0	6	1	0	0	0	7
(M.)	2	9	1	1	1	0	14
7 May (M.)	1	8	0	1	1	0	11
8 May (E.)	0	6	2	0	0	0	8
(M.)	1	16	5	1	1	0	24
9 May (E.)	0	3	7	0	0	0	10
(M.)	2	10	6	0	1	0	19
10 May (E.)	1	3	0	0	1	0	5
(M.)	2	10	2	0	2	1	17
Total	12	84	32	5	7	7	147
1931							
19 Sept. (E.)	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
(M.)	0	5	2	0	0	0	7
20 Sept. (E.)	0	16	17	0	1	2	36
(M.)	0	19	5	0	0	2	26
21 Sept. (M.)	3	21	12	0	0	0	36
22 Sept. (E.)	0	6	4	0	0	1	11
(M.)	0	5	6	0	0	1	12
23 Sept. (E.)	5	6	15	0	0	0	26
(M.)	0	12	11	1	0	1	25
24 Sept. (E.)	1	6	3	0	0	0	10
(M.)	1	9	8	1	0	1	20
25 Sept. (E.)	0	11	0	0	0	0	11
(M.)	0	15	9	1	0	0	25
Total	10	131	103	3	1	8	246

Abbreviations: F.N. Own Correspondent
For the others, see Table XIII

TABLE XVI Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press

Year / Month		1931 Sept. -Dec.	1932 Jan.- March	April -June	July- Sept.	Oct.- Dec.	1933 Jan.- Feb.	Total
American:	T.A.	23(23)	12(12)	2(2)	12(10)	12(12)	5(5)	66(64)
	T.N.	10(7)	2(2)	0	0	4(4)	3(3)	19(16)
	F.N.	5	3	0	5	3	3	19
British:	T.A.	24(12)	18(11)	3(2)	7(3)	17(5)	19(5)	88(38)
	T.N.	9(8)	7(5)	5(5)	2(2)	3(0)	5(0)	31(20)
	F.N.	9	19	0	5	12	11	56
French:	T.A.	13(9)	2(0)	1(0)	7(6)	5(5)	11(11)	39(31)
	T.N.	3(1)	0(0)	0(0)	1(1)	7(1)	3(3)	14(6)
	F.N.	7	0	1	0	9	2	19
Others:	T.A.	2(0)	2(I)	3(2)	0(0)	8(7)	4(1)	19(10)
	T.N.	3(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	7(o)	2(2)	12(2)
	F.N.	3	0	2	0	5	5	15

Abbreviations: T.A. - Tokyo Asahi
T.N. - Tokyo Nichinichi
F.N. - Fukuoka Nichinichi

TABLE XVII Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press

	Total	American	British	French	Others
Tokyo Asahi:	212(100%)	66(31.1%)	88(41.5%)	39(18.4%)	19(9%)
Tokyo Nichinichi:	76(100%)	19(25%)	31(40.8%)	14(18.4%)	12(15.8%)
Fukuoka Nichinichi:	112(100%)	19(16.9%)	58(51.8%)	19(16.9%)	15(13.4%)

TABLE XVIII American Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press

Year	1931	1932				1933	
Month	Sept. -Dec.	Jan. -March	April -June	July -Sept.	Oct. -Dec.	Jan. -Feb.	Total
In Tokyo Asahi							
N.Y. Times	5(5)	4(4)	1(1)	5(4)	3(3)	2(2)	20(19)
N.Y.H. Tribune	5(5)	4(4)	0	2(2)	4(2)	1(1)	16(14)
N.Y.W. Telegram	2(2)	1(1)	0	1(1)	1(1)	0	5(5)
N.Y.E. Post	4(4)	2(2)	0	0	1(1)	0	7(7)
N.Y. Sun	2(2)	0	0	1(1)	0	0	3(3)
Wash. Post	1(1)	0	0	1(1)	2(2)	1(1)	5(5)
Wash. E. Star	1(1)	0	0	0	0	1(1)	2(2)
Phil. Record	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	1(1)
Bal. Sun	0	0	0	1	0	0	1(0)
Hearst papers	2(2)	0	1(1)	0	1(1)	0	4(4)
For. Affairs	1(1)	1(1)	0	0	0	0	2(2)
Total	23(23)	12(12)	2(2)	12(10)	12(10)	5(5)	66(62)
In Tokyo Nichinichi							
N.Y. Times	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)
N.Y.H. Tribune	2(2)	0	0	0	0	3(3)	5(5)
N.Y.W. Telegram	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)
N.Y.E. Post	2(2)	0	0	0	1(1)	0	3(3)
Wash. Post	2(1)	0	0	0	0	0	2(1)
Wash. E. Star	1	0	0	0	0	0	1(0)
Wash. News	1	0	0	0	0	0	1(0)
Hearst Papers	0	2(2)	0	0	0	0	2(2)
Seattle Times	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0	1(1)
J. of Commerce	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0	1(1)
Harpers Mag.	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0	1(1)
Total	10(7)	2(2)	0	0	4(4)	3(3)	19(16)

(Cont.)

TABLE XVIII(Continued)

Year	1931	1932				1933	
Month	Sept. -Dec.	Jan. -March	April -June	July -Sept.	Oct. -Dec.	Jan. -Feb.	Total
In Fukuoka Nichinichi							
N.Y. Times	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
N.Y.H. Tribune	1	0	0	1	0	1	3
N.Y.W. Telegram	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Wash. Post	2	1	0	1	1	1	6
Wash. E. Star	1	0	0	1	1	0	3
Wash. News	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
Phil. Record	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
St. Louis Star	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
S.F. Monitor	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	5	3	0	5	3	3	19

Abbreviations:
N.Y. - New York
H. - Herald
W. - World
E. - Evening
Wash.- Washington
Phil.- Philadelphia
Bal. - Baltimore
For. - Foreign
J. - Journal
S.F. - San Francisco
Mag. - Magazine

Notes: 1 'Hearst papers' were normally referred to the newspapers owned by the Hearst family.

2 Only those journals which were specifically referred to in the three Japanese newspapers are listed here.

3 Figures in brackets show the number of times on which the telegrams concerned had been sent by the newspapers' own correspondents. The Fukuoka Nichinichi did not keep its own correspondents anywhere in the United States.

TABLE XIX British Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press

Year	1931	1932				1933	
Month	Sept. -Dec.	Jan. -March	April- June	July -Sept.	Oct. -Dec.	Jan. -Feb.	Total
In Tokyo Asahi							
Times	5(3)	3(2)	1(1)	2	2(1)	5(5)	18(12)
D. Mail	2(1)	2(2)	0	1(1)	4(1)	2	11(5)
D. Telegraph	3(1)	3(1)	0	0	1(1)	2	9(3)
Morning Post	0	2(1)	1	1(1)	0	1	5(2)
Observer	3	0	0	0	1	2	6(0)
D. Express	1	2(1)	0	1(1)	0	1	5(2)
S. Times	2	1	0	0	1	0	4(0)
News Chronicle	4(2)	2(2)	0	1	2	2	11(4)
D. Herald	0	1(1)	0	0	3(1)	1	5(2)
M. Guardian	1(1)	1(1)	0	1	0	0	3(2)
Sat. Review	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)
Spectator	1(1)	0	0	0	0	1	2(1)
W. End Review	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)
E. News	0	0	0	0	1	0	1(0)
19th Century	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0	1(1)
S. Despatch	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0	1(1)
E. Standard	0	0	0	0	0	1	1(0)
D. Mirror	0	0	0	0	0	1	1(0)
A. Quarterly	0	1	0	0	0	0	1(0)
Total	24(11)	18(11)	3(2)	7(3)	16(5)	19(5)	87(37)

Abbreviations: D. - Daily
S. - Sunday
M. - Manchester
Sat. - Saturday
W. - Week
E. - Evening
A. - Army

(Continued)

TABLE XIX (Continued)

Year	1931	1932				1933	
Month	Sept.	Jan.-March	April-June	July-Sept.	Oct.-Dec.	Jan.-Feb.	Total
In Tokyo Nichinichi							
Times	0	1	1(1)	1(1)	1	1	5(2)
D. Mail	2(2)	1(1)	0	0	0	2	5(3)
D. Telegraph	1(1)	1(1)	2(2)	0	0	0	4(4)
Morning Post	1(1)	2(1)	0	0	1	1	5(2)
Observer	0	0	0	0	0	1	1(0)
D. Express	2(2)	1(1)	1(1)	0	0	0	4(4)
S. Times	1	0	0	0	1	0	2(0)
News Chronicle	2(2)	0	0	0	0	0	2(2)
D. Herald	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0	1(1)
M. Guardian	0	1(1)	0	0	0	0	1(1)
Sat. Review	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	1(1)
Total	9(8)	7(5)	5(5)	2(2)	3(0)	5(0)	31(20)
In Fukuoka Nichinichi							
Times	2	3	0	1	5	2	13
D. Mail	2	1	0	0	0	3	6
D. Telegraph	1	2	0	1	1	2	7
Morning Post	1	5	0	0	1	4	11
Observer	0	3	0	1	1	0	5
D. Express	1	3	0	0	0	1	5
S. Times	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
News Chronicle	2	1	0	0	0	0	3
D. Herald	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
M. Guardian	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Sat. Review	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
'Star'	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total	9	19	0	4	11	13	56

TABLE XX French and Other Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press

Year / Month	1931 Sept. -Dec.	1932 Jan.- March	April -June	July- Sept.	Oct.- Dec.	1933 Jan. -Feb.	Total
In Tokyo Asahi							
French							
Journal	4(3)	0	0	1(1)	1(1)	2(2)	8(7)
Temps	2(2)	1	1	2(2)	0	1(1)	7(5)
Echo de Paris	2(1)	1	0	0	1(1)	1(1)	5(3)
Debat	1(1)	0	0	1	0	2(2)	4(3)
Matin	3(1)	0	0	0	1(1)	0	4(2)
Liberte	1(1)	0	0	1(1)	0	2(2)	4(4)
Soir	0	0	0	2(2)	1(1)	0	3(3)
Petit Parisien	0	0	0	0	1(1)	1(1)	2(2)
Petit Journal	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	1(1)
Populaire	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	1(1)
Total	13(9)	2(0)	1(0)	7(6)	5(5)	11(11)	39(31)
Chinese	1	0	3(2)	0	3(3)	3	10(5)
German	1	2(0)	0	0	1(1)	1(1)	5(2)
Russian	0	0	0	0	1	0	1(0)
Others	0	0	0	0	3(3)	0	3(3)
In Tokyo Nichinichi							
French							
Journal	1	0	0	0	1	1(1)	3(1)
Echo de Paris	0	0	0	0	1	0	1(0)
Debat	1(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)
Matin	1	0	0	1(1)	3(1)	0	5(2)
Liberte	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	1(1)
Petit Parisien	0	0	0	0	2	0	2(0)
Intransigeance	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	1(1)
Total	3(1)	0	0	1(1)	7(1)	3(3)	14(6)
Chinese	2	0	0	0	0	0	2(0)
German	0	0	0	0	6	2(2)	8(2)
Russian	1	0	0	0	0	0	1(0)
Others	0	0	0	0	1	0	1(0)

TABLE XX (Continued)

Year	1931	1932				1933	
Month	Sept.-Dec.	Jan.-March	April-June	July-Sept.	Oct.-Dec.	Jan.-Feb.	Total
In Fukuoka Nichinichi							
French							
Journal	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Temps	2	0	1	0	1	0	4
Echo de Paris	1	0	0	0	2	0	3
Debat	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Matin	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Liberte	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Soir	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Petit Parisien	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Petit Journal	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Populaire	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Total	7	0	1	0	9	2	19
Chinese	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
German	0	0	0	0	5	4	9
Russian	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Others	0	0	2	0	0	0	2

TABLE XXI Foreign Journals Quoted in 'Manshū Jihen ni Kansuru Ōbei Shinbun no Ronchō', Vols.91-100 (23 February - 4 March 1932)

Vol.	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	Total
U.S.											
N.Y. Times	1	1		1	1	1	1		1		7
N.Y.H. Tribune	1	1	1		1		1	1	1	1	8
N.Y.W. Telegram			1	1	1	1					4
N.Y.E. Post			1	1	1						3
N.Y. Sun			1	1		1	1				4
Brooklyn Eagle				1	1	1					3
J. of Commerce				1							1
Wash. Post				1						1	2
Wash. E. Star		1		1				1		1	4
Phil.Public Ledger				1	1		1		1		4
Phil. Inquirer									1	1	2
Balt. Sun					1	1	1			1	4
Ch.Sci. Monitor						1					1
L.A. Times	1						1				2
S.F. News			1		1						2
S.F. Examiner					1					1	2
Seattle Star				1							1
Seattle P.Intelligencer			1								1
Chicago Tribune				1					1		2
Chicago D. News				1					1		2
Oregonian						1					1
'Scripps Howard'				1							1
Total	3	3	6	13	9	7	6	2	6	6	61

(Continued)

TABLE XXI (Continued)

Vol.	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	Total
British											
Times		1	1			1		1	1	1	6
D. Mail		1									1
D. Telegraph		1		1		1		1			4
Morning Post			1					1			2
Observer		1					1				2
D. Express						1				1	2
S. Times							1				1
News Chronicle						1				1	2
D. Herald				1				1	1		3
M. Guardian								1	1		2
Total	0	4	2	2	0	4	2	5	3	3	25
French											
Journal		1				1					2
Temps		1					1	1		1	4
Echo de Paris		1					1				2
Debat			1								1
Matin		1	1								2
Others		1		1				1		1	4
Total	0	5	3	2	0	1	2	2	0	2	17

Notes: 1. Whenever a journal was quoted more than twice in the same issue, it was counted as one. The first quoted date was 19 Feb.1932 and the last 2 March 1932.

2. This booklet was compiled by the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.

TABLE XXII Telegrams from Geneva and Paris

	Total	T.A.	Rengo	Dentsu
Tokyo Asahi				
24 Sept. - 2 Oct. 1931 (Geneva)	23	13	6	4
14 Octo. - 26 Oct.1931 (Geneva)	108	49	45	14
16 Nov. - 12 Dec.1931 (Paris)	167	103	39	25
26 Jan. - 8 Feb. 1932 (Geneva)	69	34	11	24
18 Nov. - 22 Dec.1932 (Geneva)	394	183	129	82
16 Jan. - 26 Feb.1933 (Geneva)	351	144	123	84
Tokyo Nichinichi				
24 Sept. - 2 Oct. 1931 (Geneva)	41	9	24	8
14 Oct. - 26 Oct.1931 (Geneva)	91	31	43	17
16 Nov. - 12 Dec.1931 (Paris)	192	65	71	56
26 Jan. - 8 Feb. 1932 (Geneva)	43	14	17	12
18 Nov. - 22 Dec. 1932(Geneva)	334(4)	97	142(3)	95(1)
16 Jan. - 26 Feb.1933 (Geneva)	337	87	138	112
Fukuoka Nichinichi				
24 Sept. - 2 Oct. 1931 (Geneva)	30		13	17
14 Oct. - 26 Oct. 1931 (Geneva)	93		49	44
16 Nov. - 12 Dec. 1931 (Paris)	208		93	115
26 Jan. - 8 Feb. 1932 (Geneva)	57		16	41
18 Nov. - 22 Dec. 1932 (Geneva)	421(274)		168(127)	253(147)
16 Jan. - 26 Feb. 1933 (Geneva)	439(292)		127(109)	312(183)

Note: 1. T.A. and T.N. means that the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo Nichinichi received the telegrams from their own correspondents, resident or otherwise.

2. Figures in the brackets are the numbers of telegrams received from the special correspondents of Rengo and Dentsu who accompanied the Matsuoka mission to the League of Nations. Before this mission, the two news agencies had supplied the newspapers with only those telegrams received from their foreign contractors, i.e. Dentsu from UP and Rengo from Reuters, AP and Havas.

3. Only the telegrams in the morning and evening editions are listed. (Extra editions are not included).

TABLE XXIII China Issue and Contributors

	1 Jan.'27 -31 May'28	1 June '28 -30 Sept.'31	1 Oct.'31 -31 Mar.'33	Total
Gaikojiho				
INAHARA Katsuji	4	8	7	19
MATSUBARA Kazuo*	2	2	8	12
SUEHIRO Shigeo*	2	7	2	11
NAGANO Akira	5	4	0	9
ŌNISHI Sai	1	5	3	9
HONDA Kumatarō	1	3	4	8
KIMURA Masutarō*	1	5	2	8
ŌI Jirō	5	3	0	8
ŌYAMA Ujirō*	2	1	7	10
YOSHIDA Torao	2	4	2	8
FUNAKOSHI Mitsunojō	1	3	3	7
HASHIMOTO Masukichi	0	3	4	7
IZUMI Tetsu	1	1	5	7
SHINOBU Junpei*	1	6	0	7
YANO Jin'ichi	0	1	6	7
GOTŌ Chōtarō	1	4	1	6
KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu*	0	0	6	6
NISHIZAWA Eiichi	0	0	6	6
TACHI Sakutarō*	0	1	5	6
YASUOKA Hideo	2	4	0	6
FUJISAWA Chikao	0	1	4	5
IJUIN Kanekiyo	0	0	5	5
KASHIWADA Tadakazu	1	4	0	5
MATSUMOTO Tadao	0	1	4	5
NAKAYAMA Yū	1	2	2	5
NAOMI Zenzō	0	1	4	5
NISHIYAMA Eikyō	2	3	0	5
OGAWA Setsu	2	1	2	5
ŌTA Unosuke	2	0	3	5
OKABE Saburō	1	1	3	5
OKAMOTO Tsurumatsu	0	0	5	5
UCHIDA Teitsui	0	1	4	5
UEDA Kyōsuke	0	3	2	5
YAMAKAWA Tadao*	0	2	3	5
YONEDA Minoru*	4	0	1	5
Others (4 or less per person)	36	87	142	265
Total	80	172	255	507

Notes: 1. Note one is applicable to the other two charts as well.
2. * denotes a Doctor of Law.

TABLE XXIV China Issue and Contributors

	1 Jan.'27 -31 May'28	1 June '28- 30 Sept.'31	1 Oct.'31- -31 Mar.'33	Total
Kokusaichishiki				
TAGAWA Daikichirō	0	1	9	10
ISHII Kikujirō	0	1	5	6
OGAWA Setsu	3	3	0	6
ISHIKAWA Seitei	2	3	0	5
MATSUBARA Kazuo	0	1	3	4
SAITŌ Yoshie	0	0	4	4
TACHI Sakutarō	0	0	4	4
IZUMI Tetsu	0	2	1	3
KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu	0	0	3	3
NAGANO Akira	1	2	0	3
ROYAMA Masamichi	0	1	2	3
SHINOBU Junpei	0	1	2	3
TAKEUCHI Fumiaki	0	3	0	3
YAMAKAWA Tadao	0	0	3	3
KIMURA Masutarō	0	2	0	2
NISHIYAMA Eikyū	0	2	0	2
ODA Man	0	1	1	2
UEHARA Etsujirō	1	1	0	2
YOKOTA Kisaburō	0	0	2	2*
Others (once each)	13	13	25	51
Total	20	37	64	121
Chūōkōron				
YONEDA Minoru	2	2	2	6
KOMURA Shunzaburō	3	1	1	5
ROYAMA Masamichi	0	1	3	4
SUZUKI Mosaburō	0	3	1	4
KIYOSAWA Kiyoshi	2	1	0	3
NAGAI Ryutaro	1	1	1	3
NAGANO Akira	1	1	1	3
HIRANO Reiji	0	0	2	2
KAJI Ryūichi	0	0	2	2
KANDA Masao	2	0	0	2
KOMAI Tokuzō	0	0	2	2
MUROFUSHI Takanobu	1	1	0	2
NAGAOKA Katsuaki	0	2	0	2
SAITŌ Yoshie	0	0	2	2
SAKURAI Tadaatsu	0	0	2	2
TANAKA Kyūichi	0	0	2	2
Others (once each)	10	11	35	56
Total	22	24	56	102

(Table XXIV Cont.)

TABLE XXIV (Cont.)

	1 Jan.'27 -31 May'28	1 June '28- 30 Sept.'31	1 Oct.'31- -31 Mar.'33	Total
Kaizo				
HASEGAWA Nyozekan	0	2	4	6
KAJI Ryūichi	0	3	1	4
NAGANO Akira	0	3	1	4
SUZUKI Mosaburō	0	1	3	4
IKEDA Tōsen	2	0	1	3
SASA Hiroo	0	0	3	3
YAMAKAWA Hitoshi	2	1	0	3
MAEDAGAWA Ko-ichirō	0	1	1	2
NAKANISHI Inosuke	0	1	1	2
NAKANO Seigō	0	2	0	2
ŌTSUKA Reizō	0	1	1	2
RŌYAMA Masamichi	0	0	2	2
SUGIMORI Ko-jirō	0	0	2	2
SUZUE Genichi	0	1	1	2
UEHARA Etsujirō	0	2	0	2
YASUTOMI Shōzō	0	1	1	2
Others (once each)	5	18	17	40
Total	9	37	39	85

* Yokota's "Lecture on the League Covenant" consisted of 12 lectures and was published one at a time.